On 2 June, ousted President Hosni Mubarak received a life sentence for the role he played in the killing of 90 demonstrators during the January protests that ended his 30-year rule. The weak verdict fell short of people’s expectations and Tahrir Square was once again filled with protestors. Since Egyptian courts were perceived as being independent of the Mubarak presidency they were the only institution trusted enough to assist in the move towards democracy. However, only Mubarak and his ex-security chief, Habib el-Adly, were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court acquitted many top officials and Mubarak’s sons were not found guilty. This triggered questions about the role of some of the institutions involved in the investigation and prosecution of these cases.

This event has influenced the dynamics of the upcoming run-off elections on 16 and 17 June between Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Moursi and Mubarak-era prime minister Ahmed Shafiq. Protests on Tahrir Square have centred on the influence of the old order on the new Egypt and Shafiq’s ties with the old regime are seen as a possibility of returning to the Mubarak rule. One of the biggest campaigners has been the Muslim Brotherhood, using the weak verdict as evidence of the old order’s influence. It has vowed to ask for a retrial if Moursi is elected as president in the upcoming elections.

It is not, however, clear if this development will deprive Shafiq of voters from his support base. Given that he draws support mostly from people who were part of and benefited from the old regime, and who do not favour change, it is unlikely that the court judgment on Mubarak’s trial will change the vote he received in the first round of elections. However, it looks unlikely that it will help him in securing additional votes.

It will be interesting to see the extent to which the judiciary’s controversial verdict will affect the results of the run-off elections.

Sudan and South Sudan: negotiations strive for a consensus

The African Union (AU) has been overseeing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan that began on 29 May, seeking to resolve outstanding post-secession issues, including disputes over oil revenues and their shared border. Previous talks resulted in heightened tension, but these talks promise to herald different results.  Both countries are aware that this round of talks is unlike any of the previous talks and they cannot continue to approach the issues with a ‘business as usual’ attitude. This is largely because of the pressure placed on both sides by the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following the roadmap outlined in the communiqué that the PSC issued on 24 April, the UNSC adopted a resolution supporting the AU communiqué that the two countries should finalise negotiations on outstanding issues within three months. The international community is following the negotiations very closely, with the UNSC receiving fortnightly reports on progress.

However, it is not only international pressure but also the economic situation in both countries that created the urgency for achieving a negotiated settlement. South Sudan’s decision to close its oil pipeline has negatively affected its economy, as demonstrated by the depreciation of the South Sudanese dollar (SSD) against the US dollar ($). Sudan also appears to be cash strapped, with the government soliciting support from Gulf countries like Qatar. This dire situation adds to the urgent need for an agreement.

Negotiations hit an obstacle on Wednesday regarding the definition of the border between the two countries. As it has done in the past, the AU High Implementation Panel, facilitating the talks in Addis Ababa, proposed a new map to help the two sides arrive at an amicable solution.  

Zimbabwe: decreasing likelihood of new constitution before elections

This week Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara told the House of Assembly that Zimbabwe could hold elections this year using either the new constitution, which is still being drafted, or the current one, which Zimbabweans generally agree is deficient in many respects. The former is the best-case scenario and resonates with the position of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which mediated the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2008 to end the country’s political and economic crises. In its communiqué at the end of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government in Luanda, Angola on 1 June 2012, the regional body ‘urged the parties to the GPA to finalise the constitution-making process and subject it to a referendum thereafter’ and, ‘assisted by the Facilitator (South African President Jacob Zuma), to develop an implementation mechanism and to set out time frames for the full implementation of the Roadmap to Elections’. 

However, besides ensuring that Zimbabwe’s future elections become an active item on SADC’s agenda, the regional body essentially repeated the same old tune. While urging faster reforms in Zimbabwe, SADC leaders presented no plan to end the deadlock between the main political parties in the country surrounding the implementation of the provisions of the GPA and a Roadmap to Elections. Despite being the guarantor of the GPA that it had so painstakingly mediated, SADC has very few enforcement mechanisms. The regional body has failed to deploy a three-man team to join Zuma’s facilitation team and work with the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee to ensure the implementation of the GPA more than a year after the March 2011 SADC organ troika summit in Livingstone, Zambia had raised hopes of an increasingly assertive SADC.  Meanwhile, the fact that Zimbabwe’s parliament has so far failed to pass legislation such as the Electoral Amendment and Human Rights bills raises doubts about the chances of Harare speedily enacting supporting legislation and building new, or reforming existing institutions should a new constitution be adopted before elections.

Against this backdrop and with the constitution-making process in a deadlock, fears remain that worse scenarios could unfold. Prof. Mutambara mentioned that the GPA provided for elections under the current constitution if the three signatory political parties to the agreement reached a deadlock; a ‘very likely’ scenario. The constitution-making process has suffered due to the inability of the Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change formations to agree on the latest draft constitution. The draft constitution amends the powers of the president, including making key government appointments without consulting parliament or dedicated commissions. ZANU-PF has also said that Zimbabwe should not have a constitutional court, that there should be no devolution of power to the provinces and that executive authority must be vested only in the president. There is concern that ZANU-PF may attempt to collapse the constitution-making process in order to allow President Robert Mugabe to call for elections under the current constitution, which favours his party. In reality there may be very little SADC can do if ZANU-PF claims the process failed due to irreconcilable party positions. Meanwhile, Zuma may not have been able to give his full attention to Zimbabwe as he is dealing with local political dynamics, including positioning himself for re-election as the African National Congress president in December.

Compiled by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division