AU must take the lead on the DRC conflict
Given the many competing efforts, the African Union should coordinate peace initiatives and promote regional cooperation.
The security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains dire. M23 rebels have advanced further towards North Kivu’s capital Goma. And it’s doubtful that the Luanda process ceasefire of 7 March 2023 will hold following clashes between the M23 and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) on that day.
Regional forces are facing a legitimacy crisis in the context of protests against the East African Community Regional Force. And in other eastern provinces, violence perpetrated by armed groups continues as the humanitarian crisis deepens. DRC and Rwanda remain locked in a protracted diplomatic crisis, with Kinshasa recently calling for France to sanction Kigali, despite efforts backed by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to de-escalate tensions.
These developments are unfolding alongside parallel processes to address the crisis. Peace talks have been held in Nairobi, Luanda, Bujumbura and Addis Ababa at the level of heads of state. The East African Community (EAC) has deployed regional forces to eastern DRC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is also considering it. Meanwhile, the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which has protected civilians and consolidated peace in the country since 2010, is planning a drawdown.
Unless complemented by political solutions, the military focus will fail to address the conflict
Given the many competing processes, much more would be achieved if efforts were streamlined and security initiatives coordinated. The PSC’s 17 February 2023 summit urged stakeholders to coordinate and harmonise efforts to stabilise the DRC. It also called for the expeditious implementation and revitalisation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the DRC and the Region (PSC Framework Agreement).
Dominance of military responses
The political process could deliver peace and security, but a look at ongoing regional efforts indicates that hard security objectives continue to receive priority.
Under the Nairobi process, the EAC has redoubled its military efforts by deploying the EAC regional force and lifting the notification requirements of paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008). UNSC Resolution 2667 (2022) lifted the notification requirements, allowing the DRC to officially buy or receive military equipment and training without notifying the sanctions committee. The country can, thus, enhance its capacity to fight against armed groups.
However, unless complemented by political solutions, the military-heavy focus will fail to address the factors driving conflict in eastern DRC and the region. The DRC needs a well-thought-out hybrid approach to deal with its security challenges ― one that blends both diplomatic and military approaches as no single approach may suffice.
Need for continental leadership
Within policy circles, there is consensus that despite being the continental body responsible for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, the African Union (AU) has yet to demonstrate strong leadership in the DRC.
The PSC acknowledged the utility of a regional approach in dealing with the crisis. But the communiqué following the heads of state meeting on the DRC and Great Lakes on the sidelines of the 36th AU summit merely reiterated demands for all armed groups – particularly the M23, the Allied Democratic Forces and FDLR – to immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from eastern DRC. This signalled a dilution of subsidiarity and a blurring of the lines of responsibility between AU and regional economic communities (RECs) in ongoing efforts.
Despite its role to advance peace and security, the AU has yet to show leadership in the DRC
PSC Protocol Article 7(j) mandates the PSC to promote close harmonisation, coordination and cooperation between regional mechanisms (RMs) and the AU to ensure and maintain peace, security and stability in Africa. The provision allows for elevated PSC engagement to fill the gap of uncoordinated engagements.
The AU, and the PSC in particular, has failed to occupy that space, instead taking a backseat in the DRC and Great Lakes. It has ceded much of the responsibility for bringing peace and stability to RECs/RMs and the UN.
Entry points for coordination and harmonisation
The PSC has been calling for coordination of the Nairobi and Luanda processes, and for coordination of troops from the DRC, EAC regional forces and MONUSCO. Despite the need for continental leadership in these processes, the AU’s role remains intangible and unclear. Coordination could ensure the complementarity of diplomatic or political and military interventions, including pressing for dialogue between Kigali and Kinshasa.
The AU Commission can employ its convening power to coordinate peace initiatives and interregional cooperation among the multiple regional and international stakeholders supporting peacebuilding in eastern DRC. AU coordination can be enhanced through regular political and technical consultative meetings to complement those of regional oversight mechanisms. These PSC-organised meetings, to monitor and report on military and political progress, should be attended by the AU Commission and RECs (EAC, the Economic Community of Central African States and SADC). Also present should be regional mechanisms such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.
The AU should facilitate finance for regional efforts given the growing competition among RECs for funds
Coordination should extend especially to military efforts. In addition to EAC and MONUSCO forces, Angola has recently deployed to the eastern DRC and SADC is considering following suit. The memorandum of understanding among the AU, RECs and coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of eastern and northern Africa provides a framework to enhance the AU’s coordination role.
Funding for DRC peace
The summit decision to avail and replenish US$5 million from the AU Peace Fund crisis reserve facility to co-fund the EAC regional force in eastern DRC demonstrates modest progress in operationalisation of the Peace Fund. However, it amounts to very little against the scale of the challenge. The AU should facilitate sourcing more funds for regional efforts given the growing competition among RECs for funds.
As the AU Commission and Peace Fund governance structures are still working on the fund’s operation, consideration should be given to financing the integration of EAC regional force civilian and police components. This will achieve more comprehensive peacebuilding that addresses the root causes of the crisis and is important in view of the growing legitimacy crisis confronting the EAC regional force in Goma.
Sourcing more funds for regional force headquarters in Goma is equally crucial. The PSC could also deploy and support a sub-office in the city to facilitate coordination. The AU liaison office in Kinshasa should be capacitated as it is ill-equipped to discharge its mandate. Competent staff and adequate funds are needed for it to monitor progress on the ceasefire and the withdrawal and disarmament of armed forces.
The PSC could use its May 2023 Council-to-Council meeting with the European Union to encourage greater financial support, while urging member states to pay their dues to advance operationalisation of the Peace Fund. The AU, without a doubt, must adopt a long-term view and a strong leadership position given the complexity of the situation.
