Sudan’s civil war exposes a paralysed multilateral system

What options remain when an array of sanctions and mediation efforts have failed to disrupt Sudan’s war machinery?

Published on 05 March 2026 in ISS Today

By

Maram Mahdi
Researcher, African Peace and Security Governance, ISS

Sudan’s civil war has unleashed devastation unprecedented in the country’s 70-year history. Nearly three years into the conflict, African and international responses, including sanctions and mediation efforts, have not halted the war’s trajectory as the opposing sides’ positions become further entrenched.

In a war that is testing conflict responses, multilateralism is not faring well.

Last week, a United Nations (UN) report determined that the Rapid Support Force’s (RSF) takeover of El-Fasher, North Darfur’s capital, contained the hallmarks of a genocide. It said civilians faced indiscriminate attacks, torture, arbitrary and extrajudicial killings, ethnically targeted killings, and gender- and conflict-related sexual violence.

The UN Security Council has sanctioned four RSF members, issuing targeted travel bans and freezing assets. Since the conflict began in April 2023, the council has sanctioned eight people responsible for fuelling the war machinery.

Sanctions have had little impact on the warring parties, who create new or more covert supply chains

Regional organisations and individual countries have also imposed sanctions. Ahead of its February Security Council presidency, the United Kingdom (UK) sanctioned both sides in the conflict, targeting RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) senior commanders suspected of supplying warfare logistics, including equipment and mercenaries. The European Union sanctioned seven RSF and SAF members.

These sanctions fall under UN Resolution 1591 (2005), passed to prevent and manage the 2003 Darfur genocide. Previous and current sanctions against individuals and entities have had little impact on the warring parties and their affiliated militias, who bypass sanctions and create new or more covert supply chains.

Other types of multilateral responses have also yielded limited results. Mediation efforts have ebbed and flowed, picking up at three points in time.

First, at the start of the conflict, the Saudi-United States (US)- led Jeddah Process produced some positive results, especially its humanitarian declaration, despite the outcomes not being implemented.

The second critical juncture came with the Quad/Quintet (US, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and recently, the UK). The balance of power within the Quad gave it leverage to pressure both warring parties, and negotiations that produced the Quad’s roadmap for peace led to some hope.

Third were the atrocities committed by the RSF in El-Fasher and the subsequent diplomatic pressure on both warring parties to commit to negotiations. El-Fasher was a turning point. It showed the brutality of an RSF administration and highlighted the inability of the SAF and its allied forces to protect citizens.

The warring parties’ focus on legitimising their administrations suggests they intend to prolong the fighting

However, the potential for peace brought by these developments has started to wane.

SAF leader Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan rejected the Quad’s peace proposal given the UAE’s dual role as conflict facilitator and funder. The future of the Quad initiative is precarious due to the growing divergence between its Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

And so, despite the indications of genocide in El-Fasher, pressure on the warring parties – especially the RSF – has dissipated as the conflict has shifted to new frontiers in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Another important reason why international responses have had little traction is that the conflict, after El-Fasher, has entered a new phase. Both sides are pursuing a two-pronged approach of active military combat, notably in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, while ensuring political and legal legitimacy through administrative control and rebuilding in their capitals, Nyala and Khartoum.

Since it retook Khartoum in April 2025, the SAF-led ‘Government of Hope’ has aimed to operationally and symbolically ensure the capital city’s status. The de facto government has promised to reconstruct schools and hospitals and improve the delivery of electricity, water and sanitation services.

Over a million people have gradually returned to Khartoum as the transitional government rolls out its campaigns. Efforts to create a legislative council indicate a push to ensure de jure and de facto status.

The RSF has attempted to rebuild in Nyala, Western Sudan, but with less success. Since the formation of the parallel government in February last year, the RSF has informally set up a few public services to win the hearts and minds of people in its territories.

Intra-Sudanese dialogues aimed at limiting societal and political fragmentation hold some promise

The warring parties’ focus on legitimising their respective administrations suggests that they intend to prolong the fighting. They show little good faith and commitment to a permanent ceasefire, reducing prospects for peace.

Other responses to the conflict include humanitarian funding, conferences and intra-Sudanese dialogues. By saving lives, humanitarian interventions aim to indirectly incentivise the RSF and SAF to continue negotiations. But achieving this outcome has been difficult. The high-stakes 15 April Berlin Conference could bring localised ceasefires and greater delivery of humanitarian aid, but would probably not unlock a national peace agreement.

The African Union’s (AU) High-Level Panel on Sudan lies dormant and needs to be reconstituted with the necessary technical expertise. Connecting the panel to the AU’s intra-Sudanese dialogues and expanded mechanism could help streamline efforts.

These dialogues hold some promise. They include civilian members of the political elite, political parties and other stakeholders and aim to limit societal and political fragmentation. They also hope to establish a common consensus that can be used in a post-war civilian-led government. The outcomes of these dialogues can be improved by the provision of technical expertise, enhanced coordination and diversity management.

Attempts to halt Sudan’s war have ramped up over the past year. And while sanctions could be extended, humanitarian pledges increased, and mediation and dialogue augmented, tangible outcomes seem to have reached their effectiveness limit.

As the global multilateral system crumbles, Sudan is another test case that exposes its paralysis. A fundamental rethink of how carrots and sticks are used is important – but perhaps more attention is needed on self-reliance and grassroots initiatives.


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