Slow progress on AU conflict-prevention assessments
The African Union must do more to promote structural conflict-prevention tools among member states.
The African Union (AU) adopted the Continental Structural Conflict-prevention Framework to address structural weaknesses that could escalate into violent conflicts if left unattended. As part of this, it introduced two voluntary processes: the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and the Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS). These allow AU member states to evaluate their structural vulnerabilities, identify resilience factors and develop risk mitigation strategies.
The CSVRA and CSVMS are built on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and complement mechanisms such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, but with narrower national and subnational focuses. Given the importance of the tools, they have been received positively in continental policy circles, with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) repeatedly encouraging member states to use them.
In 2017, Ghana became the first country to volunteer for the process and completed internal consultations that identified realities specific to the country. After Ghana, only Côte d’Ivoire (2019) and Zambia (2020) of the 55 member states have taken part. Despite initial enthusiasm in policy circles, continent-wide uptake of the CSVRA and CSVMS has been slow, attributed primarily to a lack of member state buy-in.
Uptake of the CSVRA and CSVMS has been slow, attributed primarily to a lack of member state buy-in
Thus, the 35th assembly of the AU in February 2022 discussed the importance of the tools and urged member states to participate. The AU must ensure this happens by thoroughly examining the underlying reasons for the current status quo.
The CSVRA struggle
Three variables explain the CSVRA’s struggle for greater acceptance. The first is a lack of awareness of the tools’ usefulness in countries and regions. This was evident at a workshop of the AU Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Early Warning System in February 2020. The workshop reviewed lessons from Ghana and highlighted the importance of enhancing member state understanding of using the tools as a prerequisite for voluntary adoption.
However, delays in engaging states have continuously hampered broader uptake. While the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic played a role in the delays, the AU ought to rigorously market the tools’ usefulness beyond diplomatic representations in Addis Ababa. This lack of awareness implies that even PSC discussions and reviews are usually driven by the AU Commission rather than the member states that own the monthly agenda.
The second contributing factor is the existence of similar tools in some regional economic communities (RECs). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, has a conflict-prevention framework under which its Early Warning Directorate conducts country risk and vulnerability assessments among member states.
Between 2016 and 2019, the tool was used to assess Ghana’s structural vulnerabilities and their impact on citizens. Yet, in 2017, that country underwent a similar process at the continental level. While Ghana may be open to assessments to determine its vulnerabilities, the question remains about the value of multiple tools with similar outcomes at both RECs and continental levels. Why should member states complete both processes when the outcomes of one could inform decision-making at other levels?
The AU ought to rigorously market the tools’ usefulness beyond diplomatic representations in Addis Ababa
The third challenge is the perception among member states that assessments expose them to strategic threats. While this belief could be attributed to their non-appreciation of the benefits or reluctance to uncover internal challenges, it demonstrates the need for more consultation. ECOWAS’s assessment of Togo from 2016 to 2018, for instance, revealed Togolese authorities’ reservations about the process. The ECOWAS country risk and vulnerabilities assessment team was initially denied access for security and administrative reasons.
The AU must enhance awareness and understanding of the tools, facilitate harmonisation with regional mechanisms and engage member states constructively and inclusively.
Enhancing buy-in
Securing buy-in would mean convincing member states to endorse and undergo the CSVRA and CSVMS periodically, which would benefit the continent. It would build a regular self-assessment culture among African countries, provide for national mitigation of challenges and reduce member states’ resistance to implementing related tools on their soils, as happened in Togo.
Also, as member states pursue their role in achieving Africa’s collective security goals, it would facilitate continental experience sharing. Furthermore, the combination of country efforts could reinforce the AU’s conflict-prevention capability, thereby shifting the usual firefighter role that has often seen it respond to conflicts after the fact. By helping member states mitigate the causes of conflicts, the AU will be better placed to prevent violent manifestations of conflicts.
However, CEWS was recently integrated into the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) department. This has resulted in the eventual absence of a dedicated early warning unit to spearhead the implementation of tools such as the CSVRA and CSVMS. This raises questions about which entity will be directly responsible for coordinating uptake, previously done by CEWs.
The absence of a coordination body will eventually compromise conflict prevention and early response
As clarifications on this are yet to be provided, the PSC would need to respond in the meantime in light of Article 2(1) of its protocol, which defines it as a collective security and early-warning arrangement meant to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crises in Africa.
Revival needed
The PSC should revive and intensify awareness raising. This could be by constantly engaging member states through high-level forums, workshops, and capacity-building programmes similar to the 2020 joint workshop. The council could also exploit its relationship with civil society organisations under the Livingstone formula to harness these organisations’ role in promoting the tools.
Indeed, the AU and PSC should acknowledge the added value of CSO partners, such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding, which has been at the forefront of early warning. Similar partnerships should be encouraged and replicated in the implementation and uptake of the CSVRA and CSVMS.
The PSC could also market successful experiences such as Ghana’s and encourage member states to share their experiences of the tools’ usefulness. It could emphasise lessons learnt and task the AU Commission with spearheading efforts to document lessons and popularise best practices among states.
Another important step would be harmonising assessment tools under the umbrella of a single continental system. Clarifying the AU’s approach to coordinating continental early warning efforts will then be needed, given the absence of a dedicated unit in PAPS. Harmonisation would alleviate redundancy, reduce resistance and draw states’ attention.
More robustly, the AU needs to revisit existing concerns about the (re)establishment of an organ or unit specifically coordinating early warning and related tools, including the CSVRA and CSVMS. Mainstreaming early warning might be commendable given its cross-cutting nature, but the absence of a coordination body will eventually compromise continental conflict prevention and early response.
Image : © African Union Commission
