Chad’s election is a bellwether for the Peace and Security Council
New interventions should be sought to support Chad’s transition back to constitutional order.
On 6 May 2024, Chad will stage a presidential election to mark a return to constitutional order. The event symbolises the end of the political transition that followed the death of former president Idriss Déby in April 2021. Chad’s transition has been shrouded in a veneer of legitimacy validated by regional, continental and western actors. However, the outcome of the May election is largely considered a foregone conclusion, as transitional authorities are eligible to run. It will be a litmus test for the African Union’s (AU) approach to supporting transition on the continent.
Why Chad’s election matters
First, amid turbulent regional cross-currents, protracted civil wars in Libya and Sudan, contestations around constitutional referenda in the Central African Republic and Niger’s unconstitutional change of government (UCG) will influence Chad’s prospects for peace. Therefore, the country’s stability is paramount to stabilisation efforts in Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. Secondly, the N’Djamena election will set a benchmark for how regional and continental organisations such as the AU and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) respond to the threat of putschists as presidents. This will, in turn, set the tone for Gabon’s transition.
The election will be a litmus test for AU policymakers’ approach to supporting transition
Thirdly, Chad’s election will test the AU’s resolve to enforce the norms and principles on UCGs outlined in policy instruments such as the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This holds implications for the AU given its previous pronouncements and communiques on the Chadian transition. Therefore, in addition to domestic and cross-regional implications, Chad’s election will be a bellwether for how the AU manages myriad political transitions and will inform its response to future UCGs.
Tracing the PSC’s response
On 22 April and 11 May 2021, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened discussions on the power transfer that had taken place in Chad. After the death of Idriss Déby, the constitutional provision to allow the speaker of parliament to oversee the transition was averted and a Transitional Military Council was established, headed by Déby’s son General Mahamat Déby. After lengthy debate and amid grave concern about the military council, the PSC refrained from classifying the move as unconstitutional, enabling Chad to avoid suspension from the AU.
Recognising the serious implications of its decision, the PSC’s subsequent meetings on Chad have focused largely on means to influence its transition. Press release 1 121 and communique 1 152 urged transitional authorities not to participate in any planned elections. The importance of implementing the May 2023 Panel of the Wise’s report on Chad was emphasised. This report reiterated the AU’s position on the need to stand firm on transitional authorities’ ineligibility to take part in the elections.
Faced with a fait accompli and unable to enforce its decisions meaningfully, the PSC chose to avoid tabling and responding to the situation. Chad’s transition has not featured on the PSC agenda since May 2023 and the Council seems mute on the upcoming election. Its hesitancy to discuss the issue is premised on the recognition of the limitations imposed on it based on its previous decisions and inconsistencies.
Chad’s transition has been off the agenda since May 2023 and the Council seems mute on the election
The PSC had asked the transitional authorities to adhere to the new transition timeline, respect human rights, maintain dialogue and respect the ineligibility of transitional authorities to stand in the election. All these pleas were circumvented by officials in N’Djamena. The national dialogue extended the transitional period from an initial 18 months for two more years from April 2021 to April 2024. Other PSC decisions were simply ignored. The October 2022 events protesting the outcomes of the dialogue and the extension of the transition were met with force, resulting in scores of deaths and widespread human rights violations.
Given that the PSC did not designate the Chad situation as a UCG and still has not done so, it is now hard-pressed to apply sanctions retrospectively. This is despite the recalcitrance of military leadership to implement agreed plans. Changing the status quo would require recognising the implications of the non-suspension decision, proof of precedent and tremendous political buy-in and lobbying from PSC member states. However, despite the likelihood that Chad will remain an AU member, the PSC should explore options to redeem its past decisions and influence Chad’s post-election trajectory. This includes its threat to hold the military accountable for involvement in the election.
Moving forward
To further its PSC Protocol Article 7 mandate, the Council must work with member states to prioritise their political transitions and accompany them to full restoration of constitutional and democratic order. Evading the Chad agenda will not diminish the extent of the challenges and will continue to raise questions on the legitimacy of the PSC’s role in managing transitions. The Council will have to consider alternative measures and make clear its position on Chad without undue influence from the AU Assembly or other organs.
Evading the Chad issue will continue to raise questions on the PSC role’s legitimacy in transitions
For its May agenda, the PSC should table Chad as a country case necessitating urgent action. With the elections a foregone conclusion, the Council would be remiss not to discuss how it plans to engage Chadian authorities post-election. The election formally marks the end of Chad’s transition. It also sets the scene for and determines the extent to which the AU can provide support and oversee a meaningful change to inclusive governance, capacitated institutions and free-and-fair political debate. Furthermore, the tension observed during this election campaign could presage an equally tense post-election period.
The PSC should, therefore, continue to press Chadian officials for a post-election roadmap . This map should take stock of challenges and provide solutions and recommendations to the AU and ECCAS for their sustained support. It’s plausible that in providing electoral or post-election support that the AU risks rubberstamping Chad’s transition, but completely ignoring the process will only further weaken and undermine the Council’s position.
A session that clarifies and articulates the Council’s position, followed by a concrete and actionable communique, is an important first step. The session should investigate the October 2022 incidents. It should demand justice for the deaths, torture and unlawful detention of innocent civilians and for other abuses, including the February 2024 death of opposition leader Yaya Dillo by security forces.
A new PSC was recently constituted, making this an opportune moment for the Council to regain credibility, mend the decisions of its predecessors and recalibrate its position on Chad. However, the likelihood that the Council will remain seized of the situation is why Chad’s election will be a bellwether emphasising the legitimacy crisis of the AU in responding meaningfully to transitions on the continent.
