Enhancing PSC-ECOWAS collaboration to counteract challenges
Continental-body cooperation is a prerequisite for synergised and robust responses to West Africa’s crises.
Consultations between the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were initiated on 24 April 2024 in Abuja, Nigeria. This was followed by a second annual meeting on 16 May 2025. The inaugural gathering produced several key decisions.
These included establishing regular consultation platforms such as the annual PSC-MSC meeting, periodic interactions between the chairpersons, clearer delineation of early warning and response roles, and enhanced interoperability in mission planning and deployment. These initiatives form part of AU-ECOWAS collaboration under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to improve responses to political and security crises confronting the continent.
The creation of consultation platforms is the most decisive outcome for two reasons. First, it institutionalises a culture of consultation, identified by both AU and ECOWAS sources as a long-missing element in their relationship. Secondly, it enables open and frank discussions on crucial issues such as the division of labour in regional peace and stability efforts. The idea comes as ECOWAS grapples with complex political transitions and numerous challenges. This is compounded by the withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso from the bloc and a deteriorating security environment driven largely by the spread of violent extremism.
The AU and ECOWAS have identified a culture of consultation as long-missing in their relationship
Despite repeated calls for enhanced collaboration, differences over subsidiarity between the region and the AU have endured since the 2012/13 disagreements over the transition from the ECOWAS Mission in Mali to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. More recently, approaches to managing Niger’s 2023 coup have differed. Thus, the platforms are key to strengthening AU-ECOWAS relations. Beyond being dialogue forums, they offer strategic entry points for addressing longstanding coordination challenges – essential for building a more coherent and effective joint response to West Africa’s complex peace and security landscape.
Collaboration conundrums
APSA’s 2016 to 2020 roadmap puts the absence of shared understanding of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage at the core of repeated tensions and limited AU interaction with regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms. This holds true for ECOWAS. However, the primary issue is a lack of clarity on subsidiarity and its practical implementation. The challenge is, therefore, centred on which of the two institutions should take the lead in crisis management.
ECOWAS tends to interpret subsidiarity as a delegation of primacy to the RECs – allowing them full discretionary decision-making authority. The AU approaches it from a perspective in which its central role in continental peace and security is still intact. It believes that RECs should remain accountable to the continental body while aligning with its established norms and frameworks. Operationally, this conceptual divergence translates into disjointed responses during crises.
Despite some efforts to resolve these and their impact on the management of regional crises, the lack of clarity on the division of labour continues to undermine joint action. This was evident recently in the inability of the two institutions to formulate a unified response to the Niger coup. The disconnect is also observable in coordination on broader regional security initiatives such as the Accra Initiative and the G5 Sahel. There, competing approaches and mandates have hindered the mobilisation of collective regional and continental resources.
Barriers to effective coordination
The abovementioned gaps underpin the persistent difficulties in ECOWAS-AU collaboration, particularly in the peace and security domain. They can be attributed to three barriers. First are the few clear and binding guidelines outlining the roles and responsibilities of the AU and RECs, including ECOWAS, in managing issues. Efforts to enhance AU-REC collaboration through a practical division of labour were central to the AU’s institutional reform agenda. The proposed framework was expected to clarify ‘who should do what, when and how’ in conflict prevention, mediation and related areas.
The primary issue is lack of clarity on subsidiarity and its practical implementation
However, despite nearly eight years of publicly stated political will, the AU has yet to finalise this framework. As a result, coordination between the AU and ECOWAS – and between the AU and RECs – continues to face structural uncertainty. The creation of the Inter-regional Knowledge Exchange platform offered some space for dialogue among RECs, but it remains a peripheral initiative tied to the mid-year coordination meeting rather than a dedicated and functional coordination mechanism. The upcoming AU heads of state special summit on institutional reform, scheduled for July 2025, is expected to accelerate the process.
Secondly, coordination is hampered by the limited institutionalisation of existing platforms. Mechanisms such as the Nouakchott Process remain informal, ad hoc and crisis-driven. They are often reactive and lack robust mandates, standing structures or implementation guidelines. Similarly, the knowledge exchange and mid-year meeting convene only once a year and do not benefit from permanent follow-up bodies, working groups or in-depth engagement on strategic issues. This limits continuity, impedes institutional learning and weakens the effectiveness of AU-ECOWAS cooperation.
Thirdly, structural asymmetries between the PSC and MSC further complicate coordination. The two bodies differ in procedures, authority and decision-making structures. ECOWAS operates under its own treaty, maintains legal autonomy and has developed peace and security mechanisms that predate and do not necessarily align with those of the AU. In the absence of harmonised frameworks and shared operational guidelines, these differences increase the risks of conflicting approaches and fragmented responses to regional crises.
Addressing the challenges
The PSC-MSC 2024 meeting should be the foundation for sustained and expanded engagement between the AU and ECOWAS. Beyond the two councils, stronger connections should be fostered between their political affairs, peace and security departments. This would enable the institutions to jointly assess and address more effectively persistent challenges such as structural misalignments and fragmented frameworks. Given the institutional changes from ongoing AU reforms, a comprehensive review of structures and coordination mechanisms has become essential.
Poor application of past decisions indicates the risk of repeating discussions rather than moving on
As the AU continues drafting the AU-REC division-of-labour framework, it should use the new platforms to identify the causes of recurring misunderstandings – particularly those of subsidiarity. This could clarify roles, align expectations and generate lessons to inform AU-REC engagement.
While PSC-MSC meetings are positive, the implementation and rigorous monitoring of progress, achievements and persistent bottlenecks should be prioritised. Consultative forums are not new to the PSC ecosystem but, to stand out, this one must be backed by sustained follow-up and accountability from both AU and ECOWAS commissions.
For instance, decisions taken in 2024 have seen limited implementation, raising concerns that AU-ECOWAS consultations risk repeating past discussions rather than moving forward. This would reinforce a tokenistic approach to engagement – an outcome neither side should accept. Instead, both must translate political intentions into actionable commitments and ensure coordinated implementation through joint mechanisms.
If these practical steps are taken seriously, the AU and ECOWAS would significantly strengthen their collective ability to address the region’s most urgent matters. Effective coordination is not just a technical goal; it is a strategic imperative for regional stability and continental integration advancement.
