David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

Earlier this week, on the 31st of January 2011, some 6.7 million voters went to the polls in Niger to choose the next president of the country and 133 members of parliament. The holding of these elections forms part of the one-year transition plan set up in the aftermath of the 18 February 2010 coup that ended former president Mamadou Tandja’s ambition to hang on to power as he was about to complete his second and last term in office. The military officers who seized power claimed they wanted to restore democratic rule in Niger.  With the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy and the National Consultative Council (Conseil Consultatif National) an independent body in charge of the transition roadmap, Niger looks set to emerge as an example of a successful post-coup transition.

Any further doubts about the attitude of the junta led by General Salou Djibo and whether it would effectively put an end to the transition are progressively fading away.  With a few weeks’ delay, the January 31st presidential and legislative elections followed a peaceful referendum on a new constitution in October 2010 and local elections held on the 8th January 2011. This provided an idea about the political and electoral map of the country ahead of what many observers believe is a peaceful presidential contest. Already, the results of the local elections saw the opposition National Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) of Mohamadou Issoufou taking the lead, closely followed by the former ruling party, the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD), the newly formed Niger’s Democratic Movement  (MDN) under the leadership of Hama Amadou, former disgruntled Tandja’s prime minister and former President Mahamane Ousmane’s Democratic and Social Convention (CSD).

According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the official results will only be proclaimed after a week and will have to be validated by the Constitutional Court. It is likely that the process will head towards a run-off that might pit a candidate of the former ruling party, weakened but still popular, against one of the members of the “Strategic Alliance”, a group of 17 political parties including the Mohamadou Issoufou’s PNDS, Hama Amadou’s MDN and Mahamane Ousmane’s (CDS) on 12 March. Members of that alliance adopted the formula to stand individually in the first round of the presidential election but will collectively endorse one candidate qualified for the run-off. That political pact seeks to bar the representative of former President Tandja – Senyi Oumarou - from winning the presidential race. The danger here is that the alliance could be shortlived if both top candidates for the run-off emerge from the opposition.

Beyond the outcomes of the presidential elections, Niger’s transition process took place with a minimal international supervision and concerns. Contrary to Guinea, where an International Contact Group was set up to accompany to process, and where the process was marred by acts of widespread violence, Niger’s leaders were almost entrusted with the confidence of the regional leaders to return the country to democratic order. This was a risk in itself. Yet, Salou Djibo’s personal commitment and leadership were key in addressing internal dissensions that at a time threatened to derail the process. In the same vein, he has made it possible for the victims of famine to receive substantial humanitarian assistance. The food crisis in Niger has been politicised by President Tandja who, on many occasions, publicly denied the existence of such a crisis in Niger. According to the UN agencies, about 5 million people benefited so far from food aid while over 220 000 severely malnourished children under five are now out of danger.

While officially opinions diverged on the coup in Niger, most observers, including regional leaders, saw in it a blessing in disguise. It is generally observed that the outcomes of a post-coup transition could be unpredictable, complicated by personal ambitions and fraught with security threats as illustrated by the Mauritanian case in 2008 and more recently in Guinea under Captain Dadis Camara. A peaceful transition in Niger will certainly display some sense of domestic responsibility in responding to political crises. It will also pose a challenge to actors within the West African region who continue to undermine regional as well as local efforts to bring about peace.

One could anticipate that Niger is likely to have a newly elected president who, according to the junta, will have the noble task of focusing on socio-economic challenges facing the country. In addition, while the Touareg insurgency seems dormant if not defeated, the new authorities will need to take coherent measures against the threat posed by the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM) that has extended its operations in urban areas.

One could also hope that the consensus that was built around the transition will prevail until power is transferred to the elected president on the 6th of April.  However, something that could not be guaranteed is whether the February 18 coup d’état will be the last coup in Niger and whether enough mechanisms have been built to prevent Niger from relapsing into further coups and counter-coups.