Comoros defeats the odds at the helm of the African Union
Amid multiple challenges and limited resources, the Union of Comoros' performance as AU chair exceeded expectations.
Comoros’ candidacy and subsequent election as African Union (AU) chair occurred during the 36th AU summit in February 2023. Coming after the leadership of Senegal, the country’s election brought a lengthy debate about the capacity of ‘small’ states to drive a continental agenda and maintain progress. Some experts expressed concerns about their limited economic and diplomatic clout. Others argued that the chair's ability to mobilise member states around continental issues and drive collective initiatives was more important.
Since rotational AU chairship was enshrined in Article 6(4) of the AU Constitutive Act 2000, it has garnered interest among member states, leading to thorough scrutiny of the achievements of elected chairs. Comoros’ chairship offered another opportunity to assess the capacity of small states to advance their declared cause in Africa’s diplomatic spaces.
Comoros’ priorities
As has become the norm, AU chairs openly define the priorities for their tenures. Comoros outlined its areas of focus during the 36th AU summit, differing from Egypt, which opted to announce its plans ahead of the 2019 summit. A late announcement of priorities is not always a serious concern, given that it may sometimes result from a late official announcement of chairs. Yet, such delays frequently create a perception of unpreparedness and lack of seriousness among policymakers, experts, and the general public.
President Azali Assoumani’s speech during the previous summit outlined seven priorities. These were continental peace and security, multilateralism, accelerating the African Continental Free-trade Area (AfCFTA), women's empowerment, climate change, food security and Africa’s digitalisation. It was almost a continuation of Senegal’s chairship, as most of the priorities of the two chairs were similar. This is a commendable effort at continuity, given that chairs should contribute to long-term goals in line with the aspirations of Agenda 2063.
The seven priorities of President Assoumani were in line with those of the Senegalese chairship
Unlike other chairs, however, Comoros saw an opportunity to amplify island states' voices in addressing rising sea levels and blue economy issues. It also tabled Africa’s digitalisation instead of its debts and recovery of artefacts (see infographic below).
Priorities of the preceding AU chairs  Source: PSC Report (click on the chart for the full size image)
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Comoros’ approach
Comoros opted for advocacy through conference diplomacy. It convened a three-day ministerial meeting titled ‘The blue economy and climate action in Africa: island and coastal states at the forefront’. Held in the capital Moroni from 12 to 14 June 2023, it aimed to raise awareness amongst policymakers of the potential that the blue economy holds for island states and the continent at large.
In addition, Assoumani led the AU delegations in several Africa+1 summits, such as the 2023 Russia-Africa and Saudi-Africa events in Moscow and Riyad, respectively. Africa’s participation had multiple objectives, but enhancing food security and development stood out.
The AU chair, pursuing his conference diplomacy and good offices, voiced, with other African leaders, the continent’s demand for robust financing for climate adaptation at COP28 in Dubai last year. Similarly, he convened the quadripartite summit to address the protracted crisis in the Great Lakes region and made significant efforts to enhance ratification of the AfCFTA agreement.
Exceeding expectations
Comoros’ results as AU chair were considerable. The country’s advocacy contributed significantly to the AU’s admission as a permanent G20 member in September 2023. Despite Senegal’s gains in securing the AU’s G20 seat, 12 prominent members were still reluctant to facilitate the admission. The chair personally lobbied resisting states through good offices over months and finally secured the seat.
The abovementioned ministerial meeting gave birth to the Moroni Declaration for Ocean and Climate Action in Africa, underlining the shared vision of harnessing the continent’s blue economy. The declaration acknowledged the challenge island states face in confronting climate change. It called for an increased partnership to champion the blue economy and support the Great Blue Wall Initiative for sustainability and regeneration.
The declaration is crucial for two reasons. First, it serves as an African shared vision of the blue economy and an instrument that could help the continent mobilise partners to support Africa’s climate financing. Secondly, it will raise awareness among African leaders on the potential of blue economy.
