The reform of the African Union Commission needs a rethink
More, not fewer, commissioners are needed to realise the ambitious Africa Agenda 2063.
When the African Union (AU) initiated the reform of the AU Commission (AUC) nearly a decade ago, it was presented as a historic opportunity to modernise the institution, sharpen its focus and enhance its efficiency. Led by President Paul Kagame, the process sought to reshape the AUC into a leaner, more coherent body, equipped to carry out the continental agenda. The central feature was reducing the number of commissioners from eight to six. This was achieved through major mergers, including the political affairs and peace and security departments and the trade and industry and economic affairs departments.
The goal was an agile and streamlined AUC having a predictable division of labour with the regional economic communities (RECs). The reform promised clearer mandates, better coordination and institutions fit for purpose. Six years later, however, the results are mixed and, in several areas, deeply problematic.
Challenges
The merger of political affairs and peace and security into one single mega-commission ― PAPS ― remains one of the most emblematic decisions of the reform. Yet its logic is still unclear. In practice, the move has produced a department where crisis response overshadows accountable governance, conflict prevention and policy foresight. These are precisely the functions that should allow the AU to anticipate and mitigate conflict before it escalates. Striking internal asymmetries have also appeared: an oversized Peace Support Operations Division now outweighs the entire governance and conflict-prevention directorate, leaving long-term preventive work under-resourced and institutionally marginalised.
Some key units and pillars have become collateral damage. The Continental Early Warning System, central to the security architecture, was literally ‘forgotten’ and officially mainstreamed under regional desks. The AU Border Programme also disappeared as a full unit when border governance, cross-border mobility, integrated border management and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are becoming crucial to continental integration.
It is time to revisit some of the assumptions on which AUC reform was grounded
The economic and integration cluster reflects similar inconsistencies. The merger of the economic affairs department with trade and industry could have brought industrialisation, trade policy and economic governance under one coherent umbrella. Instead, the simultaneous establishment of the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra ― with an unusual degree of autonomy ― led to competing centres of power.
While the AUC is technically responsible for trade and economic policy, an autonomous secretariat takes charge of implementation, The two mobilise resources independently and operate from different locations. The outcome has been duplication, fragmentation and avoidable rivalry. While a specialised body was justified to implement AfCFTA, autonomy, combined with the secretariat’s physical distance from AU headquarters, has weakened strategic coherence and blurred accountability.
Last but not least, relations between the AU and the RECs remain ambiguous despite a protocol. Institutional and political competition persists over who does what, when and why. Beneath the institutional language lies a political reality: the AU as a political organisation probably needs to demonstrate its economic worth to its own members. States should easily identify why they are better off inside the AU than outside. These inconsistencies call for pause to revisit some assumptions on which AUC reform was grounded.
Rethinking
The scope, scale and complexity of continental priorities have increased: climate security, digital governance, pandemics, peace operations, migration, continental trade, industrialisation and the geopolitics of critical minerals are more challenging today. Returning to eight or even more commissioners could ensure that key mandates are not diluted nor structurally marginalised.
Returning to eight or more commissioners could ensure key mandates are not diluted nor marginalised
The creation of PAPS should also be revisited. Governance, democracy, transitional justice, prevention and early warning require their own institutional ecosystem. PAPS, as currently structured, is oriented overwhelmingly for reactive crisis management. A restored and strengthened governance and prevention portfolio would reinforce Africa’s long-term conflict-prevention capacity and give meaning to the AU’s early-warning mandate. This is particularly important as the resurgence of coups exposes the weakness of African security mechanisms’ capacity to support member states’ governance problems.
If the AU and RECs suspension regime once reduced the occurrence of coups, it was due partly to an international environment characterised by the dominance of liberal values of peace. The faltering of this order and lessons learnt from the implementation of suspension regimes require the AU’s recommitment to basic standards of accountable governance.
The relationships among the Department of Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry and Minerals, the AfCFTA secretariat and the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development also require clarity. The multiplication of autonomous bodies with overlapping functions undermines coherence. If their autonomy cannot be reversed, their roles must be anchored in a clear principle: the AUC sets continental policy, while these specialised entities implement it. Coordination should be institutional, not dependent on personalities or informal arrangements as it is now.
The AU should also consider appointing a commissioner for partnerships and multilateral engagement. The African and AU diplomatic landscape has expanded dramatically to include Europe, China, the United States, Türkiye, India, the Gulf, BRICS+, the G20, the United Nations and climate frameworks. Member states will not be expected to abandon their bilateral interests, but there are arenas where continental coordination can amplify African influence. A dedicated portfolio could bring strategic coherence to this rapidly evolving landscape.
Internal security and mobility also demand a rethink. Responsibilities are scattered across many departments: border issues under PAPS, migration within social affairs, displacement under humanitarian affairs and police cooperation within the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation. Meanwhile, the free movement protocol struggles to progress, due partly to security concerns. A commissioner for internal security and mobility could bring border management, identity systems, justice cooperation, movement of persons and counter-terrorism under one coherent umbrella, aligned with continental integration goals.
Reform should establish a commission that supports Agenda 2063 priorities
A strategic principle must be reaffirmed: specialised agencies exist to execute the policies of the AUC, not to run independent policy agendas. Over time, some agencies have become de facto centres of autonomous policy development, fuelled by independent resource mobilisation. This weakens AU policy coherence. The AUC should coordinate resource mobilisation to prevent fragmentation and institutional drift.
Long-term vision
AUC restructuring was a necessary step toward a more efficient AU. But reform is not an event ― it is a process. The success of the AU depends on its ability to evaluate, adjust and course-correct where needed. The AUC’s architecture must reflect Africa’s evolving realities, not past assumptions.
It is time to step back, take stock and refine the reform process to allow the AUC to fulfil its mandate with clarity, coherence and strategic purpose. As key decision-making organs, the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Peace and Security Council have a strategic role to play in steering the reform dynamics. The cost-cutting rationale that presided over the initial reform drive might have been welcomed at the time but cannot substitute a long-term vision for the AUC.
If Agenda 2063 is the long-term goal, then reform should establish the type of commission that could support its priorities. Members need to decide what AU they want for the next 30 years because this will determine the type of competences they must provide to the AUC.
