Return to constitutional order in Guinea: a major stress test
Continued efforts to stabilise Guinea could help restore ECOWAS’s and AU’s reputation.
The adoption of a new constitution, approved by 89.39% of votes cast in the 21 September referendum, has paved the way for the presidential election on 28 December 2025. This election and the subsequent legislative and local elections are key to Guinea’s return to democracy. They will mark the end of the transition that began after the 2021 military coup in which Alpha Condé’s regime was overthrown.
Condé’s authority was contested after the adoption of a 2020 constitution that allowed him to run for a third term. Questions are being raised about the conditions in which the December election will be held and about the roles of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in managing the transition.
Unilateral transition management
In response to the 2021 coup, the AU and ECOWAS suspended Guinea from their decision-making bodies and demanded the adoption of a transition timetable. More than a year later, Guinean authorities and ECOWAS agreed on a 24-month transition beginning in December 2022, which was later extended until 2025. This timetable would enable Guinea to restore constitutional order and travel a path to stability.
The constitution adopted in September is one of 10 timetable elements that Guinea authorities deem essential for deep sociopolitical reforms. It introduces major changes to fundamental rights such as the right to petition. Furthermore, the country’s political system and institutions will streamline presidential powers. A senate will be created to introduce bicameralism and a special court of justice to hold the government criminally liable.
Stakeholders should coordinate diplomatic efforts ahead of the presidential and ensuing legislative and local polls
However, some politicians perceive these changes as disconnected from a truly inclusive process, which undermines their legitimacy. Certain members of the political class and civil society called for a boycott of the referendum, but this had limited impact as 86% of registered voters went to the polls. The detractors believed the constitutional text served more to legitimise the ruling regime’s continued leadership of the country.
Alongside concerns over delays and a lack of clarity on the transition timetable, criticisms have mounted over the unilateral conduct of the transition. These are due notably to the ban on political or civic demonstrations since May 2022, the kidnappings and disappearances of dissenting voices and a shrinking media space.
Major political parties such as the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea and the Rally of the Guinean People have been suspended within the framework of the political party evaluation process initiated by the transitional government. Against a backdrop of intraparty quarrels, this move has sparked strong reactions within the political class, which indicates that it may consolidate transitional authorities’ position ahead of elections.
Despite the AU urging the authorities to implement the agreed transition calendar and dialogue with ECOWAS, the latter appears to have little influence on the process. It imposed sanctions on the country in September 2021, which it lifted in February 2024 to revive dialogue and negotiations.
However, these initiatives have run into issues of inclusion and participation among political actors, despite ECOWAS and AU calls for an inclusive process. Establishing the ECOWAS-led committee to monitor and evaluate the timetable has remained a dead letter, even though it would not only uphold the spirit of the October 2022 agreement but build trust among political stakeholders.
Electoral process concerns
The new constitution provides for an independent technical body for electoral management comprising representatives from political parties and civil society. However, the electoral code promulgated on 27 September allows the general electoral directorate of the ministry of territorial administration and decentralisation to oversee all end-of-transition elections. This has fuelled fears of unfair polls.
Support is needed for bodies that can conduct early-warning and citizen-observation missions
Added to this are the absence of major political leaders’ from the presidential election and General Mamadi Doumbouya’s debated candidacy validated by the Supreme Court. Doumbouya has promised repeatedly that neither he nor any member of the transitional government or parliament will stand for election to end the transition. That decision violates Guinea’s transitional charter as well as ECOWAS and AU normative frameworks.
Growing support for Doumbouya’s candidacy in the election coincides with controversial provisions in the new electoral code. These provisions appear to favour the military authorities, as they require that an independent presidential candidate be endorsed by at least 30% of mayors from at least 70% of Guinea’s municipalities. Since the dissolution of municipal councils, the presidents of special delegations ― directly appointed by the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development ― have replaced the elected mayors. This raises the risk of challenges to the integrity and legitimacy of the end of the transition electoral process and of a return to constitutional order marked by political and social unrest.
A peaceful election
The current context does not favour ECOWAS, AU, United Nations and bilateral partners normative frameworks and the application of some of their political instruments. But these stakeholders must remember that the situation arose from electoral crises that brought instability in Guinea, such as in 2020. In addition to the Guinea transition monitoring mechanism requested by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September 2021, these actors should coordinate diplomatic and mediation efforts ahead of not only the presidential but also the ensuing legislative and local polls. Past lessons must be applied to break the cycle of electoral violence.
ECOWAS and the AU should continue to encourage sincere dialogue to overcome disagreements and reopen the democratic space, as recommended by the AU African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its August 2025 media release. The two bodies should remind Guinean authorities of the rules and principles for a member state. They should also encourage broader dissemination of the new electoral code to familiarise more citizens with it.
The success of the transition depends on inclusive structural reforms conducive to lasting stability
Although the authorities claim to be conducting the process in a sovereign manner, ECOWAS and the AU must secure the financial and logistical resources needed to organise the elections. This would be in line with ECOWAS calls for Guinean authorities to accelerate the establishment of a joint committee to monitor and evaluate the transition roadmap. This also aligns with the PSC’s field mission to Conakry in May to evaluate the transition, as well as with ECOWAS and AU efforts to deploy missions to assess the country’s electoral needs in April and July, respectively.
Having deployed experts to polling stations during the referendum, ECOWAS and the AU must send election observation missions to identify and report irregularities. Increased support must be provided to civil society organisations that can raise awareness and conduct early-warning and citizen-observation missions. This is essential amid weakening civic space, which encourages disinformation that could worsen divisions and sociopolitical tensions.
Pivotal moment
Supporting Guinea’s return to constitutional order represents a major test for ECOWAS and the AU as both organisations grapple with legitimacy exacerbated by the handling of coups d’état since 2020. This situation challenges their ability to uphold their own democratic principles and frameworks. The 2021 coup occurred in a context of strong popular demand against past government abuses. The success of the transition depends less on elections at its end than on inclusive structural reforms that can lay the foundations for lasting stability. Otherwise, Guinea could spiral into another cycle of institutional crises.
West Africa’s recent coups show that governance marked by patronage, corruption and authoritarianism paves the way for the next constitutional order breakdown. Thus, ECOWAS and the AU must ensure that the post-transition elected authorities are bound by the structural reforms initiated during the transition.
