Overcoming security dilemmas in the Great Lakes region

Mistrust between leaders and the region’s militaristic past make security cooperation between affected countries difficult – but essential.

Published on 11 February 2025 in ISS Today

By

Paul-Simon Handy
Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa

Since the December 2024 meeting between Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Angola was cancelled due to Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s no-show, the M23 rebel group has continued its military advance in North Kivu, extending its control over the city of Goma in eastern DRC.

It has also launched a major offensive in South Kivu, despite the presence of the United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC and the 5 000-strong Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in the country.

Kagame didn’t participate in December because the DRC refused to commit to negotiations with M23. Thirteen years after the first M23 crisis, these new clashes bear out the enduring instability in the Great Lakes region.

Mutual accusations between the DRC and Rwanda persist. Kigali accuses Kinshasa of supporting the DRC-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – an argument regularly used by Rwanda to justify its military incursions in eastern DRC. The UN Group of Experts says over 4 000 Rwandan soldiers have been deployed in this so-called defensive intervention.

The current crisis highlights the failure of previous attempts to build a sustainable regional security architecture. Numerous models have been tested in the Great Lakes over the past two decades.

Can a regional security system be built when insecurity is driven by DRC’s weaknesses, not an external threat?

The most recent is the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (also called the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement). It outlined the various parties’ commitments (including ending support for foreign armed groups) and relied on the UN, African Union, SADC and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) as guarantors.

However, this agreement has been rendered ineffective by M23’s resurgence, supported by Rwanda and even Uganda, according to credible reports, as well as the DRC army’s well-documented collaboration with militias.

Long before the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, another tool, the ICGLR Pact, struggled to establish a collective security mechanism in the region. During the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebel group crises (2007-9) and the M23’s initial resurgence, the ICGLR could not enforce compliance with its commitments.

Its main instrument, the Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism, was overshadowed by more limited initiatives. The ICGLR lacked funding, and its members were unable to implement its decisions in the face of militarised countries that were reluctant to cooperate.

Great Lakes region Source: ISS

At the same time, economic integration, presented as a catalyst for stabilisation, has not delivered. The DRC’s entry into the East African Community in 2022 raised hopes that economic interdependence between the DRC’s eastern provinces and their neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya) could be formalised. But persistent political and economic rivalries, particularly between Rwanda and Uganda, have crippled this dynamic.

These long-term models of Great Lakes regional security have gone hand in hand with the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes, which focus on a more limited agenda of silencing the guns to allow for diplomacy.

Given the limitations of these two processes, how can a regional security system be built, given that the main source of insecurity stems from the intrinsic weaknesses of one member (the DRC), not from an external threat? The problem is compounded by deep-seated mistrust among political leaders.

Another challenge is the absence of a regional economic community straddling central, southern and eastern Africa. This is a role the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) – formed in 1976 by DRC, Rwanda and Burundi – could have played. Although CEPGL still exists, it is dormant. The lack of a functioning REC complicates regional responsibility for resolving crises, as it multiplies the number of actors who feel responsible for stability in the Great Lakes. 

Three possible solutions may be considered. First is the hegemonic model – a regional security system based on the military supremacy of a dominant actor. Similar to a common defence pact like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact, it seems inappropriate in the context of the Great Lakes, as non-aggression has failed within the ICGLR.

Although Rwanda has relative military superiority, its size, demography and economy don’t allow it to take on the role of regional policeman. In addition, other players such as Kenya and Tanzania remain torn between their commitments in the Great Lakes region and other regional priorities, particularly in East Africa.

A second option is to build a regional security system to counter the ambitions of a dominant player. However, economic and geographical interdependence between the Great Lakes region’s main states (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania) makes it difficult to identify a common enemy. And the fluidity of regional alliances makes it hard to form a coherent bloc.

A third – and the most realistic solution – is strengthening the cooperative approach in the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement and the ICGLR. This approach is based on coordination between states to prevent conflicts, while respecting economic and security interdependencies.

The Great Lakes region should be redefined to include only DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania

However, for this mechanism to work, several adjustments are needed. First, the Great Lakes region should be redefined to include only the five countries bordering the Albert, Kivu and Tanganyika lakes (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania). The past 20 years have shown that security cooperation is more successful when limited to just a few countries.

Second, a genuine common market in natural resources should be created to limit the conflicts linked to their informal exploitation.

Finally, the international guarantors of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement should be replaced by regional states with credible military capabilities, such as Angola and Tanzania. These countries should ensure agreements are implemented, and deviant actors are held accountable.

Most importantly, strengthening the Congolese state is essential. The DRC’s structural weakness remains the region’s primary source of instability. Without a state capable of controlling its borders, securing its territory and providing citizens with basic services, any regional architecture will fail.

The Great Lakes region, rich in opportunities but plagued by decades of conflict, can be stabilised only through an integrated approach in which regional cooperation and state building complement each other. Mistrust between leaders and the region’s militaristic past make security cooperation difficult – but not impossible.


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