It's Shakespeare vs Molière in the African Union
The split between anglophone and francophone countries in the AU could resurface at next year's elections for a new Commission.
It is never admitted publically, but the divide between anglophones and francophones still at times besets the corridors of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa.
As 2016 is the year of AU elections – for members of the Peace and Security Council and for commissioners – the question can be asked if this issue will again rear its head.
Or will it be a trump card in the hands of compromise candidates from the minority language groups within the AU?
Anglophone and francophone countries make up two-thirds of the member states of the AU. The other official languages of the AU are Portuguese and Arabic.
Often key decisions within the organisation are influenced by the dynamics between these two groups of states. The tough competition for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) in 2012 revived this divide, which many hoped would be obsolete by now.
The tough competition for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission revived the divide |
|
The victory of South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma over the incumbent Jean Ping was seen by some as a victory for anglophone Africa over francophone Africa. The fact that the two main positions in the organisation – chairperson and deputy chairperson – are held by South African and Kenyan nationals reinforces this impression. Yet one may question the relevance of this division in contemporary Africa.
As the AU’s ancestor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was created in particular to fight the last bastions of colonialism, it seems paradoxical that the divide between its members results from the scramble for the continent by its colonisers. Moreover, the intrinsic reality of these linguistic blocks should be challenged. Are they homogeneous blocks? What if the divide among African countries lay elsewhere?
Legacy of two different colonial approaches
One of the issues that divide anglophone and francophone countries within the AU is their approach to the West and to their former colonial states, with francophones often accused of being too close to France. This divide, according to experts, lies in the differing natures of the French and British colonial regimes, which saw direct (French) and indirect (British) rule. This in turn had an impact on the profile of African elites at independence. British historian Michael Crowder noted: ‘The French did some encouragement to the formation of a native elite, which was absorbed into the territorial and federal administrative services, albeit not on a very large scale. The British on the other hand in the twenties and thirties actively discourages the formation of a class of Europeanized Africans, particularly at the level of the central colonial administration.’
 Most francophone states were 'granted' independence |
|
Under the indirect rule of the British Empire, the colonised populations were regarded as ‘indigenous’. However, under the French regime of assimilation, colonised subjects were often considered to be French, provided they spoke the language and adhered to French cultural values.
This allowed several future heads of state in francophone Africa to start their political careers in the French parliament before independence. Former Ivorian president Felix Houphouet-Boigny, for example, was a French parliamentarian before becoming the leader of an independent Côte d’Ivoire. These crucial differences in colonial rule also had an impact on the relationship between the post-colonial elites and the international community, and were visible inside the OAU.
Except for Guinea, which refused to accept the conditions of independence dictated to it by France, most francophone states were ‘granted’ independence by their former colonial masters. Political elites in francophone countries maintained close relationships with France and Belgium through a range of agreements, such as continued military cooperation and the presence of French officials in government structures. Thus their relationship with the West was less hostile. These newly independent states were mostly non-aligned, with a strong inclination towards the West.
In contrast, most anglophone states created their national identity in a struggle against their colonisers, led by national liberation movements. As a consequence, their political behaviour on the international scene – in the OAU and then the AU – is still shaped by this experience.
In addition, many anglophone states in Southern Africa obtained independence much later than francophone Africa, which also shapes a different experience vis-à-vis the West.
No clear-cut ideological divide
| During the Cold War the linguistic cleavage took a back seat |
|
During the Cold War, however, the linguistic cleavage inside the OAU took a back seat and the split was mostly between ‘moderates’, with allegiance to the West, and ‘progressives’. This divide was not clearly drawn along linguistic lines.
Most francophone states were ‘moderate’ while the ‘progressives’ were dominated by anglophone states such as Nigeria and Kenya. However, francophone Guinea and Mali, which turned towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, were also labelled ‘progressive’.
Meanwhile, the debate on the modalities of African unity also transcended the linguistic divide. The Casablanca Group, which gathered states favouring a total overhaul of the divisions left over from the colonial era, was heterogeneous. It included many francophone countries (Mali and Guinea), as well as Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Meanwhile, the Monrovia Group, which favoured stronger cooperation among the newly independent states, included Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC).
Contest for the OAU/AU chair
The anglophone–francophone divide often comes up when the organisation’s members prepare to choose a new leader for the AUC in Addis Ababa. Here, as well, the picture is nuanced. For example, Diallo Telli, the second OAU secretary general from Guinea, was nominated by Kenya. In 1978, the contest between William Eteki Mboumoua and Edem Kodjo – from francophone Togo and Cameroon respectively – was based on their supposed ideological orientations. The first was considered progressive while the latter was accused of being too close to Paris. Kodjo won the race and served as secretary general from 1978 to 1983.
