PSC focuses on high-risk elections
While the 14 African elections monitored by the AU last year were largely peaceful, the same might not be said of those coming up in 2015.
While the 14 African elections monitored by the African Union (AU) last year were largely peaceful, the same might not be said of those coming up in 2015. In several countries the polls are taking place following political conflict, while others are being held even before the fighting has died down, such as in South Sudan or the Central African Republic (CAR). Peace and Security Council (PSC) members are concerned that AU instruments, including those on elections, are not being implemented by member states. So far only 23 countries have ratified the AU’s 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
At least 18 AU member states are scheduled to hold either parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, this year. Many of these are being held in a context that increases the risk of political violence. Risk factors include structural and institutional weaknesses; issues of citizenship and voting rights; eligibility of candidates; attempts at extending constitutional term limits; politicisation of state institutions, including security institutions; lack of autonomy of electoral management bodies; an uneven playing field and highly restricted political spaces; and issues of inequality, marginalisation and youth unemployment.
Elections in many parts of Africa mean much more than just a vote destined to transfer political power |
On 14 January 2015, as part of the effort to assess those countries facing a risk of violence or political crisis around elections and chart the preventive course of action available to the AU, the PSC held an open session on ‘The prevention of election-related conflicts in Africa’. The session included a briefing by Dr Khabele Matlosa, AU Director for Political Affairs, on major issues concerning elections and election-related violence on the continent.
Elections in many parts of Africa mean much more than just a vote destined to transfer political power. They are also processes to foster and strengthen democratic culture and civil liberties. Despite the possible risk of violence and political instability, regular elections are critical to ensuring the development of democratic values. In his presentation, Matlosa noted that all of the 14 elections that took place in 2014 and were observed by the AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) were conducted in a relatively peaceful and orderly manner with no reports of significant cases of election-related violence.
However, this year the increase in the number of countries holding elections and their state of peace and security has raised concerns. Four of the countries holding elections (Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Sudan and the CAR) host some of the major ongoing peace support operations in Africa. While the CAR, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan are affected by major conflicts, others, including Burundi, Togo and Egypt, have experienced incidents of violence during the past year.
Elections in conflict and post-conflict countries are challenging and risky. The PSC session discussed the elections in South Sudan and the CAR in light of the debate surrounding ‘elections in the absence of institutions and norms’. It was highlighted that only one-third of the CAR is under the direct and effective control of the government. Support for elections in these countries comes from a belief that elections facilitate the emergence of legitimate political leadership and the transition to stability. However, member states and international organisations were concerned that elections in post-conflict and conflict countries could cause a relapse into violence and instability. In the absence of meaningful reconciliation and transition, election victories in these countries could be used as ‘the continuation of war by other means’ in winner-takes-all political systems. There were calls for the fulfilment of the conditions needed for democracy, national reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and the establishment of proper institutions to manage the electoral process.
Interventions from PSC members and partners, as well as international organisations, have emphasised the importance of building an effective early warning mechanism. The idea of putting in place preventive diplomacy mechanisms – including mobilising regional and international attention and diplomatic efforts, and eventually sending delegations to countries at risk of election-related violence – were proposed as steps that the AU should start working on immediately to prevent such incidents. Members of the Council also noted the importance of extending the deployment of election observation teams to before and beyond the polling day. It was suggested that such missions should monitor media coverage and other elements of the election process, including campaigns and voter registration.
Discussions on electoral reforms favouring proportional representation were also part of the open session, and the role played by civil society groups in voter education and the promotion of election dialogue and initiatives to defuse conflicts was also highlighted. In addition, the independence and impartiality of security forces was mentioned as a vital element to ensure the integrity of elections.
 Members of the Council and partners repeatedly raised the issue of the non-implementation of relevant AU instruments |
Members of the Council and other participants repeatedly raised the issue of the non-implementation of relevant AU instruments. The AU has a set of well-designed normative frameworks on democracy and elections, including its Constitutive Act, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on the Principle Governing Democratic Elections and the 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. However, the lack of political commitment to sign, ratify, domesticate and implement these instruments remains a major obstacle to the AU’s democratisation project. There have not been any new signatories to the 2007 Charter on democracy since 2013, and thus far only 23 member states have ratified the Charter.
