Eastern DRC and the protests in Sudan

The worsening security situation in the eastern part of the DRC

On Wednesday, 27 June 2012 the UN Security Council (UNSC) announced its decision to renew and extend the mandate of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and demanded an end to ‘outside support’. It is clear the UNSC was referring to the presence of external actors in the security crisis in North Kivu in the eastern DRC.

North Kivu has been experiencing waves of violence since March this year, after hundreds of former rebels spurned integration efforts and defected from the national army in support of a renegade general, Bosco Ntaganda, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The group M23 was formed in support of Ntaganda. On 13 June, an interim report by the UN’s Group of Experts on the DRC was released that revealed findings demonstrating that some Rwandan army members had entered the DRC to reinforce rebel positions and had provided support and safe passage for Ntaganda and his M23 forces in Rwanda. It should be noted that Rwanda has allegedly been backing armed movements in its neighbour for the past two decades. On its part Rwanda has claimed that its involvement in the province of North Kivu was a means of tackling Rwandan rebels whose operations stretch into the eastern hills of the DRC.

An annex to the interim report accuses Rwandan Defence Minister James Kabarebe and several other senior army staff members of being in constant contact with M23. It has, however, been reported that the DRC accused the United States of blocking the annex to the interim report, as the briefing mentioned above was verbal with a finalised version expected to be released at the end of the year. Washington has since denied these allegations. In response, some UN diplomats stated that the annex would be made available next month, as Rwanda has still not formally responded to the findings made by the UN Group of Experts.

The causes of the prevailing DRC security situation in the eastern part of the country can be traced to over a century ago, when colonial powers in the region were negotiating borderlines. However, more recently the failure of the integration process to fully incorporate Congolese people of Rwandan origin into Congolese society has been a divisive issue in the country, particularly in the east, where the two countries meet. This issue links to another historical failure in the development of the country, which pertains to land and nationality, as well as the question of the exploitation rights of natural resources.

Therefore, the escalation of the current violence in the eastern DRC should be understood in the context of events that occurred in 2009 and how these triggered insecurity. First there was an armed revolt by the former Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), a rebel group in the Kivu provinces of the eastern DRC, which had been established by Laurent Nkunda in December 2006. The CNDP is sympathetic to the Banyamulenge in the eastern DRC, an ethnic Tutsi group, and to the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda. The second event was the mass rapes of July 2010 in which renegade members further intensified the security situation in the eastern DRC by perpetrating mass rapes, during which some unruly members of the CNDP were found working in collaboration with Mai Mai militias. The contested 2011 elections have also been cited as a key factor in the outbreak of the conflict in March 2012. It can also be argued that DRC President Joseph Kabila’s focus on Kinshasa at the expense of other regions in the country contributed to the escalating violence. Further, his announcement that Ntaganda would be prosecuted created insecurity, particularly in North Kivu.

Since Kabila’s announcement, it has been alleged that Rwanda is looking for a new strongman in the Kivus to replace Nkunda and Ntaganda in order to secure its interest on the ground. At this stage, this may be a difficult task, as Rwanda needs to find an individual who will be able to gain the confidence of the CNDP and M23, maintain Rwanda’s interests and appeal to Congolese with Rwandan ancestry. 

The humanitarian crisis has also reached alarming proportions. It has been reported that since the war started again, about 400 000 people have been internally displaced. So far approximately 8 000 refugees, at an average rate of 150 per day, have fled the DRC.

It seems that the international community is fatigued with the security crisis in the DRC. While the UNSC decision to renew and extend MONUSCO’s mandate by tasking it to work with the DRC military and government to ensure the protection of civilians can be applauded, DRC’s resolve lies with its people and its leadership. In order to respond to the trends that keep re-emerging in North Kivu, there needs to be a broad security sector reform process and more decisive action in partnership with international actors to end tensions with Rwanda. 

Based on the contribution of Colonel Prosper Nzekani Zena, a retired military officer from the DRC and an independent security consultant.

