Could prolonged warfare in Sudan lead to the country splitting?
Shifting military dynamics, political fragmentation and external interference could escalate clashes, pushing the country towards partition.
The war in Sudan has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Changes in battlefield tactics, along with new political and diplomatic dynamics, are hampering mediation – and could see Sudan divided under two or more rival administrations.
During the first quarter of 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – on the defensive since the war started in April 2023 – recaptured territories held by its rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Then on 23 February, the SAF amended the country’s 2019 transitional constitution to eliminate all references to the RSF.
In response, the RSF introduced a charter and constitution for a ‘new Sudan’ and began establishing a parallel government to rival the Sovereign Council based in Port Sudan under the leadership of SAF commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Meanwhile, the civilian coalition Taqaddum split into two factions: Qimam, aligned with the RSF, and the neutral Somoud.
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Port Sudan and Darfur, Sudan
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These developments have stoked concerns about the country’s potential fragmentation and a major escalation in fighting. The current wave of SAF military successes began with the onset of the dry season in October 2024. Before the season ends in May, the SAF may ramp up operations, seeking decisive military gains particularly in and around Khartoum.
The RSF plans a massive counter-offensive to reclaim lost territory and extend its reach to other parts of the country. This would worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis and increase human rights violations, even as some internally displaced people return to ‘liberated’ areas. A reversal of SAF battlefield gains is not impossible, and would continue the seesaw balance of power that has characterised the conflict.
The war may also significantly change the Horn of Africa’s geostrategic landscape, particularly if the proposed parallel government gains traction. Multilateral organisations such as the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) have condemned the idea as it contradicts the principle of the integrity of national borders.
Ethiopia, recently elected to the AU Peace and Security Council, is expected to approach the issue cautiously to avoid inflaming its own secessionist movements.
Kenya’s hosting of the RSF and allied Sudanese groups to finalise the charter for a parallel government sparked controversy. But the country has yet to take a clear stance on the matter. Ongoing diplomatic tensions with Port Sudan stem from Kenyan President William Ruto’s close relationship with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).
The SAF amended Sudan’s 2019 transitional constitution to eliminate all references to the RSF
Although the region’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development has not articulated a unified position, Uganda has rejected the RSF proposal. South Sudan remains silent, probably for fear of worsening its strained relationship with its northern neighbour.
The RSF appears increasingly isolated, with Libya being its most significant supporter due to Hemedti’s ties with Libyan National Army commander General Khalifa Haftar. Even Chad, which had previously granted the RSF military bases, is wavering.
The positions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) underscore the complexities of foreign involvement in Sudan. Alliances between external actors and Sudan’s main combatants would likely persist, even with a parallel government.
Turkey is allegedly supplying military technology to both sides while simultaneously brokering a deal between the SAF and UAE. Russia too has links with both the RSF and SAF. These moves secure Russia and Turkey’s interests in Sudan, irrespective of which belligerent wins the war.
While the UAE has not taken a definitive stance, its longstanding ties and diplomatic strategies suggest a preference for the RSF. Sudan’s recent petition to the International Court of Justice seems focused on highlighting the UAE’s links to the RSF rather than addressing the human rights violations allegedly committed during the conflict – of which both sides stand accused.
The war may change the Horn’s geostrategic landscape, particularly if the parallel government gains traction
Consolidation of SAF military gains could end the conflict. However, while the SAF could overrun additional states in Sudan, the RSF probably won’t be defeated soon. With the support of several armed and unarmed groups, and RSF supply lines linked to Chad and Libya, a prolonged conflict could ensue, leading to either a de facto division of the country or a negotiated separation.
The alternative may be a long guerrilla war involving many factions. While the SAF and RSF profess their commitment to Sudanese unity, they are backed by opposing civilian groups, local militias, and unpredictable external entities with seemingly irreconcilable ideological differences. And the belligerents’ positions reinforce division rather than national unity.
The new RSF charter endorses secularism. Meanwhile, the SAF’s removal of all references to the RSF in Sudan’s transitional constitution appears to reflect the continuing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SAF. The SAF’s reluctance to negotiate with the neutral Somoud coalition, and the main parties’ hardline positions and insistence on a military solution, make compromise and a permanent ceasefire seem unlikely.
Establishing two rival administrations in Sudan could result in a protracted conflict, making the AU’s mediation efforts harder. The belligerents would defer more to their external supporters than the AU, and civilians and internal armed groups would become increasingly fragmented or continue seeking recognition from the RSF or SAF.
The AU must adjust its mediation approach to incorporate the possibility of Sudan splitting
The AU High-level Panel and AU Committee of Five Heads of State may have anticipated the shifts in alliances, but don’t seem to have adapted to the possibility of disintegration. The AU’s ongoing pursuit of a unified Sudan is becoming increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground. The organisation must adjust its mediation to incorporate the possibility of Sudan splitting.
Besides the RSF’s proposal, Darfuri groups – marginalised by successive governments in Khartoum – have previously called for separation from Sudan. Such demands are challenging but not unprecedented, as shown by South Sudan’s split from Sudan in 2011. Nevertheless, the consequences of division must be carefully assessed.
By maintaining the current mediation format, the AU risks inadvertently facilitating Sudan’s separation without proper preparation. The much-discussed division of labour between the AU and UN on peacebuilding, along with an expanded mediation mechanism, is vital. A multi-layered, multi-actor strategy, possibly involving proxy processes, should be explored.
In June 2024, the PSC instructed its sanctions sub-committee to investigate those providing military, political and financial support to Sudan’s warring factions. This evidence is now urgently needed to enable the AU to target those in Africa and beyond who unilaterally contravene its frameworks.
This article was first published by the ISS’s PSC Report.
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