The time for PSC reform is now
With its decisions often ignored and its legitimacy questioned, innovative thinking, improved capacity and stronger enforcement are PSC imperatives.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is central to the governance of peace and security in Africa. But two decades after its inception, despite certain gains made, Africa remains dogged by familiar and recurrent challenges.
Accordingly, recognition is growing within the Council (although not without opposition from some members) and among observers that reform is vital to create a better-performing entity. But is reform necessary? What are the grounds for it? And what strategic areas would require focus to ensure a more responsive organisation, with enhanced response to conflict, insecurity and governance in Africa?
A context in flux
The peace and security context in which the Council now operates and gaps in its response efforts buttress the imperative for reform. The current outlook is marked by, among others, unyielding terrorism and violent extremism, unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs), border disputes among states, external interference and the destabilising role of private security and military companies. Also weighing in are the fallouts from the Russia-Ukraine and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and heightened insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic and Sudan.
This context imposes immense pressure on the Council’s response posture and capacity. It also brings into sharp focus how the body can consolidate its gains in silencing the guns and achieving a peaceful and secure Africa. The PSC stands out among all African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) infrastructure and is arguably the most vibrant. As of 21 June 2024, the PSC has held 1 218 meetings, the outcomes of which have guided the continental quest for peace, security and governance.
The PSC stands out among all APSA infrastructure and is arguably the most vibrant
Its most notable decision followed its June heads of state meeting on Sudan. There, it directed its newly activated PSC Subcommittee on Sanctions to identify all external backers of the war and make proposals on how to contain them within three months.
The PSC has also adopted a comprehensive approach to addressing the continent's key challenges, employing an integrated governance, security and development framework. The Council recognises that a hard focus on traditional threats is less useful than one that considers governance, development and multiple dimensions of human security interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Thus, it has sought to address threats comprehensively.
Additionally, the number of meetings and informal seminars has grown between the Council and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union. This is firmly in line with Article 7(k) of the PSC Protocol which mandates the Council to promote and develop strong partnerships for peace and security.
As Africa’s stability is inextricably linked to international peace and security, the enhancement of these partnerships – facilitated by the three African states on the UNSC (A3) – allows for joint deliberation and activities to maintain peace and security continentally and internationally. Despite these gains, gaps in the PSC’s response efforts persist.
Response gaps
Taking stock of the PSC’s work over the last two decades reveals weak capacity for early crisis response and preventive diplomacy. The approach is heavy on conflict management and light on anticipation and prevention. This stems in part from deficiencies in the implementation of APSA compounded by weaknesses in effecting recent reforms. For instance, the Continental Early Warning System, which seeks to anticipate and prevent conflicts, has suffered from changes in its implementation in form and approach. The Panel of the Wise, despite its advisory role to the PSC, is not well-resourced financially, and the capabilities of its secretariat are limited. Furthermore, the AU special envoy role is underused, with envoys rarely receiving adequate substantive and administrative support to conduct their mandate.
Governance, development and human security should be viewed as interrelated and mutually reinforcing
Strong divisions within the PSC and between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) about appropriate responses to continental crises affect conflict anticipation and prevention. The coup in Niger illustrates implicitly how these divisions are eroding consensus on key normative frameworks, including the Lomé and Malabo declarations on UCGs. Even when the Council assumes an anticipation and prevention approach, the situations in Niger and Sudan demonstrate how a growing culture of member state denialism of reports on looming crises challenges early response. Citing sovereignty, states are increasingly becoming hostile to unfavourable decisions of the Council and RECs (in these cases, the Economic Community of West African States and Intergovernmental Authority on Development).
This outlook is complicated by the PSC’s inconsistent application of agreed norms on UCGs. Article 7(g) of the Protocol affords the powers to institute sanctions whenever a UCG takes place in a member state in line with the Lomé Declaration. However, the Council’s capacity to deter military takeovers and similar incidents has weakened considerably, aided in part by the steadily inconsistent application of coup-prohibiting normative frameworks. This has raised questions about the legitimacy of the PSC and other African stakeholders to act in the interests of continental peace and security. An unintended consequence of this is that the threat and imposition of suspensions no longer seem to deter coup behaviour. Added to this, the Council seems heavily focused on military takeovers and seems to have turned a blind eye to incumbents’ growing creativity in circumventing and changing constitutional limits on their power.
The PSC thus seems to be a decision-making body without a robust enforcement mechanism. Council decisions are at the heart of the implementation of the PSC Protocol. Yet the rate of implementation of Council decisions remains low. Despite it being very active – judging from the number of meetings held in 20 years – it struggles to enforce its decisions on critical issues. The recent elections in Chad point to a lack of respect. While the communique of the PSC’s 1152nd meeting was clear that transitional authorities cannot take part in elections, incumbents ignored this, instead participating and emerging winners.
Strategic reform priorities
The aforementioned and other well-established challenges to the Council’s functioning underline opportunities to negotiate reforms to enhance its effectiveness in confronting legacies of conflict and instability. But the Council has remained divided on whether – and on what aspects – there is a need for reform. Notwithstanding arguments in favour of the status quo, there are grounds for reform to enable the PSC to fulfil its mandate. The agenda recommending the ‘required’ reform of the PSC is broad and comprises numerous issues, but there is ample basis for a review of the PSC Protocol and the Council’s working methods.
This is timely considering the PSC’s request for the AU Commission to adapt APSA to contemporary security challenges. Reviewing the PSC Protocol in this context is vital. The aim is not to dismantle the PSC but to strengthen it by bridging gaps in its functioning stemming from shortfalls in and (mis)application of some of its 22 provisions.
The aim is not to dismantle the PSC but to strengthen it by bridging gaps in its functioning
Composition, for example, divides the current Council and could potentially affect its functioning in the medium- to long term. West Africa’s insistence on retaining four of the 15 Council seats and North Africa’s push for a third seat (it currently holds two) remains contentious. This is despite the Protocol being clear that ‘the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation’ be applied. Should Nett4Peace partners review the legal framework underpinning Council work, they could clarify this and issues such as subsidiarity.
To be laser-sharp in mandate delivery, the Council will also need to innovate in its working methods to bring new means to confront multiple continental challenges. It has already included field missions and retreats, but their impact is hardly visible. An infusion of new thinking is needed into how enforcement mechanisms can be strengthened to ensure the uptake of decisions by member states and other stakeholders.
Strategic objectives would include enhancing the PSC Secretariat’s institutional capacity (with human and financial resources) and developing clear criteria for a trigger mechanism to facilitate early action consistently to emerging circumstances. More AU Peace Fund and other resources should be secured for peace activities. The ASF should become fully operational to ensure quick response to pressing conflicts, consistently apply norms in crises and depoliticise agenda-setting to ensure that important issues are addressed. Strong enforcement mechanisms are vital to implement decisions (including joint decisions from engagements with the UNSC and the EU) and could help bolster the Council’s legitimacy.
