Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate authorising the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ends on 31 October 2012. While the October Security Council Report forecasts the extension of the Mission’s mandate without any difficulties (based on AMISOM’s perceived approval from the UNSC), the delay in renewing the mandate has raised questions about the possible fate of peace making and peacekeeping operations in Somalia, should the mandate not be extended. Allowing peace support operations in Somalia with the aim of stabilising the country and creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, the UNSC mandate has previously been renewed every six months. Interestingly, however, while the UNSC mandate expires on 31 October 2012, AMISOM’s African Union (AU) mandate only comes to an end on 16 January 2013. The UNSC mandate is, however, important because it comes with a logistical support package for AMISOM comprising equipment and services.

AMISOM, which brings together troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya (there are also Ethiopian troops but they do not operate under AMISOM’s mandate), has been credited with key achievements, including routing out the militant group Al-Shabaab’s leadership and structures from the key strategic towns of Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kisimayo and Afgoye, among others. A non-renewal of AMISOM’s mandate, therefore, while not plausible at the moment, would portent nightmare scenarios for Somalia were it to happen. It would severely undermine hopes for the new Somali government and prospects for peace and stability.

The delay may, however, be occasioned by discussions around the AU’s desire to revise the UNSC support package to AMISOM taking into account the new realities on the ground (i.e. the need to provide for additional civilian protection and maritime components) while the UNSC apparently prefers any review of AMISOM packages to be conducted in tandem with its strategic review of the UN presence in Somalia. This proposes that ‘the military strategy be driven by the political strategy’ rather than the other way around. Still, the question of renewing the AMISOM mandate by the UNSC is a matter of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’.

All said, it is important that the AU and AMISOM start thinking and planning towards a smooth exit strategy. While it is too early to think about AMISOM leaving Somalia, planning for a transition/exit will help Somalia and its stakeholders to move to a more structured operational mode of enhancing local capacities and structures.

 Sudan: Khartoum accuses Israel of bombing arms factory

The bombing of Sudan’s Al-Yarmouk arms factory last week continues to raise a lot of questions. Since the incident, Sudanese government officials have blamed Israel for the operation based on evidence from the scene. This comes after the initial government reaction had ruled out external involvement. Only ten hours later, however, government sources blamed Israel and threatened a response at a time and place of Khartoum’s choosing.

This is not the first time in the recent history of Sudan that a bombing has been blamed on Israel. In 2009, the Sudanese authorities blamed Israel for two unidentified airstrikes on truck convoys in the desert near Port Sudan in which 39 people died. A similar airstrike in April 2011 on a car led to the death of two people, including a senior military commander of Hamas, and was also blamed on Israel. A very recent airstrike in May 2012 in which a popular businessman in the Port Sudan area was killed was also blamed on Israel. Last week’s Yarmouk strike is, therefore, not the first to be blamed on Israel. It is, however, the biggest hit on a government facility in recent times and one that directly touches the nerve centre of the country’s security apparatus. Many Sudanese are now asking questions about the capacity of the government to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. It is also the first time a strike on Sudanese soil has received massive international media attention and raised questions about the links between Sudan and Iran. The common denominator in all of the airstrikes is their alleged link to weapons meant for Hamas. The Port Sudan area of Sudan and the eastern corridor of Egypt have come up repeatedly as a conduit for weapons meant to arm Hamas.

A number of links are being made between Khartoum’s relationship with Tehran and an alleged use of the Yarmouk facility as a back-up weapons support point for Tehran in the case of an airstrike from Tel Aviv. The arguments are anchored on the use of Sudan as a proxy turf for Israel and Iran. This view has been given some credence with the docking of two Iranian naval ships at the port of Sudan in the midst of the furore surrounding last week’s airstrike. Sudanese government sources, however, indicate that the visit is part of a friendly exchange of relations unrelated to the airstrike.

