The AU's Policy on Libya Isolates it
Through its policy stance on Libya, the AU has undermined its relevance by taking a position that does not meet the popular aspirations of vast segments of the Libyan population. The AU appears to be inclined towards regime security rather than human security based on popular self-determination.
Festus B. Aboagye, Senior Research Fellow, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
Since its transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU) has declared its policy stance of non-indifference to the root causes of conflict in Africa, as opposed to the OAU's policy stance of non-interference. Informed by this strategy, the AU has been very vocal, albeit rhetorical, about finding African solutions to African problems.
Tunisia, where the Arab awakening started, was saved the impact of a violent conflict when Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his family fled the country on 14 January 2011 in the wake of the conflagration. Egypt, where the Arab awakening next took hold, was also spared a destabilising conflict when Hosni Mubarak was swept from power on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of popular protests.
While the new Tunisian authorities requested an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant on Ben Ali for illegal money trafficking, the new Egyptian authorities are doing the unimaginable to imprison and bring Mubarak (and his family) to trial for corruption and abuse of power, as well as premeditated murder of peaceful protestors.
Unlike in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi refused to leave the country, choosing rather to use military force to derail the popular protest in Libya where the train of the Arab awakening made its next stop.
But in all of these countries and scenarios, the AU had one policy template: revolving around contradictory condemnation of the excessive use of force; the need to respect and avoid further loss of life; of political stakeholders to work together towards democratic transition for the people to achieve freedom and popular aspirations denied them by autocratic rulers.
More pertinently, the uprisings in the Arab Maghreb Union region pose the greatest challenge to the legitimacy and relevance of the AU, to the achievement of peace and democracy within the continent, and to its political-diplomatic capacity to pursue and achieve the policy of non-indifference and finding African solutions to African problems.
That challenge stems in part from the fact that the continent's strong economies supporting the work and programmes of the AU are largely from the Arab Maghreb, including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
In political terms, the first setback to the AU's policy stance arguably occurred when Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, the three non-permanent rotating African members on the United Nations Security Council, voted with the P3 (France, United Kingdom and United States) and four other non-permanent members to pass Resolution 1973. Even though the resolution demands an immediate ceasefire, it also imposes a no-fly zone, and authorises 'all necessary means to protect civilians and civilian populated areas', among others.
Here the AU policy stance faces a dilemma. First, the AU has not yet fully recovered from the crack between these members and that of the Ad Hoc Committee, made up of the leaders of Mauritania (chair), Equatorial Guinea, Mali, South Africa and Uganda . In addition, however, the AU continues to emphasise a 5-point road map (based on a ceasefire, the protection of civilians, humanitarian aid, dialogue and an inclusive transitional period). Yet, the positions of members of the ad hoc Committee have also been divergent. Indeed, increasingly, more African states have come out openly in support of the departure of Gaddafi.
Externally, the AU has set itself on a collision course with its external partners, the main funders of its programmes aiming at achieving its strategic objectives. The AU's adamant policy position on mediation in Libya runs counter to that of its key partners committed to the use of military force to remove Gaddafi from power and install a new reality of popular freedom in Libya.
The AU has also undermined its relevance by taking a policy stance that does not meet the popular aspirations of vast segments of the Libyan population. The AU appears to be inclined towards regime security rather than human security based on popular self-determination.
The AU did not do itself any favour by its initial political inertia. It thus ceded any diplomatic initiative to the League of Arab States that, as far back as early March 2011, suspended Libya and sponsored Resolution 1973 (2011). By continuing to call for mediation, the AU is contradicting the Arab League and, indeed, the International Contact Group on Libya, which is now the locus of political-military-economic efforts to resolve the Libyan crisis. The AU's adamant position has made it irrelevant.
In the context of regional and legal architecture, the AU appears to have lost the moral argument as far back as February when the Security Council, in a unanimous vote by all 15 members, referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.
Is the AU paying any attention that besides the security operations to remove the Libyan leader from power, the international community has added a track-2 justice dimension? Does it take cognisance of the fact that the Prosecutor of the ICC has been categorical that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed by Gaddafi and his regime, as well as by the opposition? Is the AU also paying any attention to the declaration by one of its own key organs, the African Human and People's Rights Court, in March 2011, reiterating crimes against humanity by Gaddafi.
Perhaps, the AU is simply being oblivious of one fact, that the context of the Libyan crisis is more Arab than African. If that were the case, as it may very well be, then the AU's policy stance of finding an African solution to an African problem in Libya is flawed and futile.
As Alpha Oumar Konare, the then AU Commission chairperson, enunciated when he inaugurated that non-indifference doctrine, 'if we cannot tell the truth, we are heading for disaster'.
The AU needs to admit that Gaddafi must go. It must recognise the need to work closely with the Arab League and the International Contact Group, to find appropriate global solutions to a global problem rather than a fictitious African one.
