Illicit activities fuel extremism in the Sahel's conflict zones
The Nouakchott Process must be revitalised to address the illegal gold mining and arms trafficking plaguing the Sahel.
The Sahel region is facing complex security crises driven by extremism, farmer-herder conflicts and banditry. Violent extremism remains by far the major driver of violence. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel accounts for 51% of global terrorism-related deaths, solidifying its status as the epicentre of terrorism since 2019.
While the international community has focused on the violence, little attention is given to the illicit economies that enable and sustain it. Rampant unlawful gold mining and arms trafficking are driven not only by armed groups but by individuals and communities seeking to make a living or protect themselves.
Moreover, over 80% of the workforce in the Sahel is in the informal sector, often outside state oversight. Organised criminal networks, including violent extremists, exploit this and illicit activities for financial gain.
Armed groups also leverage activities as a governance strategy, embedding themselves in local dynamics to build a large recruitment base and local influence. As members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) drift apart, the African Union (AU) and Peace and Security Council (PSC) should revitalise the Nouakchott Process. They could also urge all member states in the region to adopt measures that shrink the resource and recruitment base of extremist groups.
The Sahel scourge
The region is home to the world's richest gold deposits, drawing global attention and facilitating illegal economies that thrive amid regional instability. According to a 2023 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, artisanal and small-scale gold mining, often criminal, accounts for about 50% of the region’s gold production. This robs the government of billions in revenue. Such activities play into the hands of groups that control mining communities and smuggling routes.
Lawlessness is driven not only by armed groups but by those seeking a living or protecting themselves
Over the past decade, criminal gangs, including bandits and violent extremists, have jostled for control of lucrative mining sites. With more than 1.8 million people in the Sahel relying on mining for their livelihoods, these groups capitalise on local vulnerabilities.
Movements such as Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province seize on governance vacuums, controlling territories and markets. They impose taxes and protection fees on miners and communities, ostensibly shielding them from rival groups but actually consolidating their own supremacy and their control over resource-rich territories.
In areas under their influence, JNIM – a coalition of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups including Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun, Macina Liberation Front and Katiba Serma – practises strategic governance to secure civilian support.
The group negates government regulations by permitting mining and logging in restricted natural reserves, often in hazardous conditions. This pragmatic stance garners local support, as miners and communities frustrated by bureaucratic delays in obtaining licences or restrictive state policies view extremists as enabling their livelihoods.
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, miners collaborate with armed groups out of necessity and preference, deepening extremist influence and undermining state authority. JNIM has vast membership across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, with an increasing foothold in coastal states such as Togo, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire. This enables it to control strategic routes to smuggle gold with the complicity of international criminal networks that benefit from the chaos.
Complex vulnerabilities
Illicit arms lie at the heart of the Sahel’s multifaceted crises. About 12 million illicit arms are circulating in West Africa, with seizures revealing diverse arsenal including small arms, live ammunition, improvised explosive devices, drones and rocket-propelled grenades.
Beyond Libya’s post-conflict stockpiles, reports show that weapon losses from the battlefield and diversions by corrupt officials are key sources of weapons. Markets reportedly thrive in tri-border towns such as Mallam Fatori (Nigeria), Tinzaoutine (Algeria), Téra (Niger), Murzuq (Libya), Gaya (Niger) and Porga (Benin).
Convergence of extremism and trafficking blurs the line between ideological and profit-driven motives
The demand for arms in the Sahel is not only from violent extremists, bandits and separatists, but from those forced to arm themselves due to inadequate state security. Armed vigilante groups are widespread, providing informal security for neighbourhoods and communities, including extremists who fight alongside state forces.
For instance, Burkina Faso’s Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland provides informal protection but often exacerbate violence. In Mali, vigilantes such as the Dan Na Amassagou and Pheul (Fulani) are locked in reprisal attacks over suspicion of the latter’s ties with JNIM forces.
The weapons used in these skirmishes are sourced from markets controlled by those who thrive on instability. Artisanal arms production is also rising, with 60% of weapons seized from civilians in Burkina Faso between 2016 and 2017 having been locally crafted.
Unlawful arms proliferation has obliterated opportunities for dialogue, leading to protracted inter-communal violence, farmer-herder crises and banditry. As arms flow in, people flee. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimates that about 5 million people have been forcibly displaced and another 33 million need humanitarian support – a large pool of people vulnerable to exploitation through forced labour, sex trafficking and migrant smuggling.
Youths disillusioned by the region’s crises have turned to substances. Low-cost drugs such as tramadol and other synthetic opioids are creating dependency and susceptibility to recruitment by criminal networks. JNIM’s affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, taxes cocaine- and opioid-smuggling routes.
The convergence of violent extremism with arms-, drug- and human trafficking along shared routes blurs the line between ideological and profit-driven motives, amplifying instability. Disrupting these networks requires targeted policies to strengthen border security, regulate artisanal arms production and address the socioeconomic drivers of community armament and youth radicalisation.
A continental response
The Sahel’s organised crime and extremism crisis stems not from a lack of legislation nor regional initiatives but from governments’ limited capacity to implement them. Vast ungoverned spaces, socioeconomic conditions breeding corruption and protracted insecurity enable illicit economies to thrive.
The AU could bring together AES and ECOWAS members to tackle transnational organised crime
Recent coups and junta-led governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, forming the AES, reflect decades of regional and continental failures to address crime and extremism drivers. AES commitment to withdraw from ECOWAS further fragments regional cooperation.
The PSC is uniquely positioned to lead coordinated responses, yet its efforts have been hampered by inconsistency, reluctance and the stalled plan to deploy a counter-terrorism force for over a decade.
The AU must prioritise engagement with AES countries, especially to resolve underlying conflicts such as Mali’s secessionist crisis and disrupt extremist and criminal structures that sustain illegal markets. Through its convening power, the AU could bring together AES and ECOWAS members to tackle transnational organised crime.
Revitalising the Nouakchott Process is viable only if the AU goes the extra mile in the Sahel. Success hinges on overcoming mistrust and addressing core problems through sharing intelligence, implementing joint border patrols and targeting criminal and extremist enclaves.
Coordinated hotspot assessments of trafficking routes and extremist strongholds are crucial to minimise civilian harm, while rigorous stockpile management can curb arms diversion through looting or corruption. Addressing socioeconomic drivers of crime is vital. The AU must mobilise funds to launch youth-centred economic development, especially in border communities, offering alternatives to illegal mining, smuggling and extremism.
