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The Peace and Security Council is as strong as its members allow

The PSC lacks enforcement capacity, political will and financial muscle, says Ambassador Bulus Paul Lolo, Permanent Representative to the African Union.

PSC Report sought the views of the former Nigerian ambassador to Ethiopia and former Permanent Secretary in the Nigerian Foreign Affairs Ministry on the Council’s effectiveness and efficiency.

How effective is the PSC in the light of Africa’s many challenges?

Africa faces complex, multidimensional challenges, at the heart of many of which is a crisis of governance. When governance is sound, peace and development follow, but when it is weak or self-serving, the door opens to tension, conflict and, eventually, destruction. In my view, the quality of leadership and governance is at the centre of Africa’s current predicament, directly affecting and pointing to the ineffectiveness of the PSC in implementing its mandate.

The PSC lacks three critical elements: enforcement capacity, political will and financial muscle. Without the first, the Council is unable to enforce its decisions. It makes pronouncements and issues communiqués that are not backed by action. It is like a bulldog that bares its teeth, barks loudly, but is harmless. When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threatened military intervention after the coup in Niger, it eventually backed down. This was not because the threat was unfounded but because neither ECOWAS nor the AU had the capacity or consensus to act.

Additionally, African leaders lack the political will to empower the PSC to act decisively. This is compounded by limited financial resources. These three challenges are connected and indicative of how much our leaders treasure the Council. As the saying goes, where your treasure is, there your heart will be.

Even 10% of money spent on arms would change the PSC’s capacity and decision outcomes

Is the PSC truly a priority for Africa’s leaders? It can be only as effective and impactful as its member states allow. It cannot act on its own, as the member states give it identity and strength. They must ensure that the institution is effective, relevant and responsive.

How can these issues be addressed?

The African Standby Force was to provide the capacity for collective intervention, while also being a regional mechanism for regional intervention. However, I believe it remains a concept. I am not sure whether any region currently has a fully operational, reliable and rapidly deployable standby force. Has any region deployed such a force effectively and without constraints? If not, that speaks volumes about enforcement capacity. In Mozambique, for example, the need was clear for regional or collective intervention, but we saw very little – certainly not the unified response the situation demanded.

The PSC’s political will and financial capacity issues are well known. If Africa truly values the Council, some of the money being spent on arms procurement could be redirected to preventive diplomacy. Even 10% of those resources would go a long way to change the PSC’s capacity and decision outcomes.

Leadership accountability is also essential. Many leaders manipulate systems to prolong their stay in power through flawed elections or outright constitution manipulation. But those who aspire to lead should have something meaningful to offer. Leadership must ultimately be judged by the quality of life, wellbeing and freedoms enjoyed by citizens.

Many feel that the PSC’s handling of Chad brought into question its effectiveness and neutrality, with some states describing it as problematic. How can the Council recover from what many see as a misstep?

It must have the courage and conviction to stand by its principles and defend its legal instruments. But courage alone is not enough – it must also be consistent in its decisions. In 2013, the Council faced a similar, but greater, test in Egypt. However, it did not allow Egypt’s size, standing or influence to sway it. It upheld its principles and acted decisively to suspend Egypt. That decision wasn’t universally popular but it earned internal and external respect.

I support quiet diplomacy, maintaining pressure and creating negotiation space without grandstanding

I believe the Council fell short on Chad. Perhaps it was because the chairperson of the AU Commission was from that country or perhaps it was due to external pressure. Regardless, the PSC was left to carry the shame of failing to uphold its own principles courageously and consistently. The Council appeared apologetic and to have pandered to Chad’s demands. The irony is painful, as someone who was central to an unconstitutional change of government in his country ultimately benefitted from it.

So yes, Chad was a low point. And unless the PSC returns to its principles with both courage and consistency, it will continue to carry the burden of that decision. I hope it will learn from its mistake.

The PSC lifted sanctions against Gabon after the recent elections when the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance states clearly that coupmakers should not contest elections. Yet the alternative may have pushed Gabon further away. How should such a dilemma be handled?

