Unification, division, prolonged warfare – what lies in store for Sudan?
Sudan’s conflict has reached a critical point of shifting military dynamics, political fragmentation and increasing external influence.
As 2025 began, the conflict in Sudan took a serious turn, with changes in battlefield tactics and the roles of local and international actors stalling resolution. This has left African Union (AU) policy actors – especially the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – with a significantly altered landscape of hampered mediation, changing military dynamics and the potential division of Sudan.
Against this backdrop, the International Court of Justice is set to evaluate Sudan's petition against the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Faction leaders, generals Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, face United States sanctions, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is accused of genocide and Sudan may be governed by two or more rival administrations.
As military confrontations escalate, no new solutions have emerged from either domestic or external efforts. Rather, the futility of military approaches is reiterated, the need for inclusive negotiations stressed and the termination of external support for the warring parties advocated. Given the shifting political, military and diplomatic landscape, the AU High-level Panel and AU Presidential Committee must adapt and enhance their strategies, especially as the conflict surpasses two years.
Worrying developments
During the first quarter of 2025, military, political and diplomatic events unfolded with uncertain outcomes. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which had been on the defensive since the beginning of the conflict, recaptured territories previously held by the RSF. It also amended the 2019 transitional constitution to eliminate all references to the RSF.
The PSC must adjust to hampered mediation, changing military dynamics and possible division of Sudan
In response, the RSF introduced a charter and constitution for a ‘new Sudan’ and began to establish a parallel government to rival the Sovereign Council in Port Sudan. Meanwhile, the civilian group Taqqadum split into two factions: Qimam, aligned with the RSF, and the neutral Somoud. With the exception of Somoud, the conflicting parties are acting as if the war is either over or nearing an end.
These developments have stoked concerns about the potential fragmentation of the country and the possibility of major escalation. The current wave of SAF successes began with the onset of the dry season in October 2024. As this season ends in May, the SAF may seek decisive military gains, particularly in and around Khartoum. In response, the RSF is planning a massive counteroffensive to reclaim lost territory, retaliate for its casualties and spread the conflict to other parts of the country. This may worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis and increase human rights violations, even as some internally displaced persons return to ‘liberated’ areas. A reversal of SAF battlefield gains, then, is not entirely out of the question, which could continue the seesaw status that has characterised this conflict.
Regional Context
The Sudan conflict may significantly change the geostrategic landscape of the Horn of Africa, particularly if the proposal for a parallel government put forth by Taasis – the RSF’s civilian wing – gains traction. Multilateral organisations such as the AU and United Nations have condemned the idea since it contradicts the AU principle of uti possidetis, which upholds the integrity of national borders. Furthermore, it would have implications beyond Sudan.
Ethiopia, recently elected to the PSC, is expected to approach the issue cautiously to avoid inflaming its own secessionist movements. Meanwhile, Kenya's decision to host the RSF has sparked controversy but has yet to produce a clear stance. Diplomatic tensions with Port Sudan are an ongoing issue stemming from President William Ruto’s close relationship with RSF leader Hemedti. Although the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has not articulated a unified position, Uganda has rejected the proposal. South Sudan, Sudan’s neighbour, has remained silent, probably for fear of worsening its already strained relationship.
The geostrategic landscape may change markedly if the call for a parallel government gains traction
The RSF appears increasingly isolated, with Libya being its most significant supporter due to Hemedti's relationship with Libyan National Army commander General Khalifa Haftar. Even Chad, which had previously granted the RSF military bases, is wavering in its support after envoys of Chad’s President Mahamat Déby on 2 March requested a meeting with al-Burhan. The positions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE underscore the complexities of foreign involvement in Sudan.
These positions suggest that alliances between external actors and the main combatants are likely to persist, even if a parallel government is established. Russia and Turkey’s stance are shrewd. Turkey is allegedly supplying military technology to both parties while simultaneously brokering a deal between the SAF and UAE. Russia’s established links with both the RSF and SAF indicate that it is trying to maintain a balance by engaging with both sides. These moves secure Russia and Turkey’s interests in Sudan, irrespective of the United States’ position or which belligerent wins the war.
