Inconsistencies cost the AU in Chad
Tinkering with its own rules has resulted in the African Union losing control of the transition to constitutional rule.
April 2023 marked two years of transition in Chad. Initiated after the death of then-president Idriss Déby in April 2021, the transition seeks to unite the Chadian population and restore constitutional order. The intended culmination is reconciliation, free and fair elections and the transfer of power to civilians in the near future.
Since the beginning of the transitional crisis, the African Union (AU) has adopted a rather tolerant approach to the precarious transfer of power that took place. Although it has imposed sanctions on Mali and Guinea for unconstitutional changes of government, Chad was spared.
Within AU circles, the situation in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, seems to be regarded as exceptional, due particularly to security concerns. Recognising the potential dangers of an unstable Chad, AU policy actors seem to prioritise the stability of the Sahel and Central Africa regions over Chad’s transition to constitutionalism, democracy and rule of law. However, for many actors, the situation in Chad is no less than an unconstitutional seizure of power.
The AU’s stance is thus considered by many to contradict the AU Constitutive Act, the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Lomé Declaration, which rejects such transfer of power.
This tinkering with its own rules, subsequent internal contradictions and exploitation of AU weakness in the country have landed the organisation in a delicate situation, with less and less control over the transition in Chad. Initially tipping the balance in favour of transitional authorities, the AU is now at odds on how to move forward should October 2022 inclusive national dialogue (DNIS) provisions not be respected.
Tracing AU engagement in Chad
The 993rd PSC meeting in April 2021 asked the AU Commission to constitute and send a mission including PSC members to Chad. Its mandate was to discuss the situation with transitional authorities, support the investigation into the death of Deby and assess efforts to restore constitutionalism. The communiqué released after the meeting urged Chadian defence and security forces to respect the constitutional mandate and order and expedite the return to constitutional order.
Initially favouring the transitional authorities, the AU is now at odds on how to move forward
The communiqué of the 996th PSC meeting, which examined the mission report, endorsed AU support for the transition. This support recognised the need for transitional authorities to put in place a civilian government, respect the initial 18-month period, organise national dialogue and return to constitutional order.
While the AU has been closely following the transition in Chad, the AU Commission and PSC have had their wings of influence clipped. Leveraging subsidiarity, the AU ceded responsibility to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to initiate a commission of inquiry into the October 2022 demonstrations and repression. But collaboration and cooperation between the two institutions has been lacking.
Before the bloody events of 20 October 2022, the DNIS had taken place and had extended the transition by 24 months. It also made transitional authorities eligible to contest elections. The ensuing crackdown on protesters forced several opponents into exile.
In November 2021, feeling the pressure of DNIS outcomes that were clearly at odds with AU requirements, the PSC asked the AU Commission to deploy the Panel of the Wise. Its task was to join stakeholders to gather first-hand information and brief the council before 31 March 2023. The panel undertook the mission in early-May 2023 and the council considered the mission report during its 1 152nd PSC meeting.
Faced with a fait accompli, the AU noted the transition extension. However, as reiterated by the Panel of the Wise report, it stood firm on the need for transitional authorities not to participate in the elections.
Dangers of unpredictability
AU engagement with the Chadian transition shows inconsistencies at two main levels. The first is discrepancies between AU decisions and its principles of unconstitutional transfers of power. In a report presented during the November 2022 1 121st PSC meeting, AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat called for sanctions against Chad for having bypassed almost all AU transition requirements. However, the meeting did not reach a firm decision on whether Chad ought to be sanctioned for its precarious power transfer.
Chad has circumvented all AU decisions and principles put forward to accompany the transition
Second are internal contradictions. Moussa Faki was allegedly supportive of the transition initially. However, at the opening of the national dialogue on 20 August 2022, he became more demanding and called for a readjustment to achieve the objectives set for the transition. He noted that the transition represents a historic opportunity for Chad to make a new start and should be seized wholeheartedly.
His speech was not well received in N'Djamena. Many Chadian politicians considered his stance an injunction to the transitional authorities or a questioning of their real willingness to return to constitutional order and hand over power to civilians.
These situations clearly show the inability of the AU to take a clear position, but also its failure to align the commission and the PSC. Moussa Faki, previously viewed as a loyal supporter of Déby and a defender of the transition, is now seen as its detractor.
Benefitting from competing interests
What signal could the internal contradiction of AU organs send to the transitional authorities in Chad? First, internal inconsistency and disavowal of senior Chadian officials said to have personal political ambitions are much appreciated in N’Djamena. The PSC position is also a real diplomatic victory for the authorities, which, after strong internal contestation and opposition to dialogue outcomes, have maintained good standing with the international community.
Moussa Faki, previously seen as a Déby supporter and defender of the transition, is now seen as its detractor
Moreover, since the beginning of the transition, Chad has more or less been able to bend the AU, rejecting the first special envoy appointed from the central Africa region. The country also circumvented all AU decisions and principles put forward to accompany the transition. Apart from the demand to respect the new transition duration, to respect human rights and to maintain dialogue, insistence on transitional authority ineligibility remains the AU's last firmly held position.
The transitional authorities have not announced any official intention to run in the elections. However, their eligibility has been endorsed by the inclusive and sovereign dialogue. In the 1 121st PSC meeting communiqué, the AU called for the implementation of these conclusions. Emanating from a sovereign dialogue, the recommendations hold weight and will be implemented as national law. How then can the AU guarantee the requirement’s effectiveness without clashing with those ready to do otherwise in the name of Chadian sovereignty?
What are the AU’s options?
Chad’s ongoing transition has been marked by uncertainties and foreshadows challenges ahead, especially as crucial deadlines approach. The AU must reaffirm its commitment to supporting the transitional authorities, the political class and Chadian civil society to ensure a smoother and more inclusive transition.
It is imperative for the PSC to re-evaluate the situation, clarify its position and find common ground among members on the way forward. The PSC, in collaboration with the commission, Chad’s special envoy and ECCAS, should consider deploying a goodwill mediation mission to prevent further transition challenges. Above all, the AU should seek more substantial assurances from the authorities on their eligibility, thus addressing lingering contentious issues once and for all.
Image: © Denis Sassou Gueipeur / AFP
