Situation Report: Zimbabwe: Smoke Screens and Mirrors, Chris Maroleng

SITUATION REPORT: ZIMBABWE: SMOKE SCREENS AND MIRRORS

Chris Maroleng, February 2003

Shortly before President Robert Mugabe’s controversial victory in the Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential elections rumors circulated of an exit strategy involving the departure into exile of this veteran head of state. Though a year has passed since the first plan for a graceful exit was revealed, Mr Mugabe, now 78, appears in no hurry.

In early January 2003 reports emerged of an exit strategy involving Zimbabwean speaker of Parliament, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (tipped as Mugabe`s chosen successor) and armed forces Chief-of-Staff General Vitalis Gava Zvinavashe. It was reported that retired former special forces Colonel, Lionel Dyck, acting for Mr Mnangagwa (his close business associate) and Mr Zvinavashe, met the leader of the Zimbabwean opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Morgan Tsvangirai in December 2002 to discuss a ‘soft landing’ for Mr Mugabe. This plan involved the President relinquishing power; the formation of a government of national unity; and the staging of free and fair elections. Once details were published, Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe hastily denied any involvement. President Mugabe, apparently unaware of how far plans had advanced, later described an exit deal as “foolhardy” and “counter-revolutionary”. Mr Tsvangirai also publicly distanced himself from the plan saying: "The MDC is not in the business of arranging succession strategies for an illegitimate regime that survives on the basis of a systematic and ruthless subversion of democracy and fundamental human rights and continues to rule through the barrel of the gun."

The ‘soft landing’ deals may be a rumour but the economic collapse, which has prompted them, is all too true. The economic gains and social service expansion of the 1980s has been reversed. Zimbabwean economist, John Robertson, claims the economy has shrunk by 11% over the past year. The official exchange rate (Zim $55 to US $1) and the parallel market (Zim $1,800 to US $1) diverge more each day. Fuel shortages continue and many companies have shut down. The Zimbabwean government’s ill-executed agrarian reform programme has, as yet, been unable to create a new self-sufficient class of small-scale farmers to fill the vacuum left by evicted white farmers. This controversial land-grab has undermined commercial farming, previously the economic bedrock. Production estimates for key crops in 2003 are sharply down, affecting Zimbabwe`s formerly robust agro-manufacturing industry. The current drought, attributed to the El Niño climatic effect, and the negative effects of the land programme have resulted in a severe food crisis. The government`s search for new financiers has failed to match suspended donor aid and foreign exchange remains rare.

It is almost certain that the rapid decline of Zimbabwe’s economic fortunes, more than any political rationale, has motivated the aggressive pursuit of an exit strategy for Mr Mugabe. Mnangagwa is at the center of a tangled business network that includes ZANU-PF’s investment wing, ZIDCO holdings, and several other investment companies with extensive links to Zimbabwe’s political and business elite. In a rare media interview Zvinavashe told the Business Tribune (owned by Mnangagwa’s ally, Mutumwa Mawere) that Zimbabwe’s economic crisis was caused by bad policies and recommended that a national task force address the "emergency situation".

Mnangagwa’s rivals, however, suspect that his real plan is to place himself in the presidency. Some within Zanu-PF see this as a Karanga plot to seize power. Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe are both Karanga, one of the six Chishona ethno-linguistic groups and the most numerous of Zimbabwe’s ethnic groups. Therefore, the question then arises: what would the power play surrounding Mugabe’s exit mean for the internal dynamics of ZANU -PF, and the central issue of an eventual presidential succession.

The dominant faction, currently led by Mr Mugabe, draws its core following from the Zezuru ethno-linguistic group. Other leaders of this group include political heavyweights such as retired Lieutenant General Tapfumanei Solomon Mujuru (nom de guerre Rex Nhongo) who is considered by many to be a potential kingmaker because of his extensive political, commercial connections. Theses connections include Air force Commander and Mugabe’s nephew, Air Marshal Perence Shiri and Army Commander Lieutenant General Constantine Chiwenga. Though often underestimated because of his ability to avoid the limelight, Mujuru is a force to be reckoned with. Another important Zezuru player is Dr Sydney Sekeramayi, currently Minister of Defense. Sekeramayi is seen by some as a presidential contender partly because of his powerful voice in ZANU-PF’s upper echelons, but mainly because of his strong connection to Mujuru. However, most analysts predict that Sekeramayi would support the former Minister of Finance, Dr Simbarashe Makoni. Makoni is considered to be a political lightweight within the ruling ZANU-PF and would need the backing of a more powerful party baron.

For many in the Zezuru faction, the Karanga group represents a threatening third force. This is particularly true of Emmerson Mnangagwa, a key contender in the presidential succession race because of his track record as Security Minister and the high esteem in which President Mugabe holds him. However, if it is true that Mugabe was not fully informed of the negotiations for his exit, which (according to reliably placed sources) included several meetings with South African and British intermediaries, then this raises questions about the strength of the Mugabe–Mnangagwa alliance and why the plan was exposed so dramatically. Clues may be found in statements by Mugabe’s propaganda chief, Information Minister Prof. Jonathan Moyo, who told the state-owned daily, The Herald, that the Mnangagwa plan amounted to a coup d’etat. Moyo, whose influence is based entirely on his loyalty to Mugabe, is probably aware that his political career is linked to that of his master, has denied that an exit for Mugabe is imminent. The statement from Mugabe’s mouthpieces Moyo, together with the fact that Mugabe was not fully informed, might indicate a rift between Mugabe and Mnangagwa. If true, the Zezuru camp, led by Mujuru, would prefer to see their own man, Sidney Sekeramayi, or technocrat Dr Simba Makoni take the top spot in any post-Mugabe government. Zvinavashase’s possible retirement from his position as Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Force this year after nearly 10 years in service will further weaken Mnangagwa’s support base in the defense force, where Mujuru supporters, former Commander of the notorious 5th Brigade Air Marshal Shiri and Lieutenant General Chiwenga, add to the Zezuru influence.

Observers can look forward to an eventful year as the inner ZANU-PF contest for the succession to the presidency intensifies. Revelations of an exit strategy that Mugabe had not fully consented to, requires analysts to consider how loyal Mugabe`s power base really is. While the military top brass may be loyal, Mugabe cannot count on the support of the rank-and-file. Faced with the collapse of the economy and Mugabe`s alleged imminent departure from power, ZANU-PF officials, with a personal interest in the economy, may reconsider their allegiance. Factionalism in ZANU-PF could lead to its disintegration, which would create space for the MDC to take power. However, the weakness of the MDC—caused mainly by Mugabe’s strategy of undermining civil society organisations opposed to his rule—has made this highly unlikely. Should Mnangagwa succeed in his plans to take the presidency, the Zezuru camp would find itself excluded from State House for the first time since independence, a prospect not conducive to future peace and stability.