The PSC in 2017 - fewer discussions on African crises
An analysis of the work of the PSC in 2017 shows more meetings were devoted to thematic issues than to crisis situations.
In 2017 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) scheduled more meetings than in 2016 – based on its provisional programmes, the number of meetings increased from 111 in 2016 to 146 in 2017.
Yet an analysis of the work of the PSC this year shows that this did not translate into more decisions. More meetings were devoted to thematic issues than to crisis situations.
Figure 1: PSC meetings in 2017
Fewer meetings on crisis situations
This increase in the number of meetings comes at the same time as a critical shift in the functioning of the PSC. While crisis situations still constituted a substantial part of its meetings, their share decreased from 40% in 2016 to 27% in 2017.
| Figure 2: On the PSC’s agenda in 2017 |
Figure 3: Situations on the agenda of the PSC 2017 |
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In 2017 the PSC spent more time discussing field missions and preparing for meetings with partners than in 2016. If the field missions and preparatory discussions are added to the total, the percentage of sessions devoted to crises drops from 43% to 35%, owing to the greater number of preparatory meetings in 2017.
East Africa and the Horn still dominate
Somalia and the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan still dominate the agenda of the PSC, constituting 47% of its meetings on crises. 2017 also saw the PSC paying more attention to instability in the Sahel (17%), with more meetings focussing on the Lake Chad Basin and especially Mali, which tended to be overlooked the previous year.
The political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was addressed more often this year, with more meetings focussing on the crisis than in 2016. In contrast, the number of meetings on Burundi dropped sharply, with only two meetings scheduled in 2017. Neither of these meetings saw a briefing on the dynamics of the crisis.
Subsidiarity still rules
Despite the overall increase in the number of meetings, the PSC’s stance on various crises did not change. Except for Somalia, the PSC is not on the front line in terms of managing most crises on the continent. In this regard, 2017 saw the continuation of the trend towards the regional management of crises in which the PSC supports and aligns itself with regional initiatives, either in peace support operations (G5 Sahel Joint Force) or in mediation (the East African Community [EAC] in Burundi, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD] in South Sudan).
An illustration of this was its decision on the situation in the DRC on 23 August 2017, which replicated the communiqué of the 37th SADC summit of heads of state and government adopted three days earlier. Not only did the PSC communiqué use the same language regarding sanctions by non-African actors but it also reiterated the call from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the appointment of a regional special envoy. This was despite the presence of an African Union (AU) special envoy on the ground and the risk of duplicating functions.
Problematically, this subsidiarity means that the PSC has limited leverage in influencing regional efforts. In Burundi, despite many calls in 2016, the PSC has still not been briefed on the developments in the EAC mediation led by former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa. In South Sudan, IGAD appointed a special envoy despite the fact that former AU Commission chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré is already there as the AU’s Special Envoy.
Meanwhile, the political crises in Cameroon, Togo and Zimbabwe went unaddressed at the level of the PSC.
More policy issues on the agenda
In 2017 the PSC was more oriented towards policy issues, with many follow-up meetings on the Master Roadmap to Silencing the Guns by 2020; the functioning of certain pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), such as the Panel of the Wise, the subsidiary bodies of the PSC and the African Standby Force; and terrorism. An illustration of this trend is the fact that more thematic meetings were followed by communiqués – which are binding – and fewer by non-binding press statements. In fact, there were more communiqués following thematic meetings (23) than crisis briefings (11). These thematic communiqués were mostly requests to the AU Commission for further action, and not actual decisions.
No increase in number of decisions
Figure 4: 'Decisions' by the PSC in 2017
The number of decisions by the PSC remained relatively stable, with 14 decisions taken in 2017 and 13 in 2016. Despite its having fewer meetings on crises, these are still the main reason for concrete decisions by the council. Nine decisions out of the 14 were about crises in The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Darfur, Somalia, Western Sahara and South Sudan, as well as the Lord’s Resistance Army.
The PSC also decided to reactivate all its subsidiary bodies in March.
Another critical decision was the call on the Panel of Wise to make quarterly briefings to the PSC in order to enhance conflict prevention and early warning capacity, in a context where the body very seldom addresses crises before they escalate.
Contrary to 2016, the renewal/extension of mandates constituted only 20% of decisions, against 38% the year before. One-third of decisions were about policy directions in South Sudan, the Western Sahara, Somalia and The Gambia, while five decisions were about the functioning of APSA: the subsidiary bodies of the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and early warning. The PSC also decided on the deployment of three field missions – to Guinea-Bissau, Western Sahara and Darfur – but only implemented the latter.
