Addressing regional escalation in the Great Lakes Region

M23’s advance exposes the limits of current peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Published on 16 December 2025 in ISS Today

Bram Verelst
Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS

Said Abdullahi
Research Intern, Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS Nairobi

On 4 December, the presidents of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity at a ceremony in Washington, hosted by United States (US) President Donald Trump.

The accords reaffirm commitments to the June 2025 peace agreement, complemented by a Regional Economic Integration Framework. Regional heads of state attended the ceremony, including Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye.

While leaders were making peace in Washington, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion launched a renewed offensive in South Kivu, advancing towards Uvira via the border region with Burundi. The group seized Uvira on 10 December 2025. The devastating offensive left at least 400 dead and displaced over 200 000.

This escalation raises regional tensions. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi accuses Rwanda of violating its commitments, and Burundi denounces Rwanda’s ‘belligerent attitude’. Rwanda claims that the DRC and Burundi – whose troops are deployed in eastern DRC – have violated ceasefire arrangements.  

While leaders were making peace in Washington, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion launched a renewed offensive in South Kivu

Why have peace processes failed to avert this escalation?   

First, the Washington Accords do not include M23, which is engaged in parallel talks with the government in Doha. But the Doha track – despite producing a framework agreement in November – has made little headway on establishing a ceasefire or political and security arrangements.

Rwanda continues to back M23, while Kinshasa remains unwilling to offer concessions to M23. African-led efforts, such as the merged Luanda and Nairobi processes by the East African Community and Southern African Development Community, are eclipsed by Doha and Washington and lack a political process to break the deadlock.  

Second, international pressure on key conflict parties remains too limited. Coercive instruments such as sanctions are largely absent, as the US and Qatar use mediation roles to secure investments and access to raw materials through the DRC and Rwanda.

The cost of expanding the war is low. Rwanda benefits from weakening international norms against aggression, while democratic backsliding and worsening political stability in the DRC have elicited only muted international responses.  

Third, peace processes overlook the interconnected internal and regional drivers that shape the conflict. In the DRC, the M23 rebellion reflects and fuels broader armed mobilisation rooted in unresolved conflicts over land, local power, and the presence of foreign rebel groups. Local actors, including militias, have criticised their exclusion from peace talks.

‘Silver bullet’ solutions – such as neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a core component of the Washington deal – are unlikely to succeed without addressing the wider mobilisation dynamics that are reinforced by the continued presence of foreign forces.

'Silver bullet' solutions are unlikely to succeed without addressing wider mobilisation dynamics

Regionally, neighbouring Uganda and Burundi have also shaped the M23 crisis. Their bilateral deployments in eastern DRC – Uganda in North Kivu and Ituri, Burundi in South Kivu – take place within a regional spectrum that interacts with an expanding Rwandan and M23 influence and a retreating and fragmenting Congolese state.

Their operations serve a mix of interests, some competing or conflicting with Rwanda’s. Kigali’s relations with its neighbours are complex: ties with Kampala remain ambiguous, while those with Burundi are openly tense. 

Efforts to normalise Burundi-Rwanda relations after Burundi’s 2015 political crisis failed amid renewed tensions over the deployment of Burundian soldiers in eastern DRC against M23 and accusations of Rwandan support to Burundian rebels.

This prompted Burundi to close its border with Rwanda in 2024. Rwanda and M23 accuse Burundi of backing the FDLR. These tensions must also be understood in light of a worsening local situation in South Kivu.

M23’s entry into South Kivu last year – including the capture of Bukavu and alliance with the Banyamulenge armed group Twirwaneho – further worsened security gaps following the United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC’s (MONUSCO) withdrawal.

Fighting involving Burundian soldiers, M23 and local armed groups further restricted humanitarian access, affecting Banyamulenge and other communities. Alongside Burundian support to Congolese military operations, this local escalation contributed to M23’s offensive and push for Burundian withdrawal.

The offensive carries dire consequences for Burundi. Over 60 000 Congolese refugees have fled into the country at a time when tens of thousands of Burundian refugees face the prospect of forced return from Tanzania.

There’s an urgent need to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and end external support for armed groups

Meanwhile, prolonged economic crisis and heavy dependence on the Congolese market deepen Burundi’s vulnerability, as borders with Rwanda and the DRC are closed and Tanzania’s political tensions worsen regional instability.

As conflict lines move south, the DRC-Burundi border closure further constrains humanitarian access. Humanitarian assistance must be urgently scaled up and pressure applied to ensure access.

With the Bukavu and Goma airstrips closed, keeping Bujumbura airport – located just a few kilometres from the border – operational is critical. And attempts to disrupt humanitarian air operations – including through Rwandan GPS jamming – must be prevented.

There is an urgent need to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and end external support for armed groups. Without this, key local and national conflict drivers cannot be effectively addressed. This requires a shift away from parallel peace processes – such as the Luanda-Nairobi and Washington-Doha processes – to a sequenced approach, with Rwandan disengagement conditioning actions against the FDLR and peace dialogue.

But the broader regionalisation of conflict must also be addressed, as further M23 advances towards provinces such as Maniema, Tanganyika and Haut-Katanga risk drawing in further regional involvement and compounding the presence of foreign forces.

This process must involve regional bodies, such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and be anchored in UN Security Council Resolution 2773, which calls for the withdrawal of the M23 and Rwandan troops and the restoration of Congolese State authority in M23-held areas. This should promote an inclusive regional process that not only manages the regional fallout from the eastern DRC conflict, but also tackles the regional drivers that continue to sustain armed mobilisation in DRC itself.

Lessons can be drawn from the Second Congo War (1998-2003), when regional disengagement through the 2002 Pretoria and Luanda Agreements eventually paved the way for a Congolese-led peace process.

Such steps are necessary for a genuine national peace process, including M23 and other actors, to take root and to confront the structural conditions that perpetuate conflict in the DRC.

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