What should Africa bank on from Bankole’s second term?
Amid current constraints and conditions, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security department must reconsider its priorities.
On 14 February 2025, His Excellency Ambassador Bankole Adeoye was re-elected as the African Union (AU) PAPS commissioner for a second four-year term. The increased number of votes in his favour reflects member states’ confidence in his ability to drive the continent’s peace, security and governance efforts and to achieve sustainable stability amid serious challenges.
The global and continental context in which he will work has changed considerably since his first election. There are major shifts in the actions of, and relations among, the major powers — the United States, China and Russia. These countries have also been prompted by domestic issues to focus more on their own interests and priorities than in the past.
Across the continent, security and governance threats have continued to worsen. These include ongoing armed conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and widespread, deadly violent extremism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Africa is also experiencing complex post-coup transitions and a spike in democratic backsliding. More than 45 million people have been displaced, resulting in dire humanitarian situations in major conflict hotspots.
Across the continent, security and governance threats have continued to worsen
For a continent that depends heavily on external support to contain such trends, the dichotomy of donor shifts vis-à-vis the worsening situation places policy actors in difficult situations. They have to renew their efforts, be innovative and, most importantly, reprioritise to adapt to the prevailing environment. PAPS is one of the AU structures most affected by these conditions and, given the renewed mandate of the commissioner, this is an opportune time to recalibrate its focus to ensure the most tangible results and optimal use of limited resources.
PAPS priorities
Over the last five years, a coup wave has disrupted constitutional order in many AU member states, including Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan. There has been unprecedented resistance from coupmakers to regional and continental norms, indicating that the continental zero-tolerance policy, which involves suspending and sanctioning defaulting members, has lost momentum. The Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) inconsistencies in response to these issues, together with its limited operational and financial capacities, have been mentioned repeatedly. This is compounded by the lack of robust entry points for engaging with transitioning countries, which has weakened the AU’s presence on the ground.
This necessitates a rethink of existing responses and approaches, and underscores the need for PAPS to elevate this challenge as a strategic priority. Its leadership is required to drive efforts to resolve the disconnect between continental norms and the complexities surrounding post-coup transitions. It also needs to spearhead collective action to manage the crises in Sudan and the DRC, and to contain the violent extremism trend in the Sahel.
In addition, democratic backsliding has been noticeable across the continent over the last decade. Smooth democratic power alternations in Ghana, Botswana, and Nigeria have instilled hope, but many African countries are still struggling to entrench democracy. State capture through third terms and disputed elections have become increasingly common.
AU silence on third terms and its lack of critical assessment of elections have been noted
The AU’s silence on third terms, the lack of critical assessment of elections and the tendency for short-term support for efforts to consolidate democracy have been noted. Its struggles to foster democratic polls have created a widespread perception that elections are merely elite recycling exercises. At the same time, citizens question the utility of continental and regional bodies in domestic political processes. Addressing these pressing concerns would help the AU to minimise misperceptions and strengthen its contribution to building a more democratic Africa.
Furthermore, the implementation of subsidiarity without a clear division of labour between the AU and regional bodies has led to coordination issues and competition in efforts to address the situations in Sudan and the Sahel, for instance. Adding complexity are the lack of clarity on contextual challenges and the limited commitment of member states and some regional economic communities (RECs) to continental crisis management principles, particularly comparative advantage and complementarity. Thus, the AU and its regional institutions have missed several opportunities to collaborate in addressing crises. As the primary peace and security organ, PAPS should reposition its efforts and drive collective action in crisis management.
Doing things differently
PSC Report engagements with voices in policy corridors point to existing concerns about the AU’s predominantly reactive approach. Many appreciate the AU’s commitment to continental norms during crises ― by implementing sanctions and suspensions during the 2019 to 2023 coup wave, for example, and sending high-level panels or missions to Sudan and the DRC. However, others believe it is time for greater nuance.
Although AU efforts in containing conflicts are accepted, they have not sufficiently secured member states’ buy-in to preventive approaches and tools. These include the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS). The organisation has barely sustained its efforts to ensure democratic processes across the continent, with sporadic and under-resourced electoral observer missions and maintaining a perplexing silence on constitutional manipulations. This indicates that PAPS, having demonstrated a willingness to prevent conflicts, should concentrate on promoting tools and frameworks. It should lend long-term support to entrenching member state democracy and be more assertive in assessing electoral processes.
Engagement should hinge on empirical realities rather than subsidiarity
The AU’s loss of control of post-coup transitions is well known. Previous studies of the Institute for Security Studies have identified operational and political challenges. The former includes coordination among AU agencies and between the continental body and RECs, and weak follow-up. Also cited has been the AU’s limited access to transition countries, owing to tensions caused by its inconsistent management of coups and its inadequate support to ongoing transitions. Better coordination and enhanced follow-up capacity would help.
Furthermore, a more pragmatic approach to coordination and clear division of labour with RECs would set a new tone across the continent. Opportunities to explore this include the Sahel, DRC and Sudan.
The PAPS agenda
To manage transitions effectively, PAPS should prioritise dialogue with transition authorities and incentivise the return to constitutional order through a tailored, context-specific response to member states. The AU’s approach to governance should consider long-term support beyond electoral observation through robust implementation of the African Governance Architecture and African Peace and Security Architecture.
While division of labour arrangements between RECs and the AU has yet to be finalised and adopted, the latter could be more pragmatic in crisis prevention and resolution. It could ground its engagement in empirical realities instead of a systematic reliance on subsidiarity. Internal disconnects among AU agencies should be tackled through dedicated coordination platforms. Moreover, PAPS should fully play its conflict anticipation role by thoroughly promoting tools such as the CSVR/CSVM. It must reposition the continental early warning system and reinvigorate frameworks on good governance and democracy, particularly the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
