Security and Political Governance Overlooked at the Maputo SADC Summit
The consolidation of peace and security forms part of the SADC common agenda, yet security and governance issues constitute ‘high politics’ that remain invisible in the agendas of the summit.
Dimpho Motsamai, Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis, ISS Pretoria
Decisions taken at the recently concluded Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Ordinary Summit of Heads of
State and Government, held in Maputo, Mozambique from 17–18 August 2012, underline the
gradual decline in SADC’s focus on security matters in the last
three years. The policy agendas of summits are mostly tailored to achieving SADC’s
long-term goal of improving democracy,
stability and development in its member states. However, the regional
organisation’s structures continue to fail in identifying governance and
security shortcomings in the short- to medium-term institutionalisation of its
collective policy frameworks. Political tensions and what are manifesting as
potential crises of governance in SADC member states such as Angola and
Swaziland (which has yet to embark on a democratic transition) constitute ‘high
politics’ that remain invisible in the agendas of summits. SADC member states consider
state-centric economic policies and political exercises like elections as foremost
in the consolidation of democracy development and the move towards regional
integration. Indeed, political instability in the region is widely associated
with shortfalls in establishing and consolidating democratic systems and
promoting inclusivity, peace and sustainable development. However, the SADC Summit
still fails to place adequate emphasis on these crucial issues.
The SADC Summit lies at the heart of the region’s public policies.
Because it is the supreme policy and decision-making institution of SADC,
institutional decision-making is centralised in the summit. The summit is led
by a troika consisting of the outgoing, current and forthcoming chairpersons.
It meets twice a year, conventionally before 31 March each year, to focus
primarily on regional economic development issues and the SADC Programme of
Action. The second meeting of the summit is usually in August/September and is dedicated
to political matters. While the summit has an important role to play in policymaking
and mandating collective action, it equally has the power of ‘non-decision’, or
taking decisions to pursue policy implementation in certain ways. For instance,
in the past three years the decision to make a distinct separation between
political and economic integration in its summit programme and communiqués is
observable. This was the case in Windhoek, Namibia (2010);
Luanda, Angola (2011) and currently, the Maputo Summit, where the agendas mostly focused on regional economic integration and modalities for
increasing economic cooperation among the bloc’s membership. The
foregoing neglects the well-established linkages between political integration
and economic integration. This is unless SADC integration is an exception to
this rule, and its regional integration project can be successfully implemented
apolitically.
The enduring differentiation between economic and political
integration processes in the agenda of the 2012 Maputo Summit, which
sought to appraise SADC’s regional integration agenda, gives rise to three
questions. The first concerns the issues that were taken into account when
defining the scope and parameters of the evaluation itself, and the concept of
regional integration. Second, and related to the first question, is whether there
is a common understanding of what regional integration is among member states
and whether there are existing policy guidelines and agreements on what
constitutes both economic and political integration in practice. Thirdly, to
what extent are the resolutions expressed in the communiqué evidence-based?
Conceivably,
regional integration should be grounded in key SADC policy frameworks that
guide decision-making in this area. These are the Regional Indicative Strategic
Development Plan (RISDP), which provides strategic direction in the design and
formulation of SADC programmes, activities on trade, and social and economic
integration matters; and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO),
dealing with political and security co-operation. SIPO has been described as ‘an
enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda
embodied in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)’. There
is even a mooted Institutional Capacity Development Programme (ICDP) that is
expected to improve the capacity of the SADC Secretariat to more effectively
coordinate the implementation of the RISDP and SIPO. Thus logically, if
regional integration is to be assessed at summit level, both the RISDP and SIPO
matters require scrutiny. While the revised SIPO, which supersedes its 2003
expired version, is not in the public domain, it was approved by the August
2010 SADC Summit in Windhoek, Namibia. Like RISDP, it should have standards
that commit the summit to policy implementation and evaluation. Second in the
process of the appraisal would be establishing some of the identified major
threats to the implementation of the SADC integration agenda. These have been
flagged in many past and recent SADC policy documents and include, but are not
limited to, the inadequate establishment of the SADC National Committees; lack
of effective policy implementation and monitoring mechanisms (this was flagged
by South Africa in 2005 as outgoing Chair of the SADC Organ); and weak
collaboration with civil society/non-state actors in its security and
governance plans, despite highlighting the scope for such participation in the
SIPO and other documents.
The Maputo
summit communiqué legitimises SADC public policy and will have the effect of
setting policy directions between 2012–2013.
In this context, the following policy omissions and oversights are highlighted:
- The SIPO: there was no mention of the SIPO, nor how it fits
into the broader integration agenda despite its purported complementarity
to RISDP
- The SADC
Regional Early Warning System (REWS): the assertion that the region is
peaceful and stable, with the exception of Madagascar and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, leads to questions on how conflict vulnerability is
understood and assessed
- The Mediation,
Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Mechanism: established by summit in 2004 as a dispute resolution
mechanism, the status of its operationalisation could be elaborated
- The Electoral
Advisory Council (SEAC): the mention that member states adhere to the SADC
Principles Governing Democratic Elections omits the fact that the principles
are not compulsory. The SEAC, whose mandate was approved by summit in 2006, was
to facilitate the application and review of SADC principles and guidelines
governing elections
While
most of the foregoing issues are not new, they require a renewed focus by SADC
and its decision-making structures. This will also help establish the body’s
credibility in policy implementation, as it seeks to raise funds from external
sources, including its international cooperating partners (ICPs), in the
implementation of this very agenda. Lastly, and notwithstanding the well-known
challenges of collaboration, civil society organisations should be encouraged
to continuously monitor both SADC policy and implementation. It is imperative
that policy gaps do not remain solely as public problems but become central to the
future agenda of SADC.