Extended tenures or rotational membership: the Council conundrum
Long-term Peace and Security Council membership boosts continuity and capacity but may undermine fairness, regional balance and impartiality.
The African Union (AU) PSC was modelled on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While both councils comprise 15 member states, the latter includes permanent seats with veto powers. To address this power variance and ensure a more equitable decision-making body for Africa, the PSC’s creation opted for rotational membership. Over two decades of existence, however, several states have continuously served on the PSC, leading some observers to perceive them as de-facto permanent members.
Countries that have served the most include Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt and Uganda, each of which has served five terms. Nigeria, on the other hand, has been a PSC member since the creation of the Council in 2004, essentially assuming de-facto permanence. Given the growing trend of states seeking continuous membership, a debate has emerged about the costs and benefits of regional anchor states with long terms.
PSC responsibilities
Article 5 of the PSC Protocol provides for membership to be elected ‘on the basis of equal rights’. This means that all 55 AU member states have equal rights to serve as members. However, while article 5(1) promotes inclusion and equality, article 5(2) spells out qualification criteria for all members, effectively establishing exclusion conditions.
The outcome of the 2025 PSC elections revived the debate on continuous membership of certain states
Amid the many weaknesses of most African states, the PSC Protocol can be said to contradict itself, as exclusion criteria, if followed to the letter, will shut out some countries. Over the past 20 years, however, the Council has prioritised equal representation more than capacities for membership. This brings into question whether the Council’s preferred means of determining membership is capacity or rotation.
Permanent membership debate
The PSC system allows rotational membership rather than permanent members. However, given the regional representation model, countries such as Nigeria can continue to serve on the Council as long as their regions permit. While this has sometimes ensured continuity without veto power, the long-term membership of regional anchor states presents both benefits and challenges in terms of their positions and impacts.
The outcome of the 2025 PSC elections revived the debate on continuous membership of certain states. PSC Report sources confirm that due to late application, the Central African Republic, which had sought the three-year seat for the Central Africa region, missed out to Cameroon, the region’s sole applicant. As this extended the membership of Cameroon, questions arose about the country becoming the Central African region equivalent of Nigeria.
For southern Africa, discussions centred on whether South Africa should be given three-year membership given the country’s important role in continental and regional matters. Despite a standing agreement that member states would subscribe to a single candidate based on alphabetic rotation, both Eswatini and South Africa expressed interest to the PSC secretariat and office of the legal counsel. While Eswatini was given the nod, South Africa consulted its regional counterparts to negotiate whether it could serve. This ignited informal discussions on whether equal rights to Council representation should be revisited.
Permanent membership claims
South Africa bid for a three-year seat due to its influence and contribution to regional and continental peace and security. The country is a major troop and finance contributor to both the Southern African Development Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) and previously the Southern African Mission in Mozambique. South Africa’s contribution to SAMIDRC alone was about 2 900 military personnel at a cost of R2.4 billion in 2024.
Anchor states contribute stability and continuity to the PSC, but their dominance raises concerns
The role has cost the country and its political leadership. Following the deterioration of security in eastern DRC, for example, South Africa’s political leadership has repeatedly been called on by its citizens to withdraw its troops. These calls have been rebuffed by international relations and cooperation minister Ronald Lamola, who argues that the country plays an important role in the maintenance of peace and economic stability. The strength with which South Africa has done this, compared to its regional counterparts, points to a regional hegemon capable of carrying out PSC responsibilities. Notwithstanding its status and appeal, South Africa respected the regional arrangement and ceded ground to Eswatini.
Cameroon made an equally compelling case to secure its PSC seat for 2025 to 2028. Its contribution of troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has been consistent since the force’s reactivation in 2014. At a time when Niger has suspended its participation in and Chad has threatened to withdraw from MNJTF, the continued Nigeria and Cameroon resolve to combat Boko Haram reiterates their commitment to peace and stability. The PSC decided at its 1 254th meeting in January 2025 to renew MNJTF’s mandate for another year. Thus, it can be argued that Cameroon’s presence on the PSC allows it to contribute to decision-making and implementation of decisions.
Anchor state stability
While regional anchor states contribute stability and continuity to the PSC, their dominance raises concerns, among them potential conflict between national interests and regional stability. Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, are heavily involved in regional security initiatives primarily in self-defence against threats such as Boko Haram. These efforts contribute to broader continental peace but often align with national security priorities, which may inadvertently bias PSC decision-making. Regional anchor states may sometimes also advocate policies that serve their immediate security needs rather than those of the continent.
The debate on whether certain states should be allowed continued PSC presence has gained impetus
Another issue is the disproportionate influence that long-serving states can exert on the Council’s agenda. This may lead to selective prioritisation of security issues, often sidelining domestic crises. For example, despite ongoing internal conflicts in Cameroon, the country has not been discussed meaningfully by the PSC since 2008, with the exception of cross-border migrations. Similarly, Nigeria has faced major security challenges, including human rights abuses during the #EndSARS protests in 2020. However, discussions at the PSC have focused largely on the MNJTF rather than other governance and security concerns.
Additionally, the prolonged membership of regional anchor states can create tensions. Other states may feel excluded from decision-making, leading to dissatisfaction with the rotational representation model. This can undermine regional cohesion, as smaller states may perceive the dominance of anchor states as an impediment to fair participation in the PSC. For instance, South Africa’s attempt to extend its term sparked informal debates on whether southern Africa should continue to abide by alphabetical rotation or favour member state capacity and influence in peacekeeping efforts.
Making capacity central
The debate on whether certain states should be allowed continued presence on the PSC has gained impetus. This needs to be carefully weighed against and balanced with countries’ contribution to and capacity for continental peace and security. This will bolster the strength of the PSC and advance the achievement of AU goals. As the latter prepares for an African Peace and Security Architecture review, an assessment of the Council and protocol provisions such as article 5(4) should be prioritised. By aligning membership with demonstrated capacity and commitment to peace operations, the AU can ensure that the PSC remains both representative and effective in fulfilling its mandate.