While the UAE has not taken a definitive stance, its longstanding ties and diplomatic strategies suggest a preference for the RSF. In this context, Sudan's recent petition to the International Court of Justice seems focused primarily on highlighting the extent of the UAE's links to the RSF rather than addressing the human rights violations allegedly committed during the conflict. The RSF and the SAF are both complicit in human rights violations committed over the course of the conflict.
Looking ahead
Consolidation of SAF military gains could potentially end the conflict. Regional policy circles may be considering and even preferring this outcome, although for diplomatic reasons, no official support has been explicitly voiced. Support would contradict the political solutions that Sudan’s neighbours and the AU have advocated. However, it is unlikely that the RSF will be defeated soon. Instead, the SAF could overrun additional states of Sudan but fail to completely rout the RSF, forcing it to retreat to its strongholds in Darfur. With the support of several armed and unarmed groups, and functional RSF supply lines linked to Chad and Libya, a prolonged conflict could ensue, leading to either a de facto division of the country or a negotiated separation.
With its current mediation format, the AU risks facilitating Sudan's 'sleepwalk' into a division
The alternative may be a very long guerrilla war involving many factions. While both the SAF and RSF profess commitment to Sudanese unity, they are backed by opposed civilian groups, local militias and unpredictable external entities whose ideological differences are seemingly irreconcilable. The positions adopted by the belligerents reinforce further division rather than national unity.
The new RSF charter and constitution endorses secularism. The SAF has amended Sudan’s transitional constitution to remove all references to the RSF. This omission appears to reflect the continuing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SAF and indicates great animosity towards the RSF. SAF reluctance to negotiate with Somoud suggests that all parties are far from reaching a compromise, making separation a more likely possibility.
The hardline stance of the main parties and their insistence on a military solution will diminish the chance of a permanent ceasefire. Given the factions’ reluctance to relinquish the advantages of their recent political tactics in Nairobi and Port Sudan, a quick resolution appears unlikely but not impossible. Rival governments could result in a protracted conflict supported by external actors — an outcome that the AU has historically found difficult to manage.
Implications and options for the PSC
The establishment of two administrations in Sudan, if successful, will marginalise the AU's mediation efforts. The primary belligerents will defer more to their external supporters than to the AU. Internal actors such as civilians and armed groups will become increasingly fragmented or continue to seek recognition from either the RSF or the SAF, albeit without meaningful impact independently.
A multilayered and multi-actor strategy, possibly involving proxy processes, should be explored
The AU High-level Panel and the AU Committee of Five Heads of State may have anticipated the fragmentation of fighting forces and shifts in alliances. However, they do not seem to have foreseen or adapted to the possible disintegration of the country. The ongoing pursuit of a unified Sudan is – as with the PSC’s 1264th meeting of 11 March 2025 – becoming increasingly disconnected from ground realities. The AU must adjust its mediation to the possibility of the country splitting and incorporate this into its mediation contingency plans.
The need for this is evident even before the full implications of recent developments are understood. Besides the RSF’s proposal, Darfuri groups – marginalised by successive governments in Khartoum – have previously called for the same. While these demands are challenging on many levels, they are not entirely unprecedented, as seen in South Sudan’s split from Sudan in 2011. Nevertheless, the consequences of following such a direction must be carefully assessed. By maintaining the current mediation format, the AU risks inadvertently facilitating Sudan's separation without proper preparation, essentially 'sleepwalking' into a division.
The AU should consider these possibilities and tailor its approach as the situation evolves. The much-discussed division of labour between the AU and United Nations, along with an expanded mediation mechanism, will remain necessary. However, the core mediation objectives appear to be changing. At least, a multilayered and multi-actor strategy, possibly involving proxy processes, should be explored.
During the 1 218th PSC meeting, the Sanctions Subcommittee was instructed to investigate those providing military, political and financial support to the warring factions. Now, more than ever, it is essential to gather this evidence to shift the conversation from speculation toward reality and establish a framework that minimises unilateral actions by actors in Africa and beyond.