In light of the above, it is clear that attention has to be drawn to the need to regularly assess countries facing election-related violence, the nature of the risk and the preventive measures that should be taken, tailored to the specific needs of each country. The PSC also has to prepare itself for the management of election-related conflicts, should preventive measures fail or not be deployed in due time. To this end, the PSC should continuously monitor the course of events in all the countries facing a risk of violence and task the AU to put in place the relevant strategies. These include the issuing of early warning and the deployment of preventive tools such as use of good offices and the dispatch of missions of the Panel of the Wise to prevent. To manage and resolve election-related conflicts, when they erupt, the AU should also prepare conflict resolution and management plans, particularly for high-risk countries.
Upcoming elections in Africa – 2015[1]
|
Country
|
Type of election
|
Main contenders
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Major issues
|
Risks
|
|
Burundi
|
Presidential:
26 June
(1st round)
Legislative:
26 May
|
National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (ruling party)
Democratic Alliance for Change
National Liberation Forces
|
Lack of clarity around constitutionality of third-term election; narrowing of political space; incidents of conflict among rival political actors (involvement of the ruling party’s youth league in instigating violence); and issues around land
|
High risk: Political intimidation, violence and curtailment of political space, as well as contestation over the legality of the president’s running for a third term, may escalate during the election, which may significantly affect the relative peace and stability the country has seen the past decade
|
|
Burkina Faso
|
Presidential, parliamentary:
20 September (proposed date)
Municipal:
8 November
|
Democracy and Socialism Party (Parti pour la démocratie et le socialism)
Union for Rebirth/Sankarist Movement (Union pour la renaissance/Mouvement Sankariste)
Congrès pour la démocratie et le progress (former ruling party)
|
First election in the post-Compaoré era; keeping the military from interfering in politics; lack of credible and capable institutions that can oversee the election process; and other legacies of authoritarianism
|
Medium risk: A relatively smooth transition period between Compaoré’s regime and the upcoming election may contribute to a stable electoral process. However, there is still a possibility of political unrest, mainly because of the country’s long history of authoritarianism and the role of the military
|
|
Central African Republic
|
Presidential, parliamentary:
expected before end of August
|
|
Remains in conflict since 2013; lack of national institutions able to provide the necessary legal, administrative, and security support to the electoral process; and division between Christians and Muslims creates a highly charged political environment
|
High risk: Unresolved conflict; lack of reconciliation between the two main armed political forces; absence of institutions to oversee the administration and conduct of the election and may even further deepen the conflict in the country
|
|
Côte d’Ivoire
|
Presidential:
October
|
Rassemblement des Républicains, led by the incumbent Allasane Ouattara
Front Populaire Ivoirien, formerly led by Laurent Gbagbo and currently led by
Pascal Affi N’Guessan
|
Legacy of the 2010 post-election conflict; post-conflict political processes; problems of reconciliation and inclusive reconstruction; and sustained rivalry between Gbagbo supporters and those of the incumbent
|
Medium risk: While the incumbent is expected to win, existing political and regional divisions and instability affecting parts of the country may lead to limited instability
|
|
Egypt
|
Parliamentary:
March and April
|
|
Conflict in the Sinai; continuing political tension due to violent crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood; sporadic incidents of protests and violence; and suppression of political freedom
|
High risk: A highly charged political environment, and continuing tension between supporters and opponents of the military regime, may lead to incidents of violence similar to those witnessed around the presidential election in 2014
|
|
Ethiopia
|
Parliamentary and Regional Assembly:
24 May
|
The incumbent Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn
Main opposition parties: Unity for Democracy and Justice, All Ethiopians Unity Party, Blue Party, Medrek and the Ethiopian Democratic Party
|
Continued narrowing of political space; weak and deeply fragmented opposition parties; highly controlled electoral process and the conclusion of the transition after the untimely demise of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012
|
Medium risk: The incumbent admits that there is a possibility of election-related ‘political tension and unrest’ in some urban areas, but no risk of this getting out of hand
