Weighing up the success of the African Union PAPS merger
Has the reformed African Union Commission effectively integrated governance with peace and security?
The election of the African Union Commission (AUC) in 2020 marked a turning point in the institutional reform process initiated in 2017. One of its most visible and symbolic dimensions was the creation of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), resulting from the merger of the departments of political affairs and of peace and security. The United Nations and the Economic Community for West African states (ECOWAS) had effected similar mergers earlier. The architects of AU reform hoped that the organisation would be best placed to respond to multidimensional crises if the governance and the peace and security architectures were managed in a single commission.
Five years on, and in view of the planned extraordinary summit on the reforms, it is essential to assess their impact. PAPS remains the AUC’s largest department in both staffing and budget. Its trajectory could indicate the successes and limitations of the broader reform effort.
Exclusion of key functions
From the onset, the manner in which the merger was realised raised serious concerns. Beyond the absence of a framework for policy and bureaucratic coherence, some analysts identified technical inconsistencies. The first was the dissolution of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an organ established by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.
CEWS was absorbed into the regional desks structure, which significantly reduced its capacity to anticipate and monitor emerging threats. This change weakened the early warning function, shifting focus toward crises already on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) agenda. It left emerging or latent risks insufficiently addressed. With only three officers typically assigned to each regional desk, the structural capacity to absorb CEWS’s preventive mandate was clearly inadequate. The legality of this dissolution was also questioned as it happened without a review of the PSC Protocol.
Analysts noted a lack of policy and bureaucratic coherence framework, and technical inconsistencies
The second issue was the exclusion of the AU Border Programme (AUBP) from the new departmental structure. This omission is particularly striking given the simultaneous adoption in 2018 by the AU of protocols on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the free movement of persons. These two protocols require coherent continental approaches to border governance, which was centralised within AUBP. Also, transnational terrorism and organised crime call for innovative border management responses. The removal of this programme from the PAPS structure reflects a troubling disconnect between institutional structure and policy priorities.
These two oversights raise deeper questions about the strategic rationale behind the merger. They suggest that the reform may have been driven more by the need to reduce costs and project an image of rationalisation than by a coherent vision for the integration of governance, peace and security. While the merger was intended to promote coordination and improve efficiency, it failed to introduce the necessary mechanisms. Specifically, it did not improve AUC capacity to address governance issues.
There are other operational and institutional shortcomings. One is the absence of a functional coordination mechanism between the previous departments. The new PAPS structure appears to place this responsibility on the commissioner, an elected official whose role is inherently political. In the previous structure, dedicated directors managed coordination and reported to the respective commissioners. This arrangement ensured that technical coordination, particularly between governance and peace and security, was institutionally embedded. By contrast, the current structure risks fostering institutional rivalries and silo work, particularly as these thematic areas are inextricably linked and require consistent operational integration.
No unified framework
A second missing element is a unified policy framework. Although there have been some interactions between the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the PSC since the merger, these have yet to yield a clear policy process or strategy connecting governance with peace and security. The architecture for governance and that for peace and security remain institutionally distinct. While the PSC Protocol covers both domains, the merger has not produced a genuine convergence of instruments such as the APRM and the Conflict and Structural Vulnerability Assessments. More fundamentally, there have been limited efforts to articulate a shared policy direction or clarify how the new department should function as an integrated structure.
The current structure risks fostering institutional rivalries and silo work
These gaps underline the need for a comprehensive review of the merger. A useful starting point would be to fully reintegrate both CEWS and the AUBP into the department’s organisational structure. However, what is ultimately needed is a fundamental rethink of the internal architecture of PAPS to make it more functional and responsive.
One option could be the establishment of a chief of staff or a secretary of the department within PAPS to oversee coordination across the directorates, managing partnerships, supervising the PSC Secretariat and ensuring financial oversight. This would help bridge the gap between political leadership and operations. It would also allow the commissioner to focus on strategic direction and high-level representation.
Coherence and efficiency
To ensure greater thematic and functional coherence, the internal configuration of the department should be reconsidered. Rather than merely juxtaposing the previous departments, a restructured PAPS might include three directorates. One would be responsible for conflict prevention and management and would integrate the regional desks. The second could focus on security affairs and operations and include all field deployments. The third would handle thematic issues such as governance, democratic institutions and human rights.
None of these changes will succeed, however, without adequate staffing and resourcing. The persistent mindset of ‘doing more with less’ has reached its limit. If the AU is to meet its peace, governance and security objectives, member states must invest in structures that match their mandates.
The persistent mindset of ‘doing more with less’ has reached its limit
Ultimately, the PAPS merger will rise or fall on not only its efficiency but its ability to be a cohesive and capable institution. Five years on, this remains an open question that deserves careful reflection and bold corrective action by the new AUC leadership. The multiplication of governance and security crises in Africa requires a better equipped organisation.
As the most important AUC department, PAPS (and the chairperson’s office) should develop standard operating procedures and predictable working methods based on a well-defined strategic approach of the AUC on issues. In the last eight years the relationship between PAPS and the chairperson’s cabinet has been haphazard and heavily dependent on personalities’ preferences and choices. The AU’s approach to various conflicts – and ultimately the AU’s image and legitimacy – has suffered.
AU reform should be guided by at least two priorities. First is a strategic vision for the AU beyond well-meaning slogans and current contingencies, which will give purpose to the architects of the reform. Secondly, a thorough understanding of current global and continental shifts should inform short- to medium-term adjustments.
