Urgent action needed to steer South Sudan along path to peace
South Sudan’s fragile transition is unravelling amid escalating political tensions, military fragmentation and economic decline.
On Wednesday, 26 March, security personnel led by South Sudan’s defence minister and the chief of national security forcibly entered the house of the country’s first vice-president, Riek Machar. They placed him under house arrest after disarming and removing his security detail. The catalyst was his alleged role in recent skirmishes between the Dinka-dominated South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and the White Army, a Nuer militia. These erupted in early-March, reportedly triggered by a disagreement over a long overdue rotation of the former’s soldiers in Nasir garrison.
According to the country’s information minister, Michael Makuei, the arrests were directed by President Salva Kiir to stall attacks on government installations and safeguard the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). In addition to Machar, the government arrested several influential Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition ministers and high-ranking military officers, and authorised airstrikes in Nasir County and areas around Juba. Feeling threatened, some opposition members are now in hiding.
The recent violence unfolded against the backdrop of rising tensions in the country, long characterised by unilateral reshuffles in the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity, including at the level of the vice-presidents. The reshuffles are allegedly linked to Kiir’s attempt to orchestrate a succession outside of the R-ARCSS. This reveals a deep mistrust between the country's two principal leaders and is a significant breach of the 2018 peace agreement. It also epitomises the major threats to achieving peace, many of which the arrest of Machar was ostensibly intended to prevent.
Swift action is imperative to prevent complete collapse of South Sudan’s transition
Given prior African Union (AU) investment in South Sudan and the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) role in the search for peace, swift action has become imperative to prevent a complete collapse. This requires a clear understanding of the causes and implications of the evolving crisis and the immediate options available to the PSC.
How did we get here?
The violence in Nasir and the unified forces’ holding sites, including Rajaf, less than an hour from Juba, are not isolated. They are a continuation of the intermittent violence, institutional fragility, intense political divisions and exclusionary politics that have characterised South Sudan since independence in 2011.
At their heart is the longstanding lack of trust between Kiir and Machar. This has manifested in the failure of both principals to unify their armed groups in a failing economy. The mistrust has fuelled secondary fears such as the uncertainty of elections and attempts to neutralise holdout groups and influential government figures through various mediation efforts and reshuffling.
Indeed, while both leaders are central to national disagreements, several payam, county and state conflict systems overlay national politics. This has created a complex interplay between state and national dynamics — as each level feeds off the other in a mutually reinforcing negative spiral. In Nasir, national contestations informed country choices and snowballed into a pretext to reconfigure transitional government relationships.
Similarly, the struggle to maintain the country’s patronage infrastructure within the army and the body politic remains deep-seated. Kiir’s repeated cabinet reshuffles have been interpreted by some as counterproductive efforts to assert control over the transitional government amid waning financial leverage. The economic downturn is associated with the sharp decline in oil revenues caused by Sudan’s political instability and years of economic mismanagement. Oil accounts for 90% of South Sudan’s revenue and disruptions caused by conflict reduced daily production by about 68% between December 2024 and January 2025. This has undermined political leaders’ efforts to sustain patronage and command the loyalty of their armed factions.
Oil provides 90% of South Sudan revenue but daily yield fell 68% from December 2024 to January 2025
R-ARCSS is a power-sharing arrangement whose integrity and sustainability depend on consultation and dialogue among parties. However, Kiir’s unilateral decision-making has led to perceptions that he is consolidating power or preparing for a transition that excludes the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition and other actors. Additionally, the dissatisfaction and divisions following each dismissal have intensified tensions, undermining efforts to achieve roadmap milestones. This situation has resulted in the repeated extension of South Sudan’s transitional period.
The scenarios of peril
The recent violence in Nasir has highlighted the failure to even minimally implement R-ARCSS and its milestones, and has reinforced the ongoing economic distress and deep-seated mistrust amid ethnic tensions. This has brought the country to a critical crossroads with various possible outcomes, two of which stand out.
First, and most likely, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, its associated Mathiang Anyoor and Abu militia and armed groups such as the White Army, are entrenched in their positions, attracting additional actors on all sides. Since the outbreak of violence in Nasir, all factions have tended to seek revenge for their losses, reinforce their positions or protect themselves from perceived threats. Many groups are either on standby or have retreated into hiding and are generally not inclined towards compromise.
This outcome is supported by the ongoing mobilisation of aerial capacity and ground campaigns against the opposition liberation movement in parts of the country, particularly areas outside Juba and in Upper Nile. This is evident in the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from government officials, the postponement of the visit by Intergovernmental Authority on Development ministers and the gradual engagement of ethnic groups such as the Shilluk and Equatorias. An extreme manifestation of this situation could be the collapse of the peace process, which, by all accounts, is currently in a precarious state. Even the Tumaini high-level process, which was intended to advance R-ARCSS is now in limbo.
Secondly, while less likely, Machar and some of his lieutenants may receive a conditional release, which could lead to an improved but still tense situation in the country. Taban Deng, the vice-president responsible for infrastructure, has advised Machar – while he awaits investigation and trial – to renounce the White Army and allow the government to integrate the opposition forces into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces. However, these actions would essentially amount to a surrender and are improbable, as renouncing the White Army would alienate Machar from the Nuer community.
The window is slim to salvage the peace process
Such events would undermine Machar and create opportunities for Kiir’s chosen transition actors to dominate the political landscape. The degree to which Kiir will continue to limit Machar's power will, therefore, depend largely on the latter’s influence in preventing the ascent of Kiir’s preferred successors.
At the crossroads of these two scenarios is a slim window to salvage the peace process. However, as the situation continues, it will become increasingly challenging to address the complex dynamics emerging. This includes South Sudan's military agreement with Uganda, which is bilateral and may extend beyond the scope of the AU Panel of the Wise.
Options for the PSC
In light of the potential for escalation, the AU, being a guarantor of R-ARCSS with an elevated responsibility, will need to move expeditiously to support ongoing regional de-escalation measures. In addition to PSC meetings and the call for the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of Five (C5) on South Sudan to support IGAD efforts, the AU could consider creating a contact group with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to focus on day-to-day de-escalation initiatives. A good starting point would be to establish what happened in Nasir and who bears responsibility.
Beyond the PSC’s call for the unconditional release of the first vice president, efforts should be made to apply the same to all opposition officials arbitrarily detained. This gesture of goodwill should be followed by their reinstatement in the structures outlined by R-ARCSS. These actions are essential if the integrity of the power-sharing agreement is to be maintained. Since delayed regional and continental engagement will provide room for a rise in violence and a further closing of the already-narrow window to salvage the peace process, it is important that the PSC, while ensuring the implementation of the above, remains constantly seized of the matter until it is completely de-escalated.