Almost all of the possible actors are being blamed for the leak that formed Israel’s possible source of information. The first are Israel’s Mossad informants in the Sudanese security service. On the streets of Khartoum some people are also trying to draw Juba into the debate. Other sources point to documents retrieved from the alleged Israeli operation in which Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was killed in Dubai in 2010. While a lot of information is making the rounds, it is difficult at this moment to draw critical and sustainable conclusions without any response from Tel Aviv regarding its alleged involvement and, if so, the possible motivation for such an operation. A formal response from Tel Aviv is, however, unlikely. Sudan has appealed to the United Nations Security Council to condemn Israel for breaking international law regarding respect for the territorial integrity of member states and jeopardising international peace and security.

Sudan has also threatened to respond to the strike. While the promise of attacks may be based on information available to the Sudanese authorities, the scope of the statement exposes Sudan to blame for any future activities that anti-Israeli groups may perpetrate in the name of Sudan. Placed within international law, there will still be questions as to the unquestionable proof of Israel’s involvement and Sudan’s ability to satisfy the principles of self-defence, which ought to be ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. Apart from exposing Sudan to blame, questions regarding capacity also come up. To what extent does the fact that the Al-Yarmouk operation went undetected point to the incapacity of Sudan vis-à-vis superior and sophisticated weaponry, like that of Israel?

West Africa

Nigeria: Continuing Boko Haram Attacks and the Heightened state of Insecurity

State security in Nigeria continues to remain volatile and the recent church bombing only exacerbates the already tense relations within the country. On Sunday, 28 October, a suicide bomber drove an explosive laden car into the church building of St Rita’s Catholic Church at Ungwa Yero in Malali Kaduna North, during morning mass. The attack reportedly killed 15 people and wounded 150. It is alleged that Boko Haram orchestrated the attack, as they have carried out repeated attacks in the North and Abuja, Nigeria’s political capital. These persistent attacks are likely to deteriorate relationship between Christians and Muslims within the North and with the South. Most Northern political elites (recently reinforced by the Governor of Kaduna) continue to deny the religious dimension to the attacks by Boko Haram.

Analysis of state insecurity in Nigeria remains focused on the terrorist acts committed by Boko Haram in order to destabilise the country. However, the volatility of the Nigerian state is more complex and encompasses a number of elements, namely, ethnic and religious tensions, and high levels of economic inequality. This is further aggravated by the politicization of the respective elements. 

There are also a number of incidents that add to the already pressurized state security, namely, the continued declaration of Biafran independence and the recent leaked Ribadu report.  The Biafra Zionist Movement is scheduled to re-declare their independence on the 5^th of November 2012. There justification for this is based on the premise that the people of the South East have been allegedly excluded from political and economic representation especially at the Federal level of government This may further put added pressure on the government and question their ability to maintain its legitimacy through the protection of citizens rights.. Another factor, which has raised questions about the Government’s legitimacy, is the leaked Nuhu Ribadu report. The report outlines the mismanagement of the oil sector and calculates the loss of USD 103.3billion incurred because of various patterns of criminality emanating from the exploitation and trade in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. The report identifies various stakeholders including the government and multinational companies as key players within the scam. Since the report was leaked, President Goodluck Jonathan has been criticised for down playing the findings of the report.

Despite the increased dissatisfaction with the Government, one has to consider the positive changes implemented by President Jonathan. The most prominent change has been the firing of the National Security Advisor, General Owoeye Azazi, as his approach to dealing with Boko Haram has proved to be ineffective. His replacement, Colonel Sambo Dasuki, a northerner, has focused on the restructuring and redeployment of the State Security Services (SSS). Responses to attacks, by SSS, have improved and are reportedly reducing the amount of attacks that could take place. The SSS has moved from its knee-jerk approach to a more sustained confrontation and arrests of suspected political and financial backers of Boko Haram. The arrests of high profile Northerners including a former Governor of Borno State is an indication of renewed commitment of the government.

However, the obvious economic gap in the North is an issue, which continues to threaten the security of the state. Levels of poverty in the North continue to increase with the last figure estimated at 61% in February 2012. Such increased levels of poverty leads to youth vulnerability whereby they are more susceptible to being used as an instrument of political violence. It is therefore important for government to address the growing inequality in the country, because it is within this inequality that Boko Haram gains its legitimacy.

Indeed, Nigeria’s state insecurity continues to be influenced by an amalgamation of factors (including growing regional linkages with the crisis in Northern Mali) and analysing the situation solely from one aspect will not address the security crisis adequately.