Nile River Basin Commission: regional strife could make a difficult task impossible
Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam intersect with conflicts sparked by Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions.
The newly established Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) has been charged with addressing the contentious issue of the Nile River’s equitable use. However, raised geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa region will make this difficult to accomplish.
The Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) came into force on 13 October, triggering the transition from the Nile Basin Initiative to the new cooperative framework. Under this agreement, the NRBC must resolve a dispute about the use of Nile water resources within six months.
The decade-long delay in enforcing the CFA contributed to tensions between Nile Basin states and the ongoing dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The GERD disagreement has become intertwined with a separate conflict involving Ethiopia’s ambitions to establish a naval presence in the Red Sea. Both disputes are being played out in Somalia – now the epicentre of geopolitical tensions in the Horn.
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Countries with a stake in the Nile River's water resources
 Source: ISS |
Given the short timeline to address this complex issue, how will the NRBC succeed where previous multinational efforts have failed? And would resolving the conflict alleviate broader regional tensions?
The Nile River discord stems from the 1929 and 1959 treaties between Egypt and Great Britain, which granted Egypt authority over Nile waters, sidelining concerns of upstream countries. With Sudan’s support, Egypt used diplomatic pressure, military threats and persuasion to sustain this unbalanced control. Development partners frequently aligned with Egypt on Nile-related issues, advocating for consensus-based decisions on individual riparian state projects and effectively maintaining Egypt’s water veto.
This strategy initially secured Egypt’s dominance, but that position faltered in 2010 when the CFA opened for signatures. Then in 2011, Ethiopia started building the Millennium Dam, now called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), leveraging Egypt’s preoccupation with the Arab Spring.
Egypt, which experiences severe water stress and sees the Nile as crucial for its survival (see graph), and Ethiopia, which considers the dam essential for its development, have engaged in intense rhetoric and sporadic negotiations. Both countries have regularly sought diplomatic support from other Nile Basin countries.
The dispute also creates tension between Sudan and Egypt whenever Sudan seemingly supports Ethiopia’s position. Sudan’s stance on the Nile is divided. It sees the dam as a potential solution to the annual Nile flooding in Khartoum and a way to address its energy shortages. But it also wants to fulfil its obligation as a member of the Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters with Egypt.
Similarly, during the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict from 1998-2018, Eritrea used its relationship with Egypt to pressure Ethiopia. While less vocal about the Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan clashes, other Nile Basin countries expressed dissatisfaction with the colonial-era agreements by quietly signing or ratifying the CFA. South Sudan’s accession in 2024 was significant in this regard.
Multiple attempts at resolution have been undertaken, including a 2015 principles declaration, tripartite committees for intelligence, irrigation and foreign affairs, and the creation of cooperation frameworks. A three-nation summit has been held along with World Bank-facilitated discussions, technical analyses, talks within the Nile Basin Initiative, and even the United States’ involvement during Trump’s presidency. However, all these efforts suffered mediation shortcomings, notably partiality.
By 2018, GERD’s completion was inevitable, and future negotiations needed to shift to other matters, such as collaborative dam management, which Ethiopia resisted. The CFA’s enforcement gives the NRBC the responsibility to address this issue while legally distributing Nile water control among all Basin countries.
The many attempts to resolve the GERD dispute have all suffered mediation shortcomings, notably partiality
The conflict now involves Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia. It is intertwined with concerns about national sovereignty, transboundary water disputes, maritime issues on the Red Sea, historical border disputes and global interests. The Nile controversy also extends beyond differing visions of the river. It is often intensified when Basin countries grapple with internal challenges, as Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are currently.
A significant development was Ethiopia’s unexpected signing of a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland for access to the sea in exchange for formal recognition of Somaliland. While Ethiopia’s sea access claim is legitimate, its approach frustrated Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, who saw it as an aggressive move and responded with diplomatic countermeasures.
Egypt, capitalising on this rift, is now proposing that it replace Ethiopian troops in the newly established African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, a move that’s caused unease among other troop-contributing countries, and enraged Ethiopia. On 10 October, Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia’s heads of state released a joint declaration pledging to safeguard Somalia’s sovereignty, collaborate on Red Sea matters and coordinate their diplomatic endeavours.
These developments could have serious repercussions. Tension arising from Egypt’s proximity to regional conflict hotspots could lead to changes in strategies or exploitation of these conflicts by warring factions in Ethiopia, Somalia (Puntland and Somaliland) and Sudan.
The confluence of Ethiopia and Egypt’s feud in Somalia demands radical multilateral mediation
An inter-state conflict is not anticipated. But Egypt has been encircling Ethiopia – strengthening diplomatic ties with Somalia and Eritrea, implicitly supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces in their war with the Rapid Support Forces, and nurturing relations with South Sudan. This is due to Egypt’s stake in the Jonglei Canal, a water project on the White Nile that will likely offset any losses on the Blue Nile.
This situation is intensifying already fraught relations between Somalia’s federal government and federal states, and will impede efforts to combat terrorism across the region. If Ethiopia’s reputation of negotiations over GERD is any indication, this dispute is far from over.
The NRBC has inherited an already complex dispute. The intersection of the Nile waters conflict with other regional tensions means that this new body is unlikely to resolve the matter in six months. The confluence of what Ethiopia and Egypt regard as existential crises in Somalia has created region-wide uncertainty that demands radical multilateral mediation.
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