Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin
Niger has suspended its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force, and Chad has threatened to withdraw.
Published on 27 January 2025 in
ISS Today
By
Raoul Sumo Tayo
Senior Researcher, ENACT Central Africa Organised Crime Observatory, ISS
In March 1994, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) set up the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – comprising Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, joined by Benin – to combat insecurity in the region.
The regional force symbolises LCBC member states’ ability to overcome the mistrust and friction that had characterised their bilateral relations, particularly around boundary issues. However, in the past two years, rifts have weakened the MNJTF – while the jihadist threat remains acute and demands regional, not just national, responses.
After a lacklustre first ten years, the force was reactivated in 2014 in response to the rise and spread of Boko Haram attacks. Backed by the African Union (AU), its mandate focuses on combatting Boko Haram and other terrorist groups to enable stabilisation and humanitarian operations.
The MNJTF represented a cornerstone of the holistic approach envisaged by LCBC member states
The MNJTF represented a cornerstone of the holistic peacebuilding approach envisaged by LCBC member states, who quickly understood the need to work together as a region against a transnational threat.
The force’s record since 2014 is generally encouraging, with successes achieved in halting Boko Haram’s territorial expansion. At its height, Boko Haram controlled large areas in North East Nigeria and directly threatened cities like Chad’s capital N’Djamena, Cameroon’s Far North Region capital Maroua, and southeast Niger’s Diffa.
The insurgents are currently enclaved in three main areas: Lake Chad’s islands, Cameroon’s Mandara Mountains, and Sambisa Forest in Nigeria.
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Lake Chad Basin region
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Through several operations, such as Lake Sanity, the MNJTF has regularly disrupted Boko Haram by dismantling its bases, arms caches, weapons and armour manufacturing workshops. Fighters – including commanders – have been neutralised, liberating occupied communities and enabling the seizure of military and logistical equipment.
Cross-border economic activities have largely resumed, and towns like Nigeria’s Bagakawa, Monguno, Mallam Fatori and Banki are gradually regaining their earlier dynamism.
However, Boko Haram factions have demonstrated resilience and adaptability in the face of military operations. The death of top leaders like Abubakar Shekau, the neutralisation of other senior commanders, and material losses, have weakened the group without definitively eliminating its capacity to wreak havoc. And so the threat persists.
Institute for Security Studies data shows that several deadly attacks were recorded in the last quarter of 2024 in the four Lake Chad Basin riparian countries. In Nigeria, at least 81 people died and others are missing after a 1 September attack in Mafa. In Niger, a transport vehicle ran over an improvised explosive device (IED), killing six people on 28 September.
On 28 October, Boko Haram attacked Chad’s army in Barkaram, killing over 40 soldiers. In Cameroon, an incursion into Ldamang (Mayo-Tsanaga) killed 11 people on 12 November. Daily attacks on civilians are occurring in the cross-border areas of Cameroon and Nigeria’s Borno State, along with a resurgence of IEDs and suicide bombings.
The Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum in Maiduguri this month provides the chance to consider solutions
The MNJTF has withstood Boko Haram’s attacks across the region, but is unlikely to survive a rift between the countries that contribute its troops and resources. Following Niger’s 26 July 2023 coup, the country has been in a ‘stand-down’ mode from the force. This endangers both Niger and the region, given that it is around Niger’s Baroua area that Bakura Doro, Shekau’s apparent new successor, is based.
Chad also threatened to withdraw from the force in November 2024. After the deadly October attack in Barkaram, Chad quickly launched its own Operation Haskanite to hunt down and neutralise the terrorists, but felt the other MNJTF member states should have provided more support.
These developments show the vulnerability of ad hoc security arrangements and why the current tensions between Lake Chad basin countries must be taken seriously.
At the same time, the MNJTF faces internal challenges that need attention. These include insufficient troops and equipment to deploy to islands and swamplands, and difficulties combatting IEDs and communicating effectively. Financial resources are also inadequate.
The Lake Chad Basin jihadist threat is both transnational and inter-regional, and cannot be overcome by national approaches alone. To be effective, responses must match the threat.
A weakened MNJTF would allow a resurgence of violent extremism in the region and beyond
The region should carefully examine the MNJTF’s challenges and some member states’ grievances to strengthen operations and avoid the same fate as the G5 Sahel force. The G5 Sahel was disbanded after setbacks in military cooperation between Sahel countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and France, the force’s main partner.
Unlike the G5 Sahel, which was driven by France, the MNJTF has the advantage of being run countries in the region. Although relations between Sahel countries and their neighbours remain tense, Nigeria’s recent diplomatic initiatives towards Niger and Chad should be strengthened to prevent them leaving the MNJTF.
After over a decade of relatively successful regional and multidimensional combat against Boko Haram, the LCBC member states are at a crossroads, and decisions about the future must be made.
The Fourth Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum in Maiduguri this month provides the chance to assess the MNJTF’s progress, ease hostilities and jointly consider solutions. LCBC members’ defence ministers should also meet to settle disagreements and keep the force going.
Beyond the MNJTF, countries should invest more in the LCBC’s core mission and mandate – to manage the waters sustainably and equitably, conserve the basin’s ecosystems, promote regional integration, and preserve peace and security. In short, holistic measures are needed.
Finally, more technical and financial support is needed from the international community to enhance the MNJTF’s operational and strategic capabilities. A weakened force would allow a resurgence of violent extremism in the region and beyond.
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