Strengthening cooperation between the councils
Despite promising progress, certain hurdles prevent the UNSC and PSC from realising the full potential of their relationship.
Africa accounts for more than 50% of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meetings and 70% of its resolutions. This highlights the continent’s importance in global multilateral concerns and underscores the UN’s preoccupation with the pursuit of African peace and security.
The relationship between the UNSC and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in the context of UN Charter Chapter 8 has become one of the most important partnerships. Anchored on the 2017 Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, it realises that peace and stability depend on strengthened global-continental collaboration rather than the efforts of one institution.
Sustainable peace and stability rests on strong collaboration rather than one entity’s efforts
The relationship has continued to grow on many fronts since the first joint annual consultative meeting between the two councils in 2007. Notwithstanding progress, however, policy actors on both sides acknowledge that working methods could be improved amid significant gaps. This was tabled at the joint seminar in October 2023, as part of an agenda that looked strategically at enhancing cooperation.
Taking stock
The 2017 joint framework provides for sharing information on early warning indicators, conflict prevention and management, and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Great progress has been made across technical, operational and strategic engagements.
Meetings include monthly sessions between PSC chairs and UNSC presidents, informal preparatory talks, committee working group discussions, annual joint meetings, seminars and consultations. According to the August 2024 report of the secretary-general on the UN-AU partnership, major council engagements centred on eight categories.
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PSC and UNSC talking points in 2023
Source: 2024 report of the secretary-general
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These sessions enhanced information exchange, high-level interactions between the councils and joint efforts to address African peace and security challenges. A major outcome was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023), whose process tested the relationship between the councils in diverse ways and reflected both its resilience and its limitations against demand-and-supply expectations.
Challenges and outcomes
While these achievements are commendable, three significant hurdles hinder the full potential of the councils’ partnership. The first is the nature and power imbalances between the two, given that the PSC is not comparable in power nor capacity to the UNSC. While some members of the former wish for greater power parity, UNSC and the power of its members are a notch higher, as are the politics and complications of that entity’s work.
The councils’ sessions have enhanced information exchange and joint efforts to address challenges
Second is the difference in approaches. The PSC speaks based on consensus and as a collective, while the UNSC has strong member states that make clear their individual positions. This divergence usually manifests as a mismatch in positions on certain issues.
Some AU states have been suspended by the PSC but remain UNSC members. Such differences create a diplomatic issue for the PSC in its engagement with the UNSC as the former must deal with suspended countries in New York but cannot officially do so on the continent due to their status.
Thirdly, a structure is lacking for PSC input into UNSC deliberations to ensure that Africa’s position is considered. Although this should be addressed by the PSC chair-UNSC president monthly meetings, the PSC often fails to convene early enough for its decisions to be relevant to even the A3. And, often, it does not align its calendar with the UNSC’s.
This has resulted in differences on mission leadership, as witnessed with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and with sensitive issues such as Western Sahara and Resolution 2719.
Power imbalance, different work methods and limited PSC input into UNSC deliberations remain hurdles
In the latter case, the PSC’s preference for 100% differed from the UNSC’s eventual 75% provision. When the PSC has differed with regional economic communities on issues, the UNSC has engaged with them without PSC involvement. Although engagement gains have been made, decisions often remain in statements and are not implemented.
Enhancing cooperation
Enhancing cooperation rests on increasing the frequency of interactions. Increased liaison will facilitate sustained exchange of information and support. Opportunities must be explored for joint missions to iron out positional differences on major issues through a shared understanding based on joint assessments and reporting. That will resolve the disparity sometimes characterising the relationship between the two councils, particularly on peace support operations. The PSC is sometimes invited to participate in UNSC missions as observer and not as an implementing actor.
Clear weaknesses emanate from the AU’s lack of capacity. Where the UNSC has sufficient capacity, the PSC should be supported rather than judged on its weaknesses. This could be beneficial in sequencing PSC meetings so that inputs can be submitted ahead of UNSC deliberations.
