Where to from here in Algeria?
Political uncertainty prevails in Algeria after many weeks of popular protests against the government.
It is Friday, 19 July 2019, in Algeria. Once again – as they have for 22 weeks – protesters fill the streets of cities across the country. Their ranks represent a cross-section of Algeria: young and old, men and women, office workers and labourers. All marching peacefully, many draped in Algerian flags, calling for democracy and civic rights.
The protests have accomplished far more than many observers expected. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the long-serving president whose bid for another term prompted the protests, is out of power. Politicians and businessmen linked to him are under investigation or detained.
The protests have accomplished far more than many observers expected
The duration, momentum, and pacific nature of the protests are accomplishments in and of themselves, and underscore the strong support by many Algerians for an overhaul of a deeply unpopular political system.
Despite these successes the political uncertainty in Algeria is far from being resolved. Government efforts to placate the public through small, largely symbolic actions – such as the arrest of widely disliked former regime officials or businessmen – have only fuelled demand for more comprehensive change.
A worsening stand-off
The protesters are unwilling to accept any vestiges of the old regime in positions of power. This includes both interim President Abdelkader Bensalah and Prime Minister Noureddine Bedoui.
Protesters’ rejection of these figures and the broader transition process advocated by the government led to the cancellation of elections planned for 4 July. On 9 July the mandate of the interim government expired, creating a de jure constitutional vacuum even if the interim government remains in de facto control.
Despite the creation of a national dialogue forum, there is no clarity on what happens next.
Despite the creation of a national dialogue forum, there is no clarity on what happens next. This uncertainty is exacerbated by a worsening stand-off between the protest movement and the government. Police are taking a harder line, and are arresting a growing number of protesters and dissidents.
Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaïd Salah, the army chief of staff and the person believed to be the key decision maker at present, has issued increasingly strong statements condemning those advocating against the government’s transition plans.
But, impediments to negotiating a consensual solution to the political impasse exist on both sides.
No leader among the protestors
Among the protesters there is little formal leadership or specific ideology. Initially, this was one of the movement’s greatest strengths. The leaderless approach prevented the government from detaining leaders to end the protests, while the lack of ideology other than denying Bouteflika another term enabled a broad-based coalition to coalesce.
Now, being leaderless has become a weakness. It offers no clear point for the government to negotiate with or a process for distilling the demands of the street into concrete policy proposals. For constructive negotiations with the government to begin, such leadership needs to consolidate.
The leadership that emerges must focus as much on building consensus between the different class, gender, and geographic constituencies
Crucially, the leadership that emerges must focus as much on building consensus between the different class, gender, and geographic constituencies within the protest movement as on negotiating with the government.
Vested interests
The negotiations are also challenged by factors and factions within the government, especially within the military. The latter force has played a determinative, though largely behind-the-scenes, role in political decision-making since independence.
However, the military is not neutral when it comes to the political transition. It is deeply vested in the old system. This is in part institutional, with the defense budget rising fivefold during the Bouteflika years. Current and retired senior officers are also personally vested in the system, with many leveraging their years of service into lucrative business opportunities.
The institutional and personal interests of the force in the status quo make negotiations far more difficult
The institutional and personal interests of the force in the status quo make negotiations far more difficult. Senior officers whose agreement is needed for concessions are those whose interests are most impacted by significant change.
Divisions within the military
Further complicating official decision-making is the lack of unity within the military. The force has a number of different power centres and factions. Purges of senior officers in mid- to late-2018 and again in July 2019 underscored these divisions, and has likely further fuelled tensions in the force. Divisions also exist between senior officers and junior officers, who benefit less from the system and so are more open to protesters’ demands for change.
Inter-military discord narrows the space for concessions by Salah and other senior officers. Too many concessions, or concessions on key priorities, could lead to Salah and other senior officers being removed from their positions. It may well be that Salah’s increasingly hawkish statements are meant in part to buttress his own support within the ranks.
The transition process will hinge on how the protesters and the government, mainly the military, are able to overcome their internal interests and constraints and find consensus.
However, the outcome of the process will also be influenced by external factors. In particular, the trajectory of the economy and the actions of terrorist groups could have a major impact.
Economic woes
Algeria’s economy, heavily dependent on exports of petrol, has worsened significantly over the last few years. Further deterioration – or popular perception of worsening troubles –poses risks to both sides.
Algeria’s economy, heavily dependent on exports of petrol, has worsened significantly over the last few years
The government faces the clearest potential risks, with a worsening economy exacerbating Algerians’ frustrations and grievances and redoubling support for the protesters. However, protesters also run a risk, particularly if the government seeks to link the faltering economy to protesters’ intransigence.
In the less likely event of an economic improvement, the position of the interim government will probably be strengthened. With increased revenues the government could return to the expansive social programmes of the mid-Bouteflika period, thereby allaying key public frustrations.
The threat of terrorism
Equally, terrorist activity could have a significant impact on the transition process. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb continues to operate in the north-centre and north-east of the country. Though their capacity has declined, urban suicide bombings claimed by the group in 2017 underscore that they remain a dangerous threat.
The risk now is not of terrorists resurging in Algeria, but rather of their derailing the already fragile transition process. Just one or two deadly or high-profile attacks could have a determinative impact, by swaying attitudes and decision-making among the protesters, the military, or broader society.
Just one or two deadly attacks could have a determinative impact, by swaying attitudes
The current moment is one of political uncertainty in Algeria, This is both an opportunity and a challenge. The country is moving into a new era, not only with the departure of Bouteflika but also with the passing from the political scene of the generation that was directly involved in the independence struggle.
Foreign actors engage with care
While foreign states have an understandable interest in the outcome of Algeria’s political transition, they should recognise that they have only a limited productive role to play in the process. There is little opening for foreign mediation, with little likelihood the government in particular will be amenable to such support, and a distinct danger for the protesters if they push for such aid.
There is little opening for foreign mediation, with little likelihood the government will be amenable to such support
However, this does not mean foreign actors have no part to play. Rather, they can play an important role through public expressions of support and private diplomatic pressure for a transition process that is broad-based, peaceful, and focused on building a social consensus on the next political steps.
Early in the protests, the African Union (AU) took just such an approach, with Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat stressing support for the process rather than for a specific outcome. The AU, European Union, and neighbouring states should focus on such messaging and diplomatic pressure in order to best support the transition process.
The inclusivity, peacefulness, and tenaciousness of the protests are profoundly hopeful signs for the future of Algeria. Resolving the current political uncertainty requires significant courage and strategic patience by the protesters and the government. But, if the events of the last five months are any indication, there is a real chance of success.
