Diplomacy without deterrence won’t bring peace in eastern DRC

No mediation effort has outlined the incentives required to move the conflict parties towards de-escalation, let alone peace.

Published on 15 August 2025 in ISS Today

By

Paul-Simon Handy
Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa

The fall of Goma and Bukavu to the March 23 Movement (M23)/Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) and Rwandan forces in early 2025 triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity across the Great Lakes region.

In February, the African Union (AU) endorsed a Southern African Development Community (SADC)-East African Community (EAC) joint proposal to merge the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes. But despite being officialised at the 1 August EAC-SADC summit, this ‘merger’ has been more symbolic than substantive.

While the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) refers to ‘alignment,’ the EAC insists on ‘merger’ – a semantic divergence that masks deeper institutional incoherence. Notably, it took a long time to establish an effective working relationship between the AU-appointed Mediator, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, and the Panel of Facilitators made up of former leaders from Nigeria, Kenya, Botswana, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic.

At the same time, two non-African diplomatic tracks have emerged. The United States has facilitated negotiations between Kinshasa and Kigali, while Qatar has brokered direct discussions between Kinshasa and the M23. These efforts have produced a Declaration of Principles in Doha, and a formal peace accord signed in Washington on 27 June.

Without a mechanism to compel a withdrawal of the RDF and the M23 from occupied territory, there is little incentive for de-escalation

Despite these apparent diplomatic breakthroughs, armed clashes persist across North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, ignoring repeated calls for a ceasefire. The gap between political process and military reality keeps widening. Under the current circumstances an exclusively political solution seems unlikely to resolve a conflict with such deeply rooted military, regional, and political dimensions.

A central paradox exists. On the battlefield, the M23 and its Rwandan allies have secured decisive tactical victories. In what could be referred to as a ‘Third Congo War’, Rwanda and its ally have defeated a combination of Congolese forces, SADC contingents, Burundian troops, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and even Romanian mercenaries.

In the process, Rwanda has undermined the regional influence of Angola and South Africa – two continental powers that have failed to either stabilise the frontlines or impose a diplomatic settlement.

However, these military victories contrast with Kinshasa’s international diplomatic successes. The DRC’s diplomacy has successfully framed the war narrative as a foreign aggression, earning near-universal condemnation of the M23 and its Rwandan backers.

But three major factors block any serious prospect for peace.

First, there is no credible military deterrent. Without a mechanism to compel a withdrawal of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and the M23 from occupied territory, there is little incentive for de-escalation. Future negotiations will require the capacity to apply meaningful pressure – something that neither the region nor the broader international community appear willing to mobilise.

Second, Kinshasa remains both politically and strategically unwilling to offer concessions to the M23, which it sees as a proxy force of Kigali. The emergence of Wazalendo militias – grassroots, community-based self-defence groups – has further complicated the matter.

These militias, who are far more active than the Congolese army in many contested areas, reject any compromise with the M23. Following SADC and Burundian forces’ withdrawal, alienating the Wazalendo would leave the DRC government militarily and socially exposed.

Third, the likelihood of a unilateral RDF withdrawal is low. Since losing control of Goma and Bukavu, the DRC has no oversight over key sections of its border with Rwanda. Expecting Kigali to pull back while Uganda and Burundi each maintain thousands of troops in the eastern DRC is unrealistic.

No mediation effort has clearly outlined the incentives or disincentives required to move the conflict parties toward de-escalation, let alone peace

These regional players operate in a state of competitive interference, each advancing their own interests under the guise of counter-insurgency or security cooperation. Still, diplomatic efforts persist in viewing the crisis as a bilateral DRC-Rwanda conflict, ignoring its broader regional context.

Cumulatively, these factors suggest a freezing of current positions. For Kinshasa, halting M23’s advance and securing US diplomatic involvement offered short-term insulation against the regime change ambitions of the coalition between AFC head Corneille Nangaa and the M23.

But hopes that American diplomacy alone will result in RDF withdrawal and full territorial restoration might have been misplaced. The Washington peace agreement imposes obligations on Kinshasa – such as dismantling coalitions with local armed groups and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda – without equivalent or verifiable commitments from Kigali regarding its support to the M23.

For Rwanda, maintaining a corridor of M23 control along the border ensures strategic depth within Congolese territory at minimal cost. What is emerging in the Kivus increasingly mirrors Ukraine’s Donbas – a de facto autonomous region outside national control but supported by a neighbouring state.

The response from regional actors has swung wildly from direct military intervention to diplomatic engagement. No mediation effort has clearly outlined the incentives or disincentives required to move the conflict parties toward de-escalation, let alone peace.

What’s needed is a strategic recalibration. Diplomatic engagement must be coupled with credible military deterrence. That means a meaningful military presence with appropriate artillery and aerial capabilities, and the adequate posture – not just to enforce ceasefires, but also to verify withdrawals, monitor cross-border flows, and protect civilians.

It also means recognising that current mediation efforts cannot succeed without recalibrating the regional balance of forces.

A rampant, uncoordinated loss of territorial control by the DRC government is already underway

This is not an easy option, but it presents the best prospects for sustainable peace. However, few regional or multilateral actors have the appetite – or political will – to engage militarily in such a complex and volatile region, especially against one of Africa’s most seasoned military powers.

And yet, without such a shift, ongoing peace processes will remain disconnected from battlefield dynamics, and the eastern DRC risks drifting into a protracted fragmentation.

Indeed, a rampant, uncoordinated loss of territorial control by the DRC government is already underway. As Rwandan-backed forces entrench themselves in North and South Kivu, Ugandan troops have expanded their footprint across the ‘Grand Nord’ and Ituri. This expansion, officially endorsed during the late June visit of Uganda’s Defence Chief General Muhoozi Kainerugaba to Kinshasa, took place without prior notification.

Meanwhile, Burundi has ramped up its military involvement in South Kivu to check the advance of M23 and its Banyamulenge allies, the Twirwaneho allied with Burundian armed group, Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi (RED Tabara).

Though Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi are not presently aligned, the situation increasingly resembles the late 1990s, when unsolicited interventions by neighbouring states resulted in the effective balkanisation of the Congolese state. Only Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan’s intervention helped rebalance military dynamics, paving the way for the Lusaka Accord in 1999 and the Sun City Agreement in 2002.

Diplomacy without leverage will not suffice. The international community must learn from recent history and adapt its approach, pairing dialogue with deterrence, words with muscles, and peace processes with enforcement mechanisms. Anything less risks entrenching the status quo and enabling the quiet undoing of Congolese sovereignty, one province at a time.


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