Is Borgu-Kainji becoming the next hub of Sahel and Lake Chad extremists?
Extremist threats in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin are evolving faster than national and regional counter-terrorism strategies.
Nigeria’s western borderlands are becoming a convergence zone between violent extremist and terrorist groups across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Recent attacks in the Borgu-Kainji axis show that this is no longer a localised security problem, but a rapidly-evolving regional threat with implications for coastal West Africa and the African Union (AU) counter-terrorism agenda.
The axis spans parts of Niger, Kwara and Kebbi in Nigeria. Kainji Lake National Park sits at the centre, linking northwestern and southwestern Nigeria to the Borgu and Alibori departments of Benin and Dosso region of Niger through poorly governed forest corridors, waterways and long-neglected rural communities. Jihadist-group violence in the region rose by 86% from 2024 to 2025, while the death toll increased by 262%.
Concern is mounting over security as the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) this month considers interconnected issues such as climate change and insecurity. Attention will also focus on the AU’s draft five-year continental counter-terrorism strategic action plan and the stabilisation role of the Multinational Joint Taskforce. The emerging dynamics in Borgu-Kainji demonstrate how unresolved conflicts in one place can mutate, overlap and spread into new areas when responses remain slow, fragmented and reactive.
Mass killings, abductions and roadside bombings in recent months point to a dangerous escalation of violent extremism along Nigeria’s western borders with Benin and Niger. In February, the Sadiku wing of Boko Haram’s Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction attacked Woro and Nuku villages in Kwara State’s Kaiama local government area. This followed the community’s refusal to embrace the terrorists’ doctrine. About 170 people were killed and many others were kidnapped by Sadiku-JAS ― Boko Haram’s furthest and most successful expansion outside Lake Chad Basin.
In response, President Bola Tinubu announced Operation Savannah Shield. Within days, however, further coordinated attacks struck communities in Borgu local government area in neighbouring Niger, with more than 30 civilians killed. These incidents ― with repeated roadside bomb attacks, mass abductions and targeted strikes on military formations ― form part of a wider pattern across the region.
Jihadist-group violence in Borgu-Kainji rose 86% from 2024 to 2025, increasing the death toll by 262%
Particularly worrying is the interaction among armed groups from different theatres. Sadiku-JAS is now operating in an environment with Lakurawa ― a jihadi-criminal network ― Ansaru-Mahmuda ― an early Boko Haram splinter ― and al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin elements filtering southward from the Sahel through northern Benin. Research by the Institute for Security Studies already points to operational cooperation and co-production of violence from groups such as Lakurawa and Sadiku-JAS.
This convergence creates opportunities for tactical learning, logistics coordination and transfer of resources across theatres. For example, both the Sadiku wing and larger JAS headquartered on Lake Chad’s islands are operationally networked, with pathways for arms and fighter reinforcements emerging from headquarters and ransom and extortion funds flowing back.
This resembles earlier failures in Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram exploited weak state presence, porous borders and slow political responses to entrench itself. While military operations in the area prevented the militants from sustaining territorial control on the scale seen in 2013, 2014 and early 2015, the ecosystem sustaining its operational resilience and financing has never been fully dismantled.
Similar conditions are emerging in Borgu-Kainji. First, terrain – poorly governed forests, waterways and porous borders – provides good cover for mobility, training and supply lines. It offers escape routes and hard-to-reach sanctuaries similar to Lake Chad Basin's Sambisa forest and Mandara mountains. Secondly, overlapping armed groups overwhelm and complicate security operations. Thirdly, illicit economies are powerful multipliers. Terrorists tax logging and small-scale artisanal mining, much as Boko Haram profits from fishing in Lake Chad Basin. Added to ransom payments and extortion of communities, this revenue funds weapons acquisition and recruitment and helps secure local cooperation.
If these dynamics continue unchecked, the axis could become a stable base for armed groups ― a gateway to the more stable southwestern Nigeria and coastal West Africa. That could shift attention and resources from Lake Chad, exacerbating national and regional security priorities.
The counter-terrorism action plan should stem the convergence of extremist theatres across West Africa
Nigeria’s response to date remains too narrow and geographically confined. Operation Savannah Shield focuses on Kaiama despite the highly mobile and cross-border threats. This reflects a broader weakness that has long affected continental counter-terrorism responses ― lack of coordination and cooperation to match armed group mobility and failure to target proactively their enabling ecosystem.
PSC discussions this month offer an opportunity to push for a more strategic cross-border response before the situation deteriorates further. The proposed counter-terrorism action plan should stem the convergence of extremist theatres across West Africa. Often, violent extremism in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and coastal states is treated through separate policy silos, despite increasingly clear connections among armed actors. For example, the February attack on Airbase 101 and Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, Niger was co-produced by Islamic State West Africa Province, Islamic State Sahel Province and fighters from sleeper cells in northwestern Nigeria.
The AU should encourage member states to move beyond country-specific approaches to integrated regional threat assessments and coordinated preventive action. These should include improving intelligence sharing on armed group supplies and logistics across borders and strengthening joint border surveillance mechanisms.
Military operations alone are not enough. The Lake Chad experience shows that insurgencies thrive amid governance vacuums. Therefore, kinetic efforts must be combined with governance improvements, expanding state presence through services and accountability to enhance local resilience and deny terrorists the void they exploit for recruitment and control. This is even more important given the current PSC climate-security discussions. Environmental stress, shrinking livelihoods and competition over natural resources continue to deepen vulnerability across Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel.
Local resilience must be enhanced and terrorists denied the void they exploit for recruitment and control
The AU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should, therefore, support a stabilisation framework for the Borgu-Kainji axis and Nigeria-Benin-Niger borderlands. The proposed 1 650-soldier ECOWAS standby force should then be activated quickly , combined with governance expansion, economic alternatives and environmental resilience measures. The force must include an amphibious or a naval formation to deny armed groups easy movement along waterways. Audiovisual materials reviewed by the Institute for Security Studies showed armed fighters moving weapons through a hybrid waterland route between Niger and Alibori. Informants advised that they were JAS fighters reinforcing Lakurawa at a border base between Alibori and Kebbi.
The political tension between ECOWAS and the juntas in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali is a challenge to effective cross-border cooperation. However, security realities increasingly demand pragmatic fixes regardless of political disagreements. The AU should advance re-engagement to address regional security.
At the same time, the Multinational Joint Taskforce requires renewed political and operational support. Although the force has faced limitations, it remains one of the few institutional frameworks for cross-border counter-terrorism operations in Lake Chad Basin. Lessons from its experience ― particularly intelligence fusion, joint operations and cross-border coordination ― could inform efforts in the Nigeria-Benin-Niger borderlands.
The central lesson from Lake Chad Basin is not that insurgents can become entrenched, but that slow and fragmented responses allow armed groups to evolve faster than the institutions confronting them. The affected member states, ECOWAS and the AU still have a narrowing window to prevent Borgu-Kainji from becoming the next major hub of regional violent extremism and terrorism.
