Rooting Out Somali Piracy Starts On-Shore
The dilemma facing those trying to find a solution to piracy is that it starts on-shore. Yet the country faces limited alternatives to the significant yields of piracy. Analysts are also struggling with limited information about the country’s economic development prospects.
Annette
Leijenaar, Division Head and Timothy Walker, Consultant, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division, ISS Pretoria Office
The dilemma facing
those trying to solve piracy in Somalia is that any such efforts should start
on-shore. Yet piracy’s yields are significant and alternatives are limited. On
October 31 2011, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, United
Nations (UN) Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, summed up this dilemma
in a statement made to the United Nations Security Council: ‘The Somali
people, especially the youth, need greater incentives not to succumb to the
lure of piracy. Economic rehabilitation and creation of alternative
livelihoods, especially development and rehabilitation of coastal fisheries,
must be the centre of efforts to fight piracy. But as long as piracy is
lucrative, alternative livelihood options will be hard to sell.’
Conferences searching
for sustained and widespread solutions for Somalia such as the London
Conference that took place on 23 February, the Istanbul Conference from 31 May to
1 June and the 27 to 28 June conference in the United Arab Emirates, which
focused on “A regional response to maritime piracy: enhancing public‐private partnership and strengthening global engagement’, continue to
be faced with the dichotomy of this dilemma, namely that a simultaneous
comprehensive and coordinated effort on land and sea is required to ensure a
prosperous Somalia.
Many of Somalia’s
ruling elite and business-minded citizens are increasingly characterising the
country as being on the verge of a long-desired transition. They envision that
it will transcend the impasse of its seemingly intractable state of anarchy and
conflict and move into a position where vital development goals can be
institutionalised to create a prosperous post-conflict Somalia. Yet it is clear
that both land and sea requirements need to be met to counter piracy off the
coast of Somalia.
Presently, conflict continues
with a number of hard fought victories for the African Mission for Somalia
(AMISOM) over the extremist Al Shabaab, but it must be noted that the notion of
a functional Somali State is not founded on the assumption that the defeat of
Al Shabaab is the only prerequisite for the establishment of such a State. Currently, peace remains fragile, possibly
untenable without some drastic, far-reaching and expensive support and
development. The new Somali Government will come into effect on 20 August 2012
upon the expiration of the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) mandate. The
TFG has been plagued by alleged corruption and there is concern that the new
government will lack the expertise and skills to govern effectively and provide
efficient oversight. A substantial in-country presence of the UN and identified
international expertise is required to ensure the success of the new
government.
In addition, in order
to accomplish any development goal, substantial mapping of Somalia’s current
war economy is needed. However, information and data (barring often glowing and
inspiring media reports) is sparse, and decisions cannot be made upon this
basis. Livestock and, although controversial, coal and the local drug khat
remain Somalia’s main exports. Livestock exports in particular, constitute a
huge economic activity in the region, with the majority of exports going to
neighbouring countries and the Gulf. However, this is not an economy where
goods are formally extracted and exported, rather they take place within
established informal business networks.
According to Somali
expert Mary Harper, writing for the BBC in February, with a little
investigation into the Somali economy a positive and encouraging picture
emerges. A number of business networks
have been established, ranging from the highly successful nation-wide
telecommunications industry to the emergence of smaller scale businesses such
as fishmongers to dry cleaners thriving in the capital Mogadishu. Arguably the
most successful business enterprise is the Dahabshiil,
a money transfer company established by Somali businessman Mohamed Said Duale.
It has more than 1000 branches in 44 countries and is used by Somali’s to
transfer between $750 million to $1 billion per year. Learning lessons and best
practice from businesses such as the Dahabshiil
and the telecommunications industry will be vital for future business
development in Somalia.
Somalia remains
dependent on vast quantities of aid and resources can only realistically be
delivered via the sea through the country’s harbors. Somalia is well located in
the nexus of the Horn of Africa/Middle East/Western Indian Ocean region for
maritime trade and there is vast potential for maritime trade and
infrastructural development in its ports and harbours. The ports of Berbera in
Somaliland and Bosasso in Puntland are well situated, but are located far away
from the Somali areas most in need of aid and development. Furthermore they are
nodes in pre-existing regional and international trading networks unlinked to
Southern Somalia in which social and clan ties would prove vital for trade and
the movement of aid and resources.
The undeniably strong
pride in their autonomy amongst locals in Somaliland and Puntland points to an
uncertainty over a possible future Somali federation that could ease the
movement of goods. A shift in focus is
needed towards developing the long neglected and debilitated southern half of
the country, with ports in Mogadishu and Kismayo arguably set to attain
national, international and, indeed global significance if the government’s
sovereignty and security can be established. International investors are faced
with the dilemma that the current absence of infrastructure on land, which is a
prerequisite for maritime trade development, prevents any commercially viable
maritime trade development with Somalia, the economic risks remaining too high.
Without a certain level of security, infrastructure development will not be
viable.
Aspirations of
connecting Somalia to regional trade are admirable, but remain highly
impractical given that Somalia’s participation in trading regimes remains a
challenge as it lacks de jure
sovereignty. The sustainability of already existing and thriving businesses
outside of a State remains the surest homegrown path to fulfilling, at least
partially, the human security needs of Somalis. A number of suggestions for
economic expansion can be examined, including more aggressive investments by
regional-based partnerships to ensure accountability and transparency in
transactions; short term quick impact
projects (QIPS) through enhanced support to Somali based INGOs and NGOs; scholarship
networks with a focus on trade and skills development; improving the quality of
products already successfully exported; immediate skills support for the new government
and consideration for viable economic activities such as off-shore fishing
factories (that are properly licensed and with specific job quotas for
Somalis).
The effective combatting of piracy and armed
robbery at sea is a prerequisite for economic viable solutions on land, as well
as the development of a secure regional maritime trade. Loopholes in the
international legal and judicial system to address piracy continue to hamper
the effective combatting of this scourge. Somali based piracy came at a cost of
between US$ 6.6 and US$ 6.9 billion in 2011. This is more than 110% of the
Somali annual GDP. A total of 275 of the
439 piracy attacks in 2011 occurred off the coast of Somalia. During the first
six months of 2012, 67 attacks have been made against vessels off the coast of
Somalia. In addition 185 seafarers remain in captivity. Private Military and
Security Companies (PMSCs) that provide armed protection to vessels with great
success come at a high cost. Meanwhile the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and its five Working
Groups remain the leading international body through which a comprehensive
solution to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia can be delivered.
Recommendations that will contribute to a secure regional maritime trade
include: the CGPCS should be the focal point for new funds donated towards the
development of Somalia’s maritime security capacity; enhanced efforts to ensure
the effective implementation of the Djibouti Code in the region; the
establishment of a working group to adapt the Best Management Practices (BMP)
to address the security needs of smaller Somali vessels that are softer targets
due to size, lack of security measures as well as a lack of speed; clarification on the Rules of Engagement of
PMSCs; increased support for the establishment of a 3000 strong professional
Somalia National Coast Guard, and the establishment of a regional maritime
information centre.