Stronger internal mediation the antidote to external meddling
The call for African solutions to African problems is growing amid the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
On 19 March 2025, the chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) endorsed the talks in Doha, Qatar, that brought together President Felix Tshisekedi of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Soon after, Angola, which had led the AU-backed Luanda Process to resolve the issue since 2022, announced it was ending its mediation role to concentrate on broader priorities following its appointment as AU chair. Could the AU be relinquishing its role as Africa’s primary conflict mediator amid the rising interests of external players seeking involvement in the resolution of African issues?
Addressing the crisis
Since the beginning of 2025, the conflict in eastern DRC has escalated due to intensified incursions and the capture of major towns by the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. On 28 January, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) condemned the attacks, which have led to the loss of lives, the displacement of thousands and heightened insecurity in the region.
Apart from calling for a ceasefire, the PSC tasked the AU Commission with deploying a fact-finding mission to the country against the backdrop of the June 2023 quadripartite summit. The summit involved the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region. It was followed by the PSC’s 1 261st meeting on 28 February, which called for collective African action in the spirit of ‘African solutions to African problems’.
The eastern DRC conflict has escalated due to intensified incursions and M23’s capture of some towns
The EAC and SADC had sought a resolution in a joint session in January. On 21 February, the United Nations, through Resolution 2773, called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from eastern DRC. The unanimously adopted resolution also condemned the DRC’s support for armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. Notwithstanding these efforts, the situation remains dire, with neither regional nor international efforts having been sufficiently followed up.
Mediation challenges
While peace talks between parties to the conflict were underway in Luanda, Angola, on 18 March, events took a surprising turn. Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani hosted Kagame and Tshisekedi in a symbolic effort to ease tensions and discuss pathways to peace.
A follow-up meeting was held on 28 March between Qatari mediators and representatives of the DRC and Rwanda. M23 representatives were also hosted in Doha. The involvement of Qatar signals a growing trend of external intervention in African conflicts and exposes the deficiencies of regional and continental conflict resolution mechanisms.
Following the Qatar meeting, AUC Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssef reiterated the AU’s commitment to supporting African-led solutions to the DRC conflict, especially within the Luanda and Nairobi processes. He noted that the Doha deliberations were within the AU’s spirit of constructive engagement and complemented ongoing regional efforts. The almost concurrent withdrawal of Angola from mediation highlights the underlying structural challenges of the AU in managing difficult and high-stakes situations such as the DRC.
The Emir of Qatar hosted Kagame and Tshisekedi to try to ease tensions and find pathways to peace
In conflict management, the AU relies on complementarity with regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs). An example was the AU-convened quadripartite summit on the DRC in June 2023. RECs/RMs play implementing roles in situations involving them and the AU, while the AU often fulfils the crucial role of a continental umbrella body.
The AU also relies on subsidiarity, which allows it to intervene only in matters that cannot be dealt with by RECs/RMs. Despite the lessons learnt from practising these principles and ongoing efforts to enhance their implementation, much remains to be done. The AU has been criticised for the lack of clarity in the implementation of these principles, sometimes leading to policy incoherence.
The AU backed Angola in the Luanda Process. However, overlapping RMs such as the EAC-led Nairobi Process, SADC’s DRC mission and internationally backed efforts minimised the AU’s direct influence and worsened the underlying challenges to mediation. The presence of other actors also highlighted the dangers of foreign interests’ involvement and the extent to which, if not well managed, they can undermine both regional and continental efforts to achieve stability.
Implications and options
The last two PSC communiques underscored the centrality of complementarity in crisis and conflict resolution. Following the quadripartite summit, the AU should support EAC-SADC development of a comprehensive framework to streamline the proposed merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.
External mediation may lead to meddling and thwart the championing of local solutions for local problems
In addition, the AU needs to remain a central cog in resolving African conflicts even as it acknowledges external players’ involvement. In the DRC, it should help establish the EAC-SADC mechanism to support the technical aspects of the regional mechanism.
With constant resource constraints, it should also help the EAC and SADC establish a robust funding mechanism to support the envisaged expanded mediation role and a consistent reporting system for coordinated decision-making.
PSC recommendations and decisions are often not implemented, but in the volatile DRC situation with its massive regional implications, the Council should ensure swift implementation of its decisions, which define AU visibility and involvement.
External mediation may lead to meddling and thwart the championing of local solutions for local problems. Thus, it is important that the AU remain relevant in all conflicts and assert its authority in the spirit of the AU Constitutive Act.