This is a deep and fundamental matter, demonstrating the need to re-examine how democracy is practised in Africa, its impact and what that practice actually means for its people. Had the PSC cut Gabon loose, that country might have simply moved on, just as others have done before – functioning without AU or regional support. On the other hand, lifting the suspension has set a dangerous precedent. The man who led the coup in Gabon is now its main beneficiary. The Council must be very careful and mindful of the precedents it sets.

I would not have supported lifting the suspension so soon. I believe in quiet diplomacy, maintaining pressure and creating space for negotiation without public grandstanding. Given the current political situations in some countries, deep thought is needed to devise ideas on how to deal with or resolve political challenges that may arise.

Member states serving on the Council are tending towards national interests rather than continental commitments. How should the PSC address this?

This is a dangerous trend and a slippery slope, which if not checked, will severely erode the PSC’s legitimacy. There needs to be a firm reminder that PSC membership is not a platform to promote national agendas. Yes, countries vie for Council election, but once elected, they represent Africa, not just their governments.

Ultimately, leadership must be judged by the quality of life, wellbeing and freedoms of citizens

Perhaps this reminder can come internally, through peer consultations or quiet diplomacy. It could also come from the AU Commission or external partners that are close enough to speak frankly. Whatever the mechanism, states must be reminded of the heavy responsibility of membership. Those that use their seat to block continental progress or defend narrow interests are betraying their mandate.

Some member states are pushing for a review of PSC membership: North Africa wants a third seat and others want regional powers to play bigger roles. What changes would you recommend for a reconstituted PSC?

I don’t object to North Africa having a third seat and I acknowledge that certain countries have earned reputations as regional leaders. That said, I would never support veto powers for any African country, as this would be counterproductive and deeply harmful to equity in decision-making. Still, I support a model where key players serve more regularly on the Council provided they meet clear performance expectations. Privilege must come with responsibility.

I also believe the AU Assembly must pay closer attention to those elected to the PSC. Rotation is important, but the capacity to perform must weigh equally. If a country cannot contribute meaningfully, whether due to poor engagement or representation in Addis Ababa or failure to meet its financial obligations, then perhaps it should not be on the Council.

I am open to increasing the number of seats – perhaps to 20 – but the institution should not grow so large that it becomes ineffective. It must remain able to respond quickly to emerging crises.

How do you view the growing concern about external pressure on Council members?

External pressure is real, but its impact depends on how member states respond. When I joined the PSC in 2011, I insisted that Council members own their work – drafting communiqués themselves, debating outcomes openly and collectively owning decisions. If members stand firm in unity and responsibility, they can resist external influences. But if a member state opens itself to outside forces, it must also own the consequences.

Documentation is not just archival; it is our responsibility to posterity

The PSC operates on three levels: ambassadors (daily), ministers (occasionally) and heads of state (at least annually). Yet all decisions carry equal weight under the Protocol. Those who meet most frequently – ambassadors and the Committee of Experts – must be especially aware of their responsibilities. The PSC will be only as strong, effective and credible as its members make it.

How should the PSC fulfil its mandate?

I worked extensively on its working methods and am glad that there is now a manual on these. But having a manual is not enough – new members must be oriented and supported to apply the methods consistently.

Council members must also adhere strictly to the PSC Protocol and its procedures. They must resist the temptation to leak internal deliberations, as this erodes trust and confidence, and opens the door for external manipulation. Confidentiality is crucial.

Above all is legacy. Human beings fade. How they served and what they contributed endures. Reflecting on the Egypt decision, I feel pride ― not for me, but for what we did together as a Council. Conversely, when future generations look back on the decisions on Chad or Gabon, they will remember the missed opportunities and compromises. These too become part of the legacy.

We need to improve recordkeeping and retrieval. Future scholars, policymakers and leaders must be able to examine records and understand how the PSC acted — or failed to act — in crucial moments. Documentation is not just archival; it is our responsibility to posterity. I hope the Council will continue to evolve into a respected, disciplined and courageous body that meets the expectations of the continent and of those that support the AU.

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