Is SADC's Biased Early Warning System Preventing Early Action over Swaziland?
In the context of an imminent SADC Troika Ministerial planning meeting later this month and as public protests by various formations of the Swaziland Democracy Campaign continue, questions remain about the efficacy of the Regional Early Warning System (REWS) and plausible reactions from SADC to these events, particularly its Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation).
Published on 11 November 2011 in
ISS Today
By
Dimpho Motsamai, Researcher, Africa Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
As public protests by various formations of the Swaziland Democracy Campaign continue, amid some level of unembellished brutality on the part of the Swazi police services and security apparatus, questions remain on the efficacy of the Regional Early Warning System (REWS) and plausible reactions from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to these events, particularly its security Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS). The dire humanitarian situation and efforts to compel political reform in Swaziland are well documented and known to SADC.
Indeed, the growing public dissent to the current Tinkhundla system of government ahead of 2013 general elections has the potential to threaten peace and stability not only in the Kingdom but in the region as well. Dissent have to do with balloting for the House of Assembly, which is done on a non-party basis, set up by the local council of each constituency/inkhundla, but believed to be sympathetic to the royal structures and highly unaccountable to the electorate. While many generally agree with the logic of SADC’s diplomatic interventions, that solutions cannot be proposed until the problem has been discussed as thoroughly as possible, the mere rebuff or seeming indifference of a conflict risk in Swaziland counters the efficacy of the OPDS and rationale of its REWS. The OPDS and the SADC Troika are required to, among others, prevent, manage and resolve ‘inter and intra state conflicts, by peaceful means employing inter alia, preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, and mediation’.
In the context of an imminent SADC Troika Ministerial planning meeting later this month, the OPDS ultimately needs to forge a truly collective and multilateral response to Swaziland, or at best define the ‘problem’ and/or ‘situation’ in the country. The snag, however, is that a few months ago the current Troika Summit chair, South Africa, made a unilateral economic intervention in Swaziland designed, inter alia, to facilitate political reforms, but was, ostensibly, snubbed by Swazi authorities. In its proposed strategy for the chairmanship of the OPDS, approved by cabinet on November 10 2011, South Africa has resolved to establish an interdepartmental core group under the leadership of the Department of International Relations and cooperation (DIRCO) to enable ‘full engagement’ in the fulfilment of its chairmanship mandate. For now, it is not certain whether or not South Africa can lead the Troika in taking a stronger resolution on the Swazi Kingdom. Anecdotal evidence points to the Organ’s weaknesses in responding to social unrest in the region attributed to domestic dissent generally, aside from reactive statements and undefined ad hoc missions which lack continuity, as was the case for Malawi during the August 2011 riots. How SADC identifies current and possible future events as threatening; its articulation of dynamics likely to promote the escalation of the threat; in addition to events in the offing that could trigger deterioration or create a window of opportunity for a more positive outcome remains a conundrum.
Granted that there was an attempt in 2004 to exert pressure on Swaziland to democratise and respect human rights through a SADC communiqué that underscored concerns over governance shortcomings. However, by and large, the ‘Swaziland exceptionalism’ accorded to the region’s absolute monarchy by SADC has persisted, along with the conspicuous ‘warning-response gap’. This can partly be attributed to some cognitive bias to both intelligence and decision-making on early warning within SADC structures. In the literature on early warning cognitive bias, the notion relates to perceived overestimation of risks in a given context, which consequently leads to resistance by policy-makers for preventive action, ‘preferring to risk a greater loss in the future rather than accept a certain one now’. This hypothesis gives rise to two key issues.
Firstly, the development and status of a seemingly clandestine intelligence based REWS and related processing of information and decision making on risks and uncertainty; and secondly, the definitions of conflict and circumstances that warrant OPDS diplomacy. Indeed, by design or default, little is know about the Gaborone-based REWS tasked with ‘warning SADC of an impeding conflict or its escalation as well as facilitating preventive action by SADC and or its member states’. Member states were meant to establish national early warning units feeding into the REWS, and according to the Strategic Implementation Plan of the Organ (SADC SIPO 2004:20), having ‘defined common standards to identify conflicts and promote regular assessments of factors that have the potential to lead to conflict, e.g. imbalances in welfare and poverty’. In the case of Swaziland, the existence of these national units are ambiguous let alone the issue of them existing, leading to a seemingly SADC indifference to resurgent public demonstrations on poor governance and deteriorating living conditions and recurrent violent responses on the part of Swazi governmnet.
The ability of the OPDS and the SADC Summit to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts is determined by the definitions of the circumstances of a particular conflict situation. For instance the OPDS protocol and the Defence Pact refer to the involvement of the OPDS and its chairperson, in this case South Africa, only in a ‘significant interstate and intra state conflict’. Certainly, this qualification was a response to countries that expressed concern about possible interferences in their internal affairs; the definitions are problematic in practice. ‘Significant’ interstate conflict refers to conflict between state parties to the protocol or between a state party and a SADC member that is not party to the protocol. According to the OPDS protocol, these conflicts include: conflicts over territorial boundaries and natural resources; conflicts where an act of aggression or other form of military force has been threatened or has occurred; and conflicts which threaten peace and security in the region or in a state party which is not party to the conflict.
Examples of significant intra state conflicts include: ‘large scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; a military coup or other threats to the legitimacy of the state; a condition of civil war or insurgency; and a conflict which threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of another state party’. It further notes that ‘any significant conflict’ may be tabled for discussion in the OPDS seemingly without the consent of the involved parties, but should the SADC Organ seek to resolve ‘any significant conflict’ it must seek the consent of the disputant parties to its peacemaking efforts.
The foregoing can be subjected to diverse interpretations but the long and short of it is that the nature of conflicts in the region has evolved and South Africa, in its capacity as chair of the OPDS, can refer to the range of powers the OPDS protocol has and, in consultation with other troika members, essentially table Swaziland for consideration on the basis of democratic consistency. The Swazi government has demonstrated relative resilience to both domestic and external pressure in the last few months, and it is highly plausible that it could recover from its fiscal woes, which had initially provided some catalyst for political reform. This scenario, while favourable, equally closes the window of opportunity for decisive and meaningful SADC action in giving impetus to genuine and sustained political reform.
In order to avoid belated hindsight diplomacy, the Troika Organ must at least enable conflict vulnerability assessment missions that will allow SADC to identify priority areas for intervention and policy-making. If not, plausible ways to further improve on the current models and systems of early warning as well as improving on bureaucratic changes to channel warnings more effectively to the relevant policy-makers will remain neglected.
The following need to be borne in mind regarding future SADC diplomatic initiatives in Swaziland: influencing change vis-à-vis public order policing and laws around public assembly, including the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act of 1938, the Public Order Act of 1963 which give the police overarching powers to control public gatherings among others; defining entry points along political timelines in Swaziland, for instance a possible referendum and or legislative reforms required for the promotion of human rights ahead of the 2013 polls; articulating the SADC position on multi-partism and political party registration in Swaziland; and lastly, its role in the 2013 elections, now a few months away and the application and relevance of its ‘Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO)’ in the absence of democratic space for continuous political engagement by civil society organisations in the country, among other concerns.
