No accessible meeting records: the unusual practice of the PSC
The PSC has met close to 900 times, yet it is not clear whether there are verbatim records or any official minutes of its meetings.
The African Union (AU) Peace Security Council (PSC) is the highest decision-making body of the AU on peace and security between summits of heads of state. It has met close to 900 times since its inception in 2004. Yet, while the PSC has issued communiqués or press statements on most of its meetings, it has kept neither verbatim records nor official minutes of its meetings in a consistent manner.
Although it appears that some PSC (and AU) meetings are audio-recorded, they are not transcribed. There also does not seem to be clarity as to how these recordings are stored or managed. In contrast, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, on which the PSC was modelled, keeps either minutes or verbatim records of all its meetings.
Although it appears that some PSC meetings are audio-recorded, they are not transcribed
Most PSC meetings on important peace and security issues take place in closed sessions that are typically restricted to the 15 PSC members. AU Commission officials, partner organisations or individuals may also be invited to brief the PSC. Often, invited partners are required to leave meetings after giving their input. The PSC also holds a small number of open sessions attended by non-members, partners and others.
The fact that after 15 years there are no official written records of PSC meetings – and that member states’ access to the audio recordings is unclear – creates problems for the institution and the continent as a whole. This is in terms of continuity in its work, the existence and maintenance of institutional memory, and the need to archive the history of the continent’s nerve centre for peace and security decision-making.
Possible reasons for the absence of PSC verbatim records
There are many reasons why the PSC may have decided against producing official, written, verbatim records of every meeting.
Historically, the AU, and before it the Organization of African Unity (OAU), has shown an aversion to scrutiny. This tendency is shared by member states themselves. This was even more pronounced in the earlier years of the PSC, as the AU was still transitioning from the OAU and was reluctant to invite scrutiny of its discussions and decisions.
Some have argued that not keeping verbatim records of meetings is the PSC’s attempt to prevent information from leaking and, thus, a way of keeping sensitive information classified. However, it is obvious that in order to classify information, one must possess it in the first place. Also, the AU Commission should in that case be trusted by member states to have the technical capacity to keep confidential information safe.
the AU Commission should be trusted by member states to keep confidential information safe
Insiders believe that some member states do not want scrutiny of their foreign policy choices or lack thereof, particularly their positions on sensitive issues. A PSC communiqué emanating from a meeting for which no accessible written verbatim record exists prevents non-PSC members from deducing the position of individual PSC members. It also prevents the naming and shaming of member states that have over time changed their positions on various issues or lacked clarity of policy.
In addition, it prevents the emergence of undue tensions among AU member states, as well as between AU member states and non-AU member states, that might originate from the nature of discussions and the positions of PSC member states during these discussions.
Problems with PSC’s ‘off the record’ meetings
Despite these justifications, this situation creates several serious problems.
First, it is difficult for new members to track the nature or continuity of the foreign policy positions of various countries. It is also difficult for African citizens to understand the nature of continental decision-making, the PSC’s appreciation of the challenges on the continent, and the maintenance of continuity in continental policy-making over time.
it is difficult for new members to track the nature or continuity of the foreign policy positions of various countries
While communiqués and press statements reflect the PSC’s common position on a particular issue, they are only a fraction of what can gathered from PSC discussions. For instance, they do not say how the PSC arrived at a particular conclusion and how that should inform subsequent discussions and decisions.
The nature, substance and level of engagement are completely left out when meetings are not recorded verbatim. For many new member states this can prove problematic when, for instance, the PSC has to decide on a procedural matter that a record of its past practices (which would have become customary) could quickly have helped to resolve.
Second, this potentially allows individual countries to flip-flop on decisions. In essence, as long as discussions are not recorded verbatim, PSC members are most likely not going to take responsibility for their contribution or lack thereof to a particular decision. As a result they cannot be held accountable by other AU member states and, ultimately, the African people they represent.
Voting vs. consensus in the PSC
In the absence of accessible verbatim meeting records, it is clearly impossible to track voting patterns or even attendance at the PSC.
The Protocol establishing the PSC provides that ‘each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall have one vote’ and ‘decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus’. Furthermore, if ‘consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting’.
Those with institutional memory of the PSC say it is not clear whether it has ever voted
Despite this provision, those with institutional memory of the PSC say it is not clear whether the institution has ever voted on an issue. Rather, it seems that the institution has always decided by consensus.
In fact, the practice of consensus is not just a PSC principle but an AU ‘mantra’ – with the exception of voting for the chairperson of the AU Commission and the various commissioners. Consensus as the only modus operandi, however, has its limitations.
One of the obvious challenges is that it may be time consuming. Always seeking consensus can also lead to an inability to resolve anything, especially in situations where voting is needed to arrive at a decisive action. Moreover, consensus can dilute opposite positions and favour a sterile compromise.
Ultimately, when treating the problems of the entire continent, the PSC seems to be doing so largely shielded from any outside scrutiny.
While the PSC does have a mandate to act on its own accord, it is doing so in the interest of the continent and its peoples. Short of providing accessible records to member states and ultimately making these public (depending on the nature of declassification criteria the AU uses), it should at the very least keep classified records of how it is going about its business on behalf of all Africans, for posterity.
This would be helpful for the work of the PSC itself, for its evolution and improvement as an institution and for the accountability of member states to their different constituencies.
