Review of 2016: the PSC steps back from Burundi and South Sudan
In 2016 the PSC was faced with a number of crises but its impact was limited and it often relied on regional economic communities.
In 2016 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was faced with a number of urgent crises. In several instances, however, the PSC’s impact was limited and it referred several burning issues back to regional economic communities and regional mechanisms.
This year began on grim note for the PSC. In December 2015 it had taken a historic decision on Burundi by resolving to send a 5 000-strong protection force with or without the consent of the government of Burundi, invoking article 4(h) of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act.
However, not only did Burundi, then a member of the PSC, reject the proposal, but the AU heads of state and government also reversed it in late January 2016. The impact of this event is yet to measured. It certainly increased the caution of the permanent representatives of AU member states in Addis Ababa when it comes to taking bold decisions.
This event is also illustrative of the PSC’s situation this year. A close examination of the decisions adopted shows that the body was not the main actor in managing crises and conflicts on the continent. Most of the decisions supported regional mechanisms in line with the principle of subsidiarity (Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan), while the PSC struggled to have an impact where it did intervene (Gabon).
The PSC was not the main actor in managing crises and conflicts on the continent |
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Some crises did not make the agenda of the PSC. These include the political crisis in Lesotho, lingering conflict in Mozambique, violent protests in Ethiopia and post-electoral crises in Chad and the Republic of Congo.
PSC backpedals on Burundi
Following the January 2016 events, the PSC’s strategy in Burundi was two-pronged: to get an inclusive dialogue restarted, led by the East African Commission (EAC) facilitator, former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa; and to ensure the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Burundian government on human rights observers and military experts. At its meeting with the high-level delegation on 25 February, the Burundian government agreed that the number of human rights observers be increased from 100 to 200.
However, this has not happened. By November there were only 45 human rights observers and nine military experts in the country and the MoU still had not been signed.
 By November there were only 45 human rights observers and nine military experts in Burundi |
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The organisation of an inclusive dialogue by the EAC has so far also stumbled on the Burundian government’s unwillingness to engage with certain actors such as the CNARED (Conseil National pour le respect de l'Accord d'Arusha pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi et de l'Etat de droit), which it labels as a ‘terrorist’ movement.
In April the PSC received the final report of the fact-finding mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Burundi. The PSC only ‘took note of the recommendations’ of the report, which among others called for ‘the establishment of an independent internationally supported special tribunal in Burundi whose mandates include holding perpetrators of human rights violations and other abuses criminally accountable during the current crisis’. There is little indication that this special tribunal will become a reality, with the PSC having stepped back from a situation that occupied most of its time in 2015.
Somalia: towards an exit strategy for AMISOM
Somalia has been at the top of the agenda of the PSC on several occasions, since it hosts the largest AU-led peace support operation. On 28 April 2016 the PSC renewed the mandate of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) until 30 March 2017.
| The PSC on several occasions regretted the decision by the European Union to reduce AMISOM’s funding |
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A major headache for the PSC in 2016 has been the funding of AMISOM. The PSC on several occasions regretted the decision by the European Union to reduce AMISOM’s funding by 2020, arguing that it would affect not only the morale of the troops but also their operational performance.
The deployment of enablers – by Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya – to enhance the mobility of AMISOM troops was also raised by the PSC. The tripartite negotiations between these states, the AU and the UN are still on-going, due to the lack of agreement on the rate of compensation for the use of these enablers in the framework of AMISOM.
A report by the AUC to identify the challenges encountered and progress made by AMISOM in the framework of its exit strategy is due to be presented in December.
Calls by the PSC have little effect in South Sudan
The PSC did not play a leading role this year in trying to solve the ongoing war in South Sudan. In most cases it merely endorsed orientations and decisions taken by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
| The PSC held several meetings to endorse the decisions on South Sudan taken by IGAD |
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Following the outbreak of violence in early July 2016, for example, the PSC held several meetings to endorse the decisions taken by IGAD, notably calling for the deployment of a regional protection force.
The PSC did follow through on its decision to undertake a field mission in late October. However, by the end of November its report on the mission had not yet been published.
The PSC also asked the AUC ‘to call for an urgent in-depth independent investigation on the fight that took place in Juba and to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that they are held accountable on their criminal acts’. No action has been taken on this so far, since it encompasses acts that could be tried before the planned hybrid court for South Sudan. A military court in Juba, however, convicted 60 soldiers for their role in the July 2016 violence.
| The PSC did undertake a field mission to South Sudan in late October |
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While the AUC has compiled a draft on establishing the court, this does not seem to be a priority. The aim is rather to tame current tensions and stem the fighting in South Sudan. There is consensus within the AUC and the PSC that the search for justice through the hybrid court needs to be balanced with setting in place mechanisms of reconciliation and nation building.
Subsidiarity the rule in dealing with Guinea-Bissau
The political and constitutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau has persisted in 2016. The PSC conducted a field mission to Guinea-Bissau from 16–21 March, but its decisions progressively evolved to rather support the initiatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The PSC requested the AUC chairperson to propose a high-level facilitating team to engage stakeholders and to dispatch a technical mission to determine how best the AU could assist in the country’s constitutional review process. The PSC also called for a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction mission on the ground in order to identify the necessary post-conflict reconstruction activities.
These requests were not implemented, in order to avoid duplication with the ECOWAS initiative headed by Guinean President Alpha Condé. The PSC shifted to support the regional body in a process that culminated in a six-point road map to end the political crisis, signed in September.
| In Gabon elections resulted in a political crisis that was subsequently addressed by the PSC |
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Testing the limits of managing the post-electoral crisis in Gabon
In Gabon, elections resulted in a political crisis that was subsequently addressed by the PSC. The incumbent Ali Bongo faced former AUC chairperson Jean Ping and 12 others candidates on the ballot on 27 August.
In its statement on 2 September the PSC underlined the need for addressing the current situation in Gabon based on ‘consensus among all concerned Gabonese stakeholders in conformity with the relevant AU instruments’. During its 624th meeting, the PSC requested the AUC to deploy ‘observers who will be chosen [from] among eminent members of High African French speaking jurisdictions to assist the Constitutional Court of Gabon, in accordance with the modalities to be determined by common agreement with the said court’. However, the Gabonese government, a few days later, opposed the deployment of AU experts to assist the court, saying that this would be an infringement of its sovereignty.
| The Gabonese government opposed the deployment of AU experts |
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On 25 September the Constitutional Court validated the election of Bongo despite continuing allegations of fraud. The PSC has not discussed the situation in Gabon further since then.
Dispute over Morocco’s request for membership
In August the PSC convened a meeting on the process that should be followed when a state accedes to the AU. This meeting followed Morocco’s request to join the AU, made to the AU chairperson during the AU summit in Kigali.
The PSC adopted a decision recalling that any aspiring member states should commit to upholding and respecting the principles outlined in the Constitutive Act, referring to the ‘intangibility of borders’ contested by Morocco back in 1963 at the creation of the Organization of African Unity.
While the accession process to the AU does not explicitly fall within the competence of the PSC, the body has managed to have an impact in this matter. However, there is a risk that this decision, taken in August, is seen as reflecting the positions of some states opposed to Morocco, rather than a decision representing all the views within the PSC, and the AU in general.
This is an extract from an article published in issue 87 of the PSC Report.
