Can the African Union reassert authority in the Somaliland debate?
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland generated unusual cohesion in Africa and beyond, but condemnation hasn’t delivered a consensual solution.
Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland, a secessionist northern part of Somalia, set off a series of political and diplomatic shockwaves in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. In a region already facing acute tensions amid global geopolitical reconfigurations, how the African Union (AU) handles the fallout will be key.
Somalia rejected the move as an infringement on its territorial integrity. Most regional and international organisations, including the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, United Nations (UN), European Union and Arab League condemned Israel’s actions, citing violations of international law, the AU Constitutive Act and UN Charter. Some countries known for their opposition to Somaliland’s independence, such as Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, reacted similarly. Others adopted an attitude of ‘wait and see’.
For the AU, any unilateral claim of sovereignty is an irritant. Its highest decision-making body on security issues, the Peace and Security Council, strongly condemned Israel’s position, saying: ‘No actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of an AU member state.’ However, this strong wording froze the discussion without providing a solution.
Quest for independence
Somaliland’s quest for international recognition symbolises various dimensions of African post-colonial statehood. It raises questions around the criteria for sovereignty and has legal, political, geopolitical and regional implications. Somaliland gained independence from Great Britain on 26 June 1960. After Somalia secured independence from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960, the Republic of Somalia was formed as a union of former British Somaliland and Somalia Italiana. However, following the outbreak of civil war in 1969 and the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Somaliland declared independence in 1991.
Somalia rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an infringement on its territorial integrity
From a strict legal perspective, the AU often invokes the commitment of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, to the intangibility of borders inherited from colonisation. The principle of uti possidetis juris was established in 1964 in Cairo to avoid the multiplication of irredentist claims that could have destabilised newly established states. The Cairo Declaration has since been a cornerstone of the AU’s normative framework.
However, advocates of Somaliland’s independence use the same principle to justify its quest for sovereignty. The entity’s independence was achieved within the borders of British Somaliland. The decision to form a union with Somalia was its own, and, supporters say, Somaliland has the right to reverse it. The relative stability and regular alternation of power in Somaliland's elections are also cited by advocates of the country’s independence.
The threat of secession
Rather than making a legal case, the AU would be better served by advancing a political argument for the territorial integrity of its member states. That paves the way for political solutions as the preferred means of resolving internal tensions. The AU is also wary of setting a precedent that could have far-reaching consequences in the Horn of Africa, the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states.
Eritrea and South Sudan seceded from Ethiopia and Sudan in 1993 and 2011 respectively. The severe post-liberation challenges these two newly established countries face, characterised by authoritarian repression and intense internal conflict, do not serve Somaliland’s cause.
No actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of an AU state
New states in the region tend to inherit similar problems as pre-existing states. Their structural foundations were compromised long before the clamour for independence. As a result, new states fail to realise their envisioned objectives, owing to numerous factors, including the act of separation itself.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has generated unusual cohesion among regional actors and AU member states against Somaliland. This is because it stems from the actions of an external actor and violates a sacrosanct AU principle: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Complex regional dynamics
For the AU, the Somaliland question represents a particularly acute challenge: it has reiterated a normative principle in the face of a crisis, but lacks the operational means to enforce it. At a time when the AU’s peace and security framework is under review, member states should propose innovative ways to empower the AU Commission to enforce its principles.
The Somaliland question is also a reminder that, despite being deployed in Somalia since 2007, the AU allowed this issue to fester until it became vulnerable to instrumentalisation by external actors. For Somalia, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition, combined with the strong internal support it enjoys, directly undermines pan-Somalian, the country’s implicit state ideology. Somali nationalism is grounded in the irredentist idea that all Somalis should be united in a single nation, as they share a common identity, culture and language.
The pursuit of that political project led to wars in East Africa such as the Ogaden War/Ethio-Somali War with Ethiopia in the late 1970s. Over the years, Somalia has gradually abandoned its ambition of unifying Somali-inhabited territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
For Somalia, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition undermines pan-Somalian ideology
In this context, Somaliland’s entrenched secessionist project not only questions the viability of Somalia within its current borders, but challenges the foundations of pan-Somalism, an ideology grounded on contested assumptions. This failure of pan-Somalism challenges a more widespread assumption in Africa’s public debate that instability is primarily the result of arbitrarily drawn colonial borders that created artificial states with high ethnic diversity. The de facto secession of Somaliland since 1991 provides a rebuttal to this thinking, which correlates ethnic homogeneity with stability.
Empirical evidence from other parts of Africa also reveals that ethnically homogeneous societies are no less prone to violent conflict than their more heterogeneous peers. This shows that national cohesion is not just a product of demographic uniformity, but the result of state-building strategies, effective diversity management and political legitimacy.
The AU Peace and Security Council’s communiqué has frozen the discussion about Somaliland’s quest for independence. Longstanding AU efforts to stabilise Somalia must include dialogue with Somaliland. This will increaselegitimacy and prevent additional external actors from following Israel’s precedent.