The feud of 2012
To this day, the perception remains among anglophone states that francophone states are ‘not really independent’, due to their strong institutional links with France. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari recently voiced this opinion in public when he said in a French television interview in September 2015 that ‘France was still in charge in its former colonies’.
| Ping’s defeat was celebrated as a proxy victory against France |
|
There was also a prevalent view in South Africa during the 2012 campaign for the AUC chair that Ping – French educated and a Gabonese national – would be unable to oppose France’s intervention in places such as Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. Ping’s defeat was celebrated as a proxy victory a posteriori against France.
Many of the reports about the bid for the AUC chairpersonship in 2012 stressed that Ping was ‘largely backed by francophone countries’ while Dlamini-Zuma was supported by anglophone countries, yet the reality was much more nuanced. Several anglophone countries ‘defected’ from supporting Dlamini-Zuma. Then-Institute for Security Studies researcher Mehari Maru noted in 2012: ‘Some regional players such as Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya and Ethiopia had actually promoted Dr Ping with the aim of preventing actively Dr Dlamini-Zuma’s success.’ One of the reasons for this opposition was the fact that South Africa’s bid broke the unwritten rule that candidates for the position of chairperson should come from smaller states.
Similarly, many francophone countries did not support the Gabonese candidate. Countries such as Benin, Burundi and Chad apparently voted for Dlamini-Zuma despite alleged French pressure to vote otherwise.
| Not English, French, Portuguese or Arabic could be considered a uniquely African language |
|
Clearly, more often than not, contemporary African states define their foreign policy based on their own interests, rather than the linguistic community they belong to. Often the adherence is to regional blocks rather than language.
While Dlamini-Zuma was unconditionally supported by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Ping failed to gather the same cohesive support in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), eventually costing him the election.
Some have pointed out that not English, French, Portuguese or even Arabic could be considered a uniquely African language. Dlamini-Zuma has been known to insert paragraphs of Swahili into her speeches. Perhaps another solution to Africa’s language divide?
English dominates the current commission
The current AUC is characterised by a predominance of English-speaking personalities, with two English-speaking nationals holding the positions of AUC chairperson and AUC deputy chairperson.
Of the eight commissioners, four are from anglophone countries while two are from francophone countries. The split is more equitable among the eight directorates, where three are English speaking and two French speaking. Of the remaining three, one is headed by an Arabic speaker, one by an Ethiopian (Amharic speaker), and one is vacant. There is a striking imbalance in the organs reporting directly to the office of the chairperson: eight of the 11 bodies are headed by nationals from anglophone Africa, while the remaining two are held by French-speaking and Arabic-speaking nationals respectively. The cabinet of the chairperson is composed mostly of nationals from SADC countries, except for two nationals from Cameroon and the DRC.
Once again, the importance of the linguistic factor should be nuanced. One could also argue that the three prominent positions (AUC chairperson, deputy chairperson and commissioner of peace and security) are held by nationals from countries ruled by former national liberation movements (South Africa, Kenya and Algeria). As was stated earlier, such a trend historically disadvantages francophone states in West and Central Africa, which have had a different history.
French on the decline
| Countries such as Senegal have traditionally punched above their weight |
|
The decline of France as a major power on the international scene arguably has an impact on the influence that francophone states have on world affairs.
Many francophone states, with the exception of countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, are relatively small, economically weak and characterised by deadlocked political systems.
While some argue that this leads to less active diplomacy at the AU level, countries such as Senegal have traditionally punched above their weight in this regard. Senegal’s President Macky Sall is chairing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development steering committee and is seen as an important figure continentally.
Furthermore, the domination of English as an international language, to the detriment of French, also adds to the salience of the divide. In the daily life of the AU, the translation of documents and deliberations is a major issue. French-speaking officials often complain that, while they are eager to learn the language of Shakespeare, the reverse is rare. Thus, the language difference sometimes leads to a lack of understanding and political mistrust.
Is the divide between ‘anglophones’ and ‘francophones’ as relevant today as in the past? Clearly, despite many nuances, language differences still have an impact on attitudes that shape politics inside the AU. The next AUC should address this split by ensuring a more equitable distribution of positions inside the organisation.