|
|
Guinea
|
Presidential:
planned for November
|
Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen
Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée
L’Union des Forces Républicaines
Parti de l’Espoir pour le Développement National
|
History of political instability; divisive ethnic politics; weak or fragile institutions; and the effects of the Ebola outbreak
|
Medium risk: The effects of the Ebola outbreak and the fragility of relevant institutions are set to present significant challenges to the organisation and conduct of the election including the manipulation of the outbreak by political elite
|
|
Lesotho
|
Parliamentary:
28 February
|
All Basotho Convention
Lesotho Congress for Democracy
Basotho National Party
|
Political instability; and partisan security institutions
|
Medium risk: The parties’ willingness to go to the polls and significant regional oversight will limit the risk of violence, although contestation over the credibility of the election could trigger instability
|
|
Nigeria
|
Presidential and general:
14 February
|
Peoples’ Democratic Party, led by incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan
All Progressive Congress, a new coalition established in February 2013
|
On-going conflict with Boko Haram; volatile political environment (along the north/Muslim and south/Christian divide); protracted violence in Niger Delta; and the establishment of a new coalition of opposition parties, which may give the ruling party a real test
|
High risk: A number of factors, including the nature of the electoral campaign, a history of electoral problems, lack of full confidence in state institutions involved with the election, a highly charged political atmosphere and Boko Haram’s campaign of terror, could all contribute to both pre- and post-election-related incidents of violence
|
|
Sudan
|
Presidential and legislative:
2 April
|
National Congress Party, led by President Omar Al-Bashir
National Democratic Alliance
National Umma Party
Sudan Revolutionary Front
|
Political dialogue between the ruling party and the main opposition parties unsuccessful thus far; on-going conflicts in different parts of the country (Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile State); history of election malpractices and manipulation of both the election process and results
|
High risk: A number of factors including the building of alliance by the opposition, the contestation over the national dialogue, incidents of protests witnessed over the course of the past two years, spike of violence in Darfur during the past year, the continuing state of conflict in the two areas are likely to heighten tension that may induce incidents of violence as various political forces use the election to mobilize various sections of society
|
|
South Sudan
|
Presidential and parliamentary:
9 July
|
|
First election in post-independence era; deeply fragmented political elite; on-going conflict; lack of capable institutional and administrative capacity
|
High risk: The current ethnic conflict significantly compromises the possibility of having a smooth electoral process
|
|
Tanzania
|
Presidential, parliamentary and local:
October
|
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (ruling party)
Civic United Front
Chadema
|
Incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete is ineligible to run for a third term; increasing capacity of opposition parties may force the establishment of a ‘unity’ government; concerted effort is needed to ensure the democratic consolidation process since the first multi-party democratic election in 1992 remains intact
|
Low risk: Given that elections in the last two decades were seen to be peaceful and credible, the upcoming election is also expected to be smooth. However, issues such as the constitutional review process, increasing youth unemployment and corruption remainmajor issues
|
|
Togo
|
Presidential:
planned for March
|
Rally for the Togolese People, led by President Faure Gnassingbe
National Alliance for Change, led by Jean-Pierre Fabre
|
Third-term candidacy of the incumbent; strong opposition coalition created to challenge the incumbent; rising opposition to the Gnassingbe regime
|
High risk: Tension is mounting in the country as the incumbent insists on running for third term and opposition protests become commonplace, stoking fears of a violent electoral contest or even a Burkina Faso-style popular uprising
|
|
Zambia
|
Presidential:
20 January
|
Patriotic Front Party, led by Edgar Lungu
United Party for National Development, led by Hakainde Hichilema
|
Ensuring a smooth transition from the presidency of the late Michael Sata
|
Low risk: Given the track record of the country in holding peaceful elections, it is expected that the electoral process will not see any political unrest
|
[1]Other countries holding elections include Benin, Comoros, Mauritius and São Tomé & Príncipe.
