Have AU PSC informal consultations impacted post-coup transitions?
Despite constant informal meetings, the African Union struggles to reassert its authority in managing post-coup transitions.
During the 2019 - 2025 coup wave, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) consistently suspended defaulting member states in line with Article 30 of the AU Constitutive Act. While these suspensions closed official engagement channels, informal consultations continue, grounded in articles 25(3) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and 8(11) of the PSC Protocol.
Held mainly at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the consultations allow the PSC to maintain diplomatic ties with coup countries, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, Guinea, Sudan, Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau. The 18th round of informal discussions was held on 27 February 2026. The consultations have been used in combination with other instruments, such as the deployment of AU special envoys for good offices and PSC field visits.
Yet, transition authorities continue to show defiance or disregard for roadmaps and AU norms, questioning the effectiveness of PSC informal consultations as a post-coup transition management tool. Mali and Burkina Faso have unilaterally postponed elections scheduled by joint transition roadmaps concluded with the AU. At the same time, coup leaders ran for elections in Gabon and Guinea despite Article 25(4) of ACDEG, which prohibits their participation in elections to restore constitutional order.
The latter have regained full rights to participate in AU activities following the post-election lifting of sanctions. Some coup countries denied AU officials access to their territories, although AU visits to monitor compliance with roadmaps were discussed during meetings.
The PSC aims to provide a trustworthy platform for exchanges on transition roadmaps
Informal meetings ― initiated by the PSC in April 2023 ― have supplemented sanctions with continued diplomatic engagement. This, according to some member states and AU sources, has created space for frank discussion, enhanced collegial adoption of transition roadmaps and enabled monitoring of coup leaders’ compliance with AU norms.
The utility of PSC meetings
After good offices led by Sambo Sidikou (2021 to 2025) were stalled and field visits generated few outcomes, the PSC initiated informal post-coup meetings with Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan, the only coup countries at the time. Sixteen others followed as of December 2025. From the onset, according to diplomatic sources, the PSC clearly outlined the goals it sought to achieve with transitioning countries.
Its primary objective was to provide a trustworthy platform for exchanges on roadmaps and their challenges. Ultimately, it aimed to ensure that coup leaders comply with continental norms against unconstitutional change of government (UCG) enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act, the ACDEG, the PSC Protocol, and other instruments.
Given the PSC’s consistency and countries’ attendance, informal consultations have partially met their objectives of providing a platform for dialogue, strengthening diplomatic engagements with defaulting countries and monitoring progress and obstacles. This is significant as most countries in transition have consistently complained about not being admitted to nor heard during PSC formal sessions examining their situations.
Without coercion, the expected behavioural change among transition leaders has not materialised
Some diplomats confirmed to the Institute for Security Studies that informal meetings have enabled them to air their views and discuss stumbling blocks, which sporadic PSC field visits and discussions with special envoys do not necessarily offer.
Similarly, PSC member state representatives told the PSC Report that the approach has helped align the Council’s interventions with relevant frameworks and has effectively monitored transition roadmaps. Consultations have provided the PSC with granular data to deepen its understanding of challenges and facilitate tailored interventions.
Structural limitations
As mentioned, the approach enables monitoring of compliance with AU norms to elicit behavioural change from transition leaders, thereby making way for the transfer of power to democratically elected civilian governments. In that regard, there was a need to combine dialogue with coordinated coercive measures.
However, in the absence of coercion, the expected behavioural change has not materialised. Three elements could enhance outcomes. The first is coordinated diplomatic pressure jointly by the PSC and regional economic communities (RECs). Yet, despite o PSC liaison with countries, RECs were barely involved, impeding progress. In addition, AU and REC approaches to managing transitions are misaligned and often competitive, as seen in Niger (August and September 2023) and Sudan (since April 2023).
Sahel transition leaders insist that informal meetings should focus on security concerns rather than constitutional order
The second is upholding a collective threat of military intervention against non-compliant countries. Such a firm, unified stance from the AU and RECs would further incentivise transition leaders to roll out roadmaps as agreed and would enhance their appetite to comply with established continental anti-UCG norms. Unfortunately, consensus was not reached on AU and REC responses to military takeovers nor on managing post-coup transitions.
For instance, the Economic Community of West African States envisaged a military intervention following Niger’s 2023 coup, but the PSC did not support it. This was in addition to the misalignment of ultimatums issued by both institutions to the coup leaders to return to the barracks and restore constitutional order. A direct consequence was the erosion of the continental consensus on the UCG’s zero-tolerance policy and a fragmented approach to managing subsequent transitions.
In the absence of a solid combination between consultations and coordinated, coercive means, dialogue alone has had a limited impact on transition leaders’ behaviour. However, in Mali (2012), Burkina Faso (2015), The Gambia (2017) and Niger (2010), military threat and dialogue were effectively combined.
The third is about firmly addressing transition leaders’ disregard for decisions made in informal meetings. While ambassadors, according to diplomatic sources, consistently report on the outcomes of meetings to their capitals, recommendations for a swift return to constitutional order are not followed. This is demonstrated through repeated slippages in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and by their leaders’ restrictions on civic spaces.
The Sahel transition leaders, for example, insist that informal meetings should focus on security concerns rather than the return to constitutional order, which, in their view, will not be sustainable. Therefore, the core challenge is more about an unwillingness to comply than a disconnect with diplomatic representations in Addis Ababa, reinforcing the need for effective coercive mechanisms to back meetings.
Options for enhancement
Sources from the AU and member states maintain that the PSC could strengthen its informal meetings if accompanied by minimal pressure. This may include, in the short- and mid-term, an effective monitoring body to enforce leaders’ compliance with continental norms. The newly established PSC sanction subcommittee ― with RECs ― could fulfil this role if capacitated and equipped.
In the long run, the AU must rebuild the institutional and political consensus that helped sustain the zero-tolerance policy on UCGs from 2003 to 2019. This should be done within the AU and with RECs, given that the former’s struggles with RECs have impeded coordination.
Failing to fulfil the above requirements will lead to continued dilution of diplomatic efforts to manage post-coup transitions and to the normalisation of military takeovers ― ‘whitewashing’. As underlined by the Angolan president, outgoing chair of the AU Assembly bureau, whitewashing coups through elections and military takeovers should not be normalised. This is a serious threat to Africa’s democracy and the sustainability of AU norms.
