Twenty years of PSC’s growth and challenges in relation building
The Peace and Security Council must establish itself as an independent and strong decision-maker, providing clear guidance to partners.
Recognising the crucial need for cooperation in Africa's pursuit of peace and security, leaders empowered the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to develop strong partnerships with the United Nations (UN) and others. This was done through articles 7(k) and 17 of the PSC Protocol. This was in furtherance of Article 3 of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act, which encourages the establishment of conditions for Africa to play a meaningful global role.
The importance of partnerships is premised on the AU’s recognition that the UN, in particular, is primarily responsible for maintenance of international peace and security. Given the inextricable linkages between the security of Africa and that of other continents, international organisations such as the European Union (EU) also have a role in promoting Africa’s peace and stability. Other international organisations’ willingness to work with the the AU, in turn, hinges on the increasing appreciation of its indispensable leading role and comparative advantage in the management of African challenges.
Partnerships have benefitted Africa but the jury is out on their evolution and the PSC’s learnings
Thus, the PSC, which is charged with decisions to prevent, manage and resolve continental conflicts, has institutionalised partnerships with the UN and its organs and with decision-making structures of other international organisations. Key has been the PSC’s engagements with the UN Security Council (UNSC), UN Peacebuilding Commission, EU Peace and Security Council (EU PSC) and the Peace and Security Council of the Arab States. The PSC’s modalities for engaging organisations, outlined in its working manual, are structured on its relationships with these entities. While these relationships have grown over the years, with several benefits to the continent, the jury is still out on how they have evolved and whether the PSC is learning from their nuances.
Are PSC partnerships growing?
The PSC Protocol and other AU documents reveal the purposes of international partnerships. These are to provide capacity building, a forum for strategic dialogue, negotiation and bargaining; summit diplomacy, technical coordination and facilitating other forms of support. From this perspective, the EU’s support for peace operations in Africa and the UN-AU continued engagement in African conflict situations through deployments such as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) indicate clearly the benefits of such partnerships to the continent.
However, given the PSC’s 20th anniversary, examining the growth of such relationships is useful since it measures the quality of the relationship over time. Three major dynamics define how PSC engagements with international organisations have evolved over two decades.
The first is the working relationship between organisations. Over time, this has involved strengthening engagement methods, deepening mutual commitments and improving the quality of discussions on key priorities. Initially, interactions between the PSC and the UNSC were basic and focused largely on commitments to continue discussions and plan future meetings. However, this has now developed into a structured, substantive and strategic partnership involving joint reflections, exchanges and deployments in Africa. From 2007 to 2023, there were 17 annual joint consultations and eight informal seminars on major issues. These included the situations in Sudan, the Sahel, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia and deployments such as ATMIS.
Alternating locations between New York and Addis Ababa has signified mutual respect and appreciation of the need to balance the partnership. And the deepening of the content of joint communiqués issued after these meetings provides tangible evidence of increasing agreements and shared positions on many substantive issues. The emergence of established practices for planning content, agreeing on agenda items, negotiating and issuing joint statements have advanced relationships between the PSC and the UNSC as well as the Council and the EU PSC.
The Council, although Africa’s primary decision-maker, is hardly seen as a final decision-maker
The second factor is the AU’s emerging clarity on the role of the A3 and its use to advance Africa’s peace and security interests. The A3, originally composed of member states advancing individual interests, is now a structured mechanism for sustained African engagement with the UNSC. A3 members are increasingly receptive to the continental dimension of their mandate, are willing to act together and enjoy perpetual membership of the UNSC. The group played a crucial role in sustaining the agenda on securing financing for AU missions and the eventual passing of UNSC Resolution 2719.
Indeed, the latter represents the biggest outcome of the relationship with the UNSC. Discussions on securing adequate, sustainable and predictable financing for AU peace support operations have remained a perennial issue in UNSC-PSC interactions since 2007. It was among the most contentious issues given the opposition from some UN big powers. While UN Resolution 2719 may not have fully met PSC expectations, debates preceding its adoption sparked deeper discussions about the contributions of each party to peace operations and the nature of UN-AU relations. This is an important indication of how the quality of issues discussed has improved over time.
Power relations
While there is ample evidence that the relationship between the AU and partners has evolved significantly since 2004, it is still a work in progress and far from where it ought to be. The biggest challenge to relations between the PSC and other actors is that the PSC, although the most important decision-making African body, is hardly seen as a final decision-maker in key matters. This is evident in the fact that despite the several comparative advantages the PSC brings to decision-making and response to African crises, its decisions at the best of times do not guarantee automatic UNSC alignment. They do, however, give the latter a sense of what African countries may be thinking on issues. There is also an inherent partner perception of the PSC as weak. This often leads to clear efforts by the UNSC bureaucracy, in particular, to avoid projecting any sense of equality in its relationship with AU counterparts.
This situation has been exacerbated by major missteps in the PSC’s two decades of learning. A retired AU diplomat told PSC Report that the Council’s decision in December 2015 to deploy protection troops to Burundi affected its credibility in its partnership with the UNSC. This decision, under AU Constitutive Act Article 4(h) and later reversed by heads of state at the PSC’s 571st meeting, differed from the UNSC’s position. In addition, the handling of the matter further strained relations. Such perceptions explain the underlying tone of opposition to the finality of PSC decisions on the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund PSC-authorised deployments, as seen during negotiations on UNSC Resolution 2719.
The biggest avenue for PSC influence has been the A3 but it has not used it adequately in relations with UNSC
The EU’s African Peace Facility’s transformation into the global-facing European Peace Facility ― which allows the EU, in principle, to bypass the PSC to directly fund peace efforts in different countries ― raises further questions around power relations. If the PSC is to salvage itself in relations with partners, it has to establish recognition for its decisions. This will go a long way in managing the current yawning gap in power relations.
The years ahead
Given its 20-year milestone, the time is opportune to empirically assess weaknesses and strengths in PSC relations with others. This will enhance understanding and appreciation of the challenges the Council has faced in its interactions with the EU PSC and UNSC, in particular. It will also allow it to address practical operational challenges and its inability to project capacity as the basis of trust in partnerships.
In 20 years, the biggest addition to the PSC’s influence has been the A3. However, the Council’s inability to adequately use the A3 in its relations with the UNSC remains a lacuna to be bridged. Structuring its links with the A3, including considering the place of observer status of the A3 in the PSC, would boost relationships with the A3 and with the UNSC in the long term.
Steering away from partnerships in which the search for resources is the main decider is also important. It's clear that striving for funds has been an important dimension of AU partnerships. This has led the PSC and its partners into an awkward donor-recipient relationship with major implications on discussions and outcomes. Addressing this would greatly influence the nature of power relations and perceptions involving Africa’s decision-making organs.
It is crucial that the PSC becomes an independent and strong decision-maker. Partners, the African group in Europe and the A3 will then be firmly guided on continental positions they need to champion or work with in a divided UNSC. If the PSC can secure member state support for its decisions, it will not only strengthen itself but improve its working relationship with partners, particularly the UNSC.
