Can a new agreement fix the African standby force coordination gap?
The newly endorsed MoU is a milestone – but unless the AU and its regional bodies agree, policy and deployment will remain misaligned.
The 39th AU summit took place amid rising continental insecurity, intensifying global power competition and geopolitical uncertainty. The gathering led to the adoption of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the AU and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs), which has been in the making since 2018.
Centred on the African Standby Force (ASF) – the AU's Africa Peace and Security Architecture pillar for peace support operations (PSOs) – the adoption (the MOU) offered an opportunity to use the mechanism effectively.
The MoU is an integral part of the ongoing process of resetting peace and security frameworks to align with current and emerging threats and issues. In particular, it links with the recently concluded ASF strategic review, which followed the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 's 2022 call for the reconceptualisation of the force and broader AU institutional reforms.
While the MoU is yet to be signed and ratified by the RECs/RMs, its endorsement by the AU Assembly is a milestone, as the process has spanned many years. Importantly, it indicates measured progress with the potential to address some major constraints of the ASF. It provides greater clarity on the roles of mandate and force generation, the latter involving the acquisition of personnel and equipment, and the training required for the mission. The MoU seeks to further institutionalise practices that previously took place informally.
The current ASF
The AU's Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security formally declared in 2016 that the ASF has reached full operational readiness. Yet the force remains underused in addressing the continent's ongoing crises, as it neither generated forces nor deployed operations as envisaged in its original/foundational concept.
The MoU may address some major constraints of the African Standby Force
However, the force has contributed to developing strategic capacities for deploying some PSOs. Some RECs/RMs have also leveraged the ASF to deploy missions, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in The Gambia and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Yet these were carried out without prior AU mandate, a procedure enshrined in the ASF policy framework (articles 2.9 and 3.24.b).
Effective ASF use remains hampered by limited political strategic convergence and institutional coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs, among other challenges. These constraints are mutually reinforcing: the absence of harmonised mandating and authorisation processes delays deployment, with gaps in financing and command-and-control fragment implementation undermining long-term operational sustainability.
Mandate clarity
Lack of clarity in political decision-making is a key constraint for ASF operations. The inaugural Lessons Learned Forum for AU PSOs and ASF highlighted the need for harmonisation in the mandates and authorisations between the PSC and the United Nations Security Council, and between the REC/RM policy organs. The Forum was established in 2022 to evaluate 20 years of PSOs to reconceptualise and ensure full use of the ASF.
The PSC is the AU's central decision-making body for conflict prevention, management and resolution across the continent. While Article 13 of its protocol gives the Council exclusive authority and responsibility for authorising PSO missions, in practice, RECs/RMs have deployed several missions, largely in response to security crises.
The most recent example was the SAMIM deployment, mandated by the AU and recognised as an ASF deployment six months after deployment. This reaffirms the need for early consultation and joint analysis to enable political and strategic convergence to achieve common objectives.
The memorandum adapts to political realities by introducing a more structured mandate framework
The MoU adapts to current political realities by introducing a more structured, yet nimble, mandate framework. The current arrangement clarifies(indicates?) that both the PSC and RECs/RMs can issue mandates for their respective operations. In the case of REC/RMs authorisation, the memorandum stipulates that RECs/RMs undertake 'early consultations with the AU' for missions (Article 6).
This precludes cases in which RECs/RMs approach the AU for post-facto or delayed endorsement of their deployment as ASF missions, but it creates greater clarity, reaffirming the PSC's or RECs/RMs' mandates to act decisively while considering subsidiarity.
However, early consultation risks being perceived as an optional courtesy rather than a binding requirement for RECs/RMs, which may still see value in deploying missions independently. Interpretation of this provision should follow clear procedures that acknowledge the urgency of processes during crises, where the need for speed can outweigh coordination with the AU.
Bridging the coordination divide
The lack of clear role clarification and subsequent coordination challenges have also hindered ASF progress from mission authorisation to mandate implementation. Apart from challenges for the former, the previous practice was also characterised by limited alignment and interaction between the PSC and RECs/RMs, notably in force generation and command and control. The failure of the AU and ECOWAS to align their responses to the 2012 Mali crisis, which almost led to parallel deployments by the two organisations, exemplifies this challenge.
The perennial gap between policy and implementation must be overcome
A longstanding issue before the MoU was that the provision for RECs/RMs to handle force and capability generation, on behalf of the AU, was not effectively enforced. Article 9 of the MoU states that member states, through the RECs/RMs, must make available the pledged capabilities to the AU for deployment.
It stipulates that the generation of pledged capabilities must be conducted through a coordinated and consultative process between the AU and the RECs/RMs. It further requires each regional body to conclude legal agreements with its member states for preparation, employment and post-employment of pledged capabilities. The regional bodies are also to provide quarterly updates to the AU on the status of these, enhancing accountability and institutionalising subsidiarity in force generation.
The MoU further outlines that REC/RMs must ensure that member states fulfil their duty to facilitate training and readiness of uniformed personnel. It also stresses the AU's role in reinforcing standardisation through ASF training policies and harmonised regional training frameworks (Articles 17: 13 to 17 of the memorandum).
The memorandum addresses coordination through designated focal points– units appointed by each party to coordinate and oversee cooperation between the AU and REC/RMs, with the PSO division being the focal AU point. The use of focal points was mentioned in the ASF Policy Framework (paragraphs 2.22 to 2.26), but it has not yet been implemented, which could pose a hurdle to realising the memorandum's provisions.
Prospects and recommendations
The MoU must overcome at least three implementation challenges: political prioritisation, timely REC/RM signatures and the perennial gap between policy and implementation that plagues AU policies. The PSC should make the ASF a priority this year, ensuring the MoU is implemented. It should also urge RECs/RMs to sign the agreement promptly. Finally, it should instruct and liaise with the AU Commission to develop a work plan and relevant operational documents to ensure implementation.
