Algeria-Mali tensions demand swift attention
Having lost influence in the Sahel-Saharan region, the African Union must act decisively on the current crisis.
Diplomatic relations between Algeria and Mali, dating back to the 1960s, have deteriorated sharply since April, following the downing of a Malian drone by the Algerian army near the Tinzaouaten border. While Malian authorities claim the drone was in their territory, the Algerian army insists it had crossed into Algerian airspace. Although relations between the two countries have previously been tense, due mainly to recurring insecurity in northern Mali, this is the first time Bamako has publicly condemned Algerian military action. It has also referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council, describing it as ‘a premeditated hostile action by the Algerian regime’.
Direct confrontation between the two countries remains unlikely, but the effects of the dispute are rippling across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) bloc. This is amid worsening regional security and the recent withdrawal of Sahelian states from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), factors that significantly challenge the new African Union (AU) Commission leadership. The situation calls for urgent AU engagement to prevent further escalation and strengthen the organisation's presence and credibility in the region.
Regional implications
The tension between the countries has taken on a regional dimension given the political, diplomatic and military alliance of the AES confederation comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Niger and Burkina Faso appear to be showing solidarity with Mali calling for the withdrawal of their ambassadors to Algiers. Mali and Niger have also withdrawn from the Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), which had brought them together with Algerian and Mauritanian military forces.
Bamako has described the drone incident as ‘a premeditated hostile action by the Algerian regime’
Even though CEMOC has not been that active since its creation in 2010, it has been a useful platform for security coordination and a cooperation framework, with Algeria especially providing training support. This has been advantageous given the vast stretch of desert in that part of Africa, which has been a prime transit route for arms, drugs and smuggling of migrants.
The AU’s challenge
With Algeria’s unrivalled military capabilities in the region, the likelihood of the current tension escalating into open armed conflict appears minimal. However, the situation may hamper regional stability. Most immediately, it risks destabilising the already fragile buffer zone between the Maghreb and West Africa, an area already weakened by Libya’s civil war and persistent insecurity in neighbouring states.
A second, deeper issue is the recent withdrawal of AES countries from ECOWAS, depriving the latter of the legal standing and political legitimacy to mediate the crisis. It also undermines ECOWAS’s operationalisation of the AU peace and security architecture – particularly subsidiarity, which assumes regional bodies will lead initial conflict-prevention efforts. Amid this institutional vacuum, the AU remains the only continental body positioned to engage both parties and re-establish diplomatic dialogue. It has a unique opportunity to restore constructive relations between Algeria and AES countries.
The situation further calls for urgent attention to the unresolved security dynamics in northern Mali, which are the core of the current crisis. Before the drone incident, Malian authorities accused Algeria of serving as a rear base for the separatist Front de Libération de l’Azawad following renewed hostilities between the group and the Malian state in late 2023. This led Mali to formally withdraw from the 2015 Algiers Accord, which had failed to achieve sustainable peace with the separatists.
This diplomatic standoff is not isolated, but part of a trend of regional volatility. It underscores the urgency for the Peace and Security Council to examine closely the complex dynamics in northern Mali, which remain central to ongoing instability across the Sahel-Saharan belt.
Rare opportunity
Faltering relations between Algeria and Mali and their ripple effects across the region allow the AU to reassert its influence in the Sahel. This is especially important given that the AU was sidelined during the 2012/13 dispute over the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. This was due in part to its competition with ECOWAS over leadership in managing African troop contributions under United Nations command.
The AU has a unique opportunity to restore constructive relations between Algeria and Sahel states
The AU was further marginalised by France’s dominant role in the Sahel and its support for the G5 Sahel. The G5 Sahel emerged as an alternative to the AU Nouakchott Process, which sought to strengthen regional security and the counter-terrorism coordination of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Successful AU-led mediation between Algeria and the AES bloc could revitalise the Nouakchott Process.
The withdrawal of western actors, the collapse of the G5 Sahel and its joint force and the marginalisation of ECOWAS position the AU to fill the leadership void and reassert African-led responses to regional insecurity.
Options for addressing the challenge
The AU must focus on three tasks, starting with easing the tension between the two neighbours. Secondly, it should promote a wholly African political solution to the northern Mali crisis, which has been central to interstate contestation for some time. Thirdly, it has to revitalise African-led initiatives in the region, particularly the Nouakchott Process, to manage tensions and insecurity.
This will involve leveraging existing opportunities, including strong Angolan and South African historical ties with the two countries and the extension networks and goodwill of AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Countries such as Mauritania – a CEMOC member enjoying cordial relations with the AES bloc – and Chad – which maintains links with both parties – could be additional entry points for mediation.
Initiatives such as the Nouakchott Process must be revitalised to manage tensions and insecurity
AU engagements should be part of the broader response to deteriorating peace and security in West Africa. This includes addressing the AU’s limited engagement in the region, as seen in the absence of a high representative and a head of the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel since August 2023. Appointing a new AU representative to Bamako and bolstering the mission’s mandate would allow it to operate more effectively in a volatile environment, engage Malian authorities and manage tension with that country’s neighbours.
The AU must reinforce its presence in other AES countries, particularly Niger and Burkina Faso. It should appoint senior political officers to AU Semi-arid Food Grain Research and Development in Ouagadougou and the Centre for Linguistic and Historical Studies in Niamey. These structures can initiate regular dialogue with de facto authorities and maintain open communication.
Reactivating the Nouakchott Process technically is important in assessing political will and laying the groundwork for higher-level engagement. This could benefit from the leadership of Ghana’s new president, John Dramani Mahama, whose initiative to engage AES leadership has already seen the appointment of a special envoy.