Comoros also advanced talks during the second Russia-Africa summit, resulting in the shipment of 200 000 tons of grain to six African countries in November 2023, thus enhancing food security. The Saudi-Africa summit saw several commitments from the Saudi Crown Prince to support development initiatives in Africa. Comoros lobbied peers to ratify the AfCFTA agreement which resulted in an additional ratification after February 2023.
The Comoros budgeted a substantial sum of 11 million US dollars for its chairship
Furthermore, it assisted the quadripartite conference on the Great Lakes region to adopt the Joint Framework on Coordination and Harmonisation of Peace Initiatives (JFCHPI) in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It also endorsed the establishment of a multilevel coordination working group.
However, the country’s footprints were minimal, especially regarding peace and security and climate change. The chair and the entire AU failed to address burning cases such as Sudan, the protracted Sahel crisis and emerging threats to regional integration efforts in West Africa. In addition, conference diplomacy did not generate much beyond the Moroni declaration, the JFCHPI and the multi-level working group on Eastern DRC.
Gaps and challenges
Despite commendable achievements, Comoros faced multiple challenges, foremost among them its limited financial capacity. The financial burden and the absence of a budget dedicated to chairs meant that Comoros had to bear additional costs despite domestic financial constraints.
The country budgeted US$11 million for its chairship, a considerable amount for a state with limited resources. This engendered an over-reliance on external partners such as France amid the AU’s push to own its initiatives. In response, policymakers proposed that the AU contribute at least 20% to 30% to the bureau’s budget.
The second was Comoros’ internal pre-electoral political context in 2023, with Assoumani running for a third consecutive term. Ongoing contestations following his re-election on 14 January 2024 indicate that the chair had to deal with fierce political contestation back home. Thus, he was overstretched between national and continental challenges.
The third was a limping bureau beset by struggles between Morocco and Algeria over the 2024 chairship. Chairing the AU should be a collective bureau-led effort comprising, among others, the outgoing, incumbent and incoming chairs ― the troika. Without prejudicing bureau members such as Senegal, the absence of a deputy, Morocco or Algeria, deprived Comoros of essential support. This could have strengthened diplomatic clout and helped the chair deliver better.
Comoros achieved results, challenging those who predicted its failure
Another issue was discord with countries in post-coup transition, especially Mali and Burkina Faso, during the Russia-Africa summit in July 2023. Sticking to the AU anti-coup norms, the AU and AUC chairs and some member states declined a ‘family’ picture with the de facto authorities of Burkina Faso and Mali.
In reprisal, the two denied the AU chair access to their territories, preventing monitoring missions in August 2023. Due to their perception of Comoros as a ‘small’ state, transitional leaders Traoré and Goita responded strongly to deny officials in Moroni access which in turn hampered Comoros' plan to contribute to successful post-coup transitions and counter-terrorism.
Chair’s commitment
Despite numerous challenges including limited economic capacity and diplomatic clout, Comoros gained support from peers and partners to drive continental affairs. A significant lesson learnt is the equal importance of economic and diplomatic muscle at the AU helm and the chair’s commitment and determination. By being active and determined in driving affairs, the country achieved results, challenging observers who predicted its failure.
This proves that any member state can drive the AU irrespective of its size and economic and diplomatic capacities, should it show sufficient determination and ability to create synergy on issues of common interest. Limping bureaus have been the Achilles' heel of the last two chairs. The consequences seemed more pronounced during 2023, given PSC sources’ assertions that Comoros could have achieved more with a completely composed bureau.
The AU Assembly, therefore, should vote to elect a deputy in the absence of regional consensus. In addition, the AU should develop robust financial support mechanisms and strengthen Articles 15 and 16 of the AU Assembly rules of procedure to clarify criteria guiding chair elections and bureau roles. Given the demanding nature of the chairship and the continent's challenges, chairs should be strongly supported by peers and the AU.
