Madagascar: Ending the Status Quo
On 17 November 2010, Madagascar will be holding a referendum to decide on a new constitution that should pave the way for the transition, following a coup d’etat in this country in 2009.
David Zounmenou, senior researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria
On 17 November 2010, Madagascar will be holding a referendum to decide on a new constitution that should pave the way for the transition, following a coup d’etat in this country in 2009. One key element in the new constitution that could raise concern, in addition to the “unilateral” character of the process, is the amendment of the age requirement for presidential candidates, that is lowered to 35 years, instead of 40 in the previous constitution.
Another issue relates to the conditions under which this referendum is being held. The proposed constitution stipulates that presidential candidates must be resident in the country for at least six months prior to elections - a provision apparently aimed at barring the exiled former president Marc Ravalomanana from taking part in the process.
The holding of the referendum is the result of the national conference held in September that had brought together some 84 small political parties and members of civil society. Major political actors including former presidents Albert Zafy, Didier Rastiraka and Ravalomanana boycotted the proceedings. They insisted on the fact that the transitional government, the Haute Autorité de la Transition (HAT) has disregarded the Maputo charter and has unilaterally imposed its own plan.
It appears that their radicalism does not constitute any impediment to the regime in Antananarivo whose leaders enjoy the tacit endorsement of some external actors. Some members of the European Union are prepared to give a chance to the new plan that would see Madagascar holding a constitutional referendum (in November), municipal elections (in December) while legislative presidential elections will be held next year in March and May. The plan has not taken into account any suggestions from Maputo or Addis Ababa and has left SADC and the international mediation team divided. Meanwhile, SADC remains firm on its position to have an all-inclusive transition process based on the Maputo charter to return Madagascar to constitutional order.
The regional organisation seems to enjoy the support of the African Union and the US in this regard, while France’s approach is more pragmatic. France would like the international community to engage the current leader Rajoelina, work with the regime to implement the “home-grown initiative” and hold him accountable on the promise he made not to partake in the presidential electoral competition. The problem here is likely to come from lack of consensus on how to move the process forward and the absence of guarantees that the regime will keep its promise. If no consensus is reached between the two positions, Rajoelina is likely to take advantage of the situation and consolidate his grip on power. In these circumstances, he is assured of a favourable outcome of the various initiatives.
Indeed, there are some indications that the young leader has set the scene to remain in power for more years. The domestic environment is heavily securitised with a ban on any protest or public manifestation against the regime. To complement this control machinery, Rajoelina has also adopted “emergency measures.” Owing to the economic sanctions imposed on Madagascar, worsening economic conditions and higher unemployment rates have compelled the HAT leader to create special sales points where rice and other essential goods needed by the Malagasies are sold cheaper than their current cost. For instance rice will be sold at 500 ariarys (O,18 euro) instead of 1000 ariarys. These initiatives undertaken by the current transitional government are seen by some as an instrument used by Rajoelina to increase his popularity, just as the former president Ratsiraka did in the 1970’s.
Rajoelina is less concerned about the outcome of the referendum unless the voters’ turn out is very low, adding to the controversy of the plan. This first step and the results will define his resolve to continue undermining the mediation efforts by SADC and carry on with his auto-legitimisation process. So far, he has successfully managed to co-opt some elements of the military to accompany the controversial process. The challenge is even greater if he receives the endorsement of some external partners who recognise the results of the referendum and subsequent elections. This will not be without consequences.
Firstly, the AU and SADC will continue seeing the regime as illegitimate and consequently could maintain its suspension from the structures of both organisations. Secondly, another consequence of this unilateral process is that it simply delays the profound reforms that could help Madagascar overcome the vicious cycle of political crises that the country has become accustomed to over the past decades since its independence. One could therefore argue that since Rajoelina remains in power, and particularly given his apparent support base, he should be taken on board. However, this should be done but with in mind three imperatives:
Madagascar needs a meaningful and all-inclusive political dialogue, the country has experienced many political crises in the recent years and its citizens need to sit down to craft a new social contract based on what people want. Unilateralism will only reproduce the conditions for future crises. What is needed is a genuine political consensus building exercise, which has at its core, elements of reconciliation and national cohesion.
Institution-building appears as a critical means to stop the coming to power of individuals who would use the state to accumulate wealth at the expense of the citizens. The state in Madagascar has served to further business interests of key political actors impeding a meaningful democratisation process and a fair distribution of resources, fuelling the rise of populist leaders. Populism is a dangerous threat to good governance in an environment where people lack the minimum to survive. But unfortunately, it could be a powerful tool of social upheaval and violence inducing political mobilisations. There is a need to reemphasise that reinforcing key local, national institutions would need to feature in any plan to build effective and inclusive political system in Madagascar. Effective institutions could help minimise and manage peacefully political crises.
Finally, the reform of the security sector should also be envisaged and insisted on. The army and the security forces have become highly politicized. A careful attention to this sector will remind them of their republican duties of protecting citizens, defending the nation and not being used as political tools by opportunistic politicians to maintain power.
There are hard choices to be made if AU/SADC mediators are to remain relevant and effective in the process. The first choice would be to reconcile the divergent views on how to resolve the crisis in the best interest of the country working with the main actors in the crisis. Rajoelina seems to be working well with the home-grown approach. Perhaps there is a need to see how to bring other political actors to provide inputs into this plan and create conditions that will ensure fairness and transparency.
