Coordination flaws thwart continental peace-making efforts
To master peace and security, the African Union and regional economic communities should coordinate interventions and rethink approaches.
To achieve a conflict-free continent, African leaders have centred their strategy on stronger coordination between the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs). However, obstacles have arisen. RECs, being independent entities, tend to regionalise peace processes rather than create a robust continental response system. Member states’ attachment to sovereignty also hampers the AU’s position as a supra-regional body.
Through the 1991 Abuja treaty establishing an African economic community, African heads of state envisioned RECs as building blocks of continental integration and of the AU as the body spearheading African affairs. In that spirit, during the first AU-RECs mid-year coordination meeting in 2019 in Niamey, Niger, leaders reaffirmed their conviction about an ‘integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa…’ It could, they stressed, be achieved only with solid multisectoral coordination, notably in peace and security, between the AU and RECs.
The opposite is evident in several conflicts plaguing the continent. For example, in response to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) responded disjointly with competing peace processes. Both institutions developed roadmaps and appointed mediators when expected to respond to the crisis collaboratively. This goes against the spirit of coordination that should underpin the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Responding to the Sudan conflict, the AU and IGAD responded disjointly with competing peace processes
However, situations such as Sudan persist, as do coordination flaws in Mali, Guinea, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite framework guidance, persistent coordination challenges between the AU and RECs call into question African institutions’ willingness to build the ‘Africa we want’ hand in hand, as envisioned by Agenda 2063.
Flaws in coordination are detrimental to continental peace-making, integration and the achievement of Agenda 2063. They must be addressed in conflict management, looking at their causes and implications for peace-making in Africa.
How do flaws manifest?
Sources interviewed by the PSC report highlighted four manifestations of flaws, namely coordination principles, excluding RECs from decision-making, ongoing AU structural reforms and limited financial and operational resources. According to several observers, subsidiarity, which divides labour between the AU and RECs and defines roles in conflicts, is vastly misunderstood.
In Mali and Central African Republic (CAR), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have complained about a lack of clarity in labour division. According to a PSC Report source, the two communities indicated that they do not know to what extent they can intervene with or without the AU.
This has often caused confusion and tensions between the AU and RECs in conflict-torn countries. For example, ECOWAS and the AU struggled to align their responses to the 2012 Malian crisis. This translated into nominating an AU special envoy, with no consultations, and creating two missions (AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel and ECOWAS Mission in Mali) with competing agendas.
Similarly, tensions and misaligned responses occurred in CAR, when ECCAS recognised the leadership of coup perpetrator Michel Djotodia, who irregularly assumed power in 2013, in contrast to the AU push for non-recognition. Nonetheless, the subsequent creation of the CAR International Contact Group improved collaboration between ECCAS and the AU.
Some argue that the AU assumes most member states’ participation in RECs ensures regional awareness and uptake. Consequently, the AU would engage RECs only when necessary. However, the communities see this approach as an AU attempt to impose its views and methods on the continent rather than encouraging constructive collaboration and coordinated responses to emergencies. Even when intervention mechanisms are agreed on, the AU does not grant RECs full leeway but micromanages, leading regional blocs to develop competing responses.
Subsidiarity, which divides labour and defines roles in conflicts, is vastly misunderstood
AU reforms were repeatedly cited as a disruption to AU-REC coordination. APSA calls for harmonising structures, but structural changes at the AU level have yet to happen within the RECs. As a result, emerging structural discrepancies disrupt existing arrangements. A potent example is the merger of AU’s peace and security and political affairs departments, which nullified the continental early warning system.
Coordinated continental early warning is challenging, and early response has ceased to be harmonised. Furthermore, with changes at the AU, AU-REC coordination falls under the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and APSA. This implies the need to develop an AGA/APSA roadmap to determine REC engagement modalities with the reformed AU. As this is yet to materialise, the AU should familiarise RECs with its current transitional working methods.
Finally, certain experts argue that beyond financial and operational issues that limit their response capacities, coordination shortcomings result mainly from a lack of political will from the AU and RECs. They claim that the two structures could overcome challenges if only they could address their ‘ego’ and faithfully cooperate.
Implications for peace and security
Coordination struggles between the AU and RECs hamper the harmonisation of regional and continental policies, including conflict management frameworks. RECs’ mechanisms, initiatives and policies overlap AU frameworks. And member states prioritise regional instruments rather than those proposed by the AU, which has not helped domesticate continental frameworks, share experience and foster coordination under APSA.
Instead of coordination, competition has become the norm, made more complex by overlapping REC membership. In addition to struggles with the AU, RECs compete among themselves and duplicate interventions. In the DRC, for example, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community and the AU fail to coordinate their responses, disregarding regional and continental policies. Beyond that, absence of coordination among RECs could be analysed in two ways.
First, frameworks such as APSA and the revised protocol on AU-REC coordination indicate how subsidiarity should look between the two but remain silent on RECs’ coordination of overlapping membership. Secondly, policymakers believe weak interest in coordination results from RECs’ lack of political will and emerging powers’ hidden agendas. One could understand RECs’ stance vis-a-vis the AU, but emerging powers often intervene in crises without consulting the AU and RECs, acting against efforts that may conflict with their interests.
As a result, instead of coordinated responses to crises, the AU and RECs compete, which diverts their attention from genuine concerns. They put each other ahead of faits accomplis, as was the case in Mali (2013) and CAR (2014), where they engaged in unnecessary disputes over primacy.
In such context, questions arise on who between the AU and ECOWAS, for example, should fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali. Whether both can leverage the will to coordinate efforts remains unclear, given that they are two missions providing competing responses.
Competition has become the norm, made more complex by overlapping REC membership
Broadly, peacemaking is halted by AU-REC coordination struggles. These struggles foster the proliferation of micro-initiatives addressing specific issues with limited impact and also impede effective regional and national implementation of continental frameworks and mechanisms such as APSA.
What should be done?
To fix the loopholes, especially when responding to crises, the AU and RECs should agree on and implement a joint evaluation of their previous and ongoing responses. This would help map out past and current challenges and anticipate emerging ones. An evaluation would identify best practices to improve coordination and inform an AGA/APSA roadmap. It would also address coordination in countries of overlapping membership.
The AU should continue tailoring its responses on its case-by-case appreciation of conflicts. This, at least theoretically, allows flexibility and adaptability of working methods. Still, as reforms bring changes, the AU should engage RECs to jointly address structural disruptions and foster harmonisation of structures and response mechanisms.
RECs have reportedly grown increasingly independent of the AU and rarely see the need to consider it in their interventions, even though it is the primary organ for managing peace and security. However, they should be reminded that their mandate in conflict resolution stems from the 1991 Abuja treaty and APSA. They should nurture a collective approach, coordinating with the AU and working as part of a system rather than running in a direction contrary to continental integration.
The AU and RECs should explore alternative and reliable ways to enhance their financial capacities. This could entail decentralising the continental peace fund regionally and encouraging contributions from stakeholders such as the private sector. They should leverage political will and commit to building a stronger Africa.
Image: peaceau.org