Sudan: Protests and the political situation

1. Economic difficulties

Sudan is under economic sanctions and is still internationally isolated. It lost most of its oil reserves when the secession of South Sudan deprived it of 80 per cent of its former oil wealth. This has directly reduced the inflow of foreign currency needed to pay for imports. Sudan also lost a huge percentage of its revenues because of the oil shutdown by South Sudan in January 2012. To make matters worse, Sudan lost half of its own oil production in mid-April 2012 because of the clashes in Heglig.[1]

Moreover, inflation is rising very fast and reached 30 per cent in May 2012, mainly on food prices. And there is a dangerous scarcity of foreign currency. Indeed, the Sudanese pound has been sliding sharply against the dollar on the black market for months. In order to reduce its budget deficit and increase its foreign currency reserves, Sudan has tried to enlist the support of Gulf states such as Qatar (which made a US$ 2 billion pledge to buy government bonds and invest in different sectors), Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These Gulf states are reportedly interested mainly in Sudan’s banking sector and looking to invest in farmland.

2. Bashir’s precarious political position

In terms of foreign policy, Sudan is comfortable with Libya (it has established a very good relationship with the new government there, including a military and intelligence relationship), Chad (relations were normalised in 2010, joint border patrols are undertaken and Deby’s political marriage was arranged)[2], Egypt (which is almost entirely focused on its internal problems and has lost its leverage in Sudan), Eritrea (which is too weakened and does not represent a threat anymore) and Ethiopia (which is trying to act as a neutral broker).

Sudan has also pushed out the Justice and Equality Movement from Darfur and the SPLA-North from Blue Nile. The downside is that these two rebel groups have created the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF), financially and militarily supported by South Sudan.

Bashir is nonetheless politically frustrated because he has made so many compromises, presiding over the breakup of Sudan, and did not get commensurate rewards from the international community. He has pledged not to run in the next presidential elections due in 2015.

There are rumours that the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is divided and that Nafie Ali Nafie, the hardline vice-chair of the NCP and rival of the moderate Sudanese first vice-president Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, has been side-lined. There are equally unsubstantiated rumours that there is a rift between Bashir and some of his generals. The military has been diluted, changed by repeated reshuffles and major purges and is overstretched by military conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Yet, the military still retains officers who consider themselves nationalist. There are also within it competing forces that are, in a rather elitist manner, politicised. In case of the NCP’s faltering and a resulting power vacuum, the military could consider it its duty to take power. Thus, the danger of a future coup cannot be discounted. The ruthless and powerful National Intelligence and Security Services will remain loyal even if its Director-General, Mohamed Atta Almola who unexpectedly replaced Salah Gosh in August 2009, keeps a low profile.

3. Protests in October 2011

Protests occurred in October 2011 in Khartoum and Omdurman. They were mainly caused by rising unemployment, the substantial increase in the cost of living and government corruption. The police and security forces disbanded the protests by firing tear gas and arrested many unarmed protesters and an imam for inciting the popular protests. It should be noted that newspapers were warned by the National Intelligence and Security Services not to report on these protests.

Protests in June 2012

Sporadic and leaderless protests spontaneously occurred in Khartoum when students from the University of Khartoum took to the streets on June 17, 2012. The students were protesting against the rising costs of living. They burned tires, blocked roads and called for the removal of Bashir’s government. The protests drew the usual violent response from police and security forces, which made numerous arrests. In the following days, the protests spread to other towns including Al-Obaiyd, Madani, Kassala, Port Sudan and Gedaref.

The protests were caused by the government’s plan to lift fuel subsidies. This plan is part of the austerity package needed to reduce a budget deficit of approximately US$ 2.4 billion. The austerity package includes layoffs in the civil service, cuts in salaries and cuts in the perks of senior officials. On June 24, 2012 and in his usual provocative style, Bashir described the protesters as ‘alien bubbles’ who will be ‘dealt with’. The government also continued its usual crackdown on newspapers. The privately-owned dailies Al-Ahdath, Al-Watan and Al-Jarida were instructed by the National Intelligence and Security Services not to distribute their newspapers.

Conclusion

Sudan may be experiencing the same kind of popular uprising that swept across North Africa and the Middle East and toppled leaders in Libya and Egypt, its northern neighbours. That may be precisely because the current 23-year-old government continues to resist implementing genuine political and economic reforms and continues to use violence to remain in power.

Compiled by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division ISS Addis Ababa