Libya: the case for a negotiated solution
While the crisis in Libya continues, it is evident that the military option does not offer a solution to the Libyan crisis and that a political settlement may be the only viable way out.
Issaka K. Souaré,
Senior Researcher,
African Conflict
Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
There has been a lot of controversy about the military
operation undertaken by a coalition of mainly Western countries to implement
resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council, imposing a no-fly zone on Libya with
the aim of protecting civilians. The operations now spearhead by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has consisted not only of bombing Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi’s military positions, but also civilian installations,
including his office, and giving air cover to the rebels that are in control of
much of the eastern part of the country. Meanwhile, the African Union (AU) has
consistently called for dialogue between the parties, and has even proposed a
road map for this dialogue, which the Gaddafi regime has unconditionally accepted
while the coalition forces and the rebels have rejected it. The latter have so
far insisted on Gaddafi’s immediate departure from power as a prerequisite for
any negotiation.
The question now is whether the solution to the Libyan
imbroglio is in these military operations or in the negotiated settlement
advocated by the AU and called for by the same UN resolution.
Those favouring the military option wish to get rid of
Gaddafi and those around him and pave the way to a ‘democratic’ system that the
Libyan people deserve. They posit that stopping this will only allow Gaddafi to
gain the upper hand and possibly annihilate his opponents. They further seem to
believe that once Gaddafi is out of power, there will be peace in Libya and the
rebels will be representative of the Libyan society and establish a political
system responsive to the aspirations.
But there are at least two problems here. The first one is
that little is known about the rebels apart from the fact that they oppose
Gaddafi. The fact that they are armed, unlike other protesters, is intriguing.
Some argue that Gaddafi’s regime attacked them with merciless force, but is it
not a fact that Mubarak’s forces in Egypt killed more than 800 ‘peaceful’
protesters; Ben Ali’s more than 200 in Tunisia and that hundreds of protesters
have been killed in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen? None of those protesters took or
have taken up arms against their governments even though they do not lack
military elements that defected from their regimes.
Given that ‘regime change’ does not seem to be an end in
itself, there is no guarantee that a forceful victory of the rebels in Libya
will bring about a better political system that responds to the aspirations of
the majority of Libyans, particularly that most of the top brass of the
rebellion were dignitaries of the Gaddafi regime until recently. Did they leave
Gaddafi for tribal considerations or for bona fide concerns for democracy and
good governance?
Secondly, there is no guarantee that once Gaddafi is
deposed, there will be peace in Libya, as he has scores of supporters, not
least from his Gaddafah tribe and allies. A sort of guerrilla warfare and years
of instability is likely to ensue, which will not only destabilise Libya, but
also some of its neighbours.
In any event, air strikes cannot continue endlessly. Unless
they can kill, dislodge or arrest Gaddafi and eliminate or pacify his
supporters, coalition forces must at one point stop the airstrikes and admit
that ‘civilians are now protected’ as per the UN resolution. This leaves us
with no option but to consider the mediation approach.
It should first be noted that the reluctance of the rebels
and the coalition forces to countenance a negotiated settlement is often
predicated on two intertwined assumptions.
On the one hand, there is a purported lack of trust in
Gaddafi, ‘a man who does not keep his words’, some argue. But this argument is
yet to be backed by hard evidence. In how many instances has Gaddafi signed an
agreement with an international partner and later reneged on it? When he was
pressed over issues of supporting terrorism and having programmes of chemical
weapons, he undertook to renounce them, and handed over two Libyan nationals
over Lockerbie, which is why the West restored diplomatic relations with him
and lifted economic sanctions. Or did the West do this while still mistrusting
him over these undertakings? If so, why not now?
There is on the other hand a second issue related to
perceptions about the AU as the chief advocate for negotiations. The rebels and
many of their backers think that the AU is indebted to Gaddafi and therefore
biased in his favour. It is true that after his ‘arsonist’ years – when he was
accused of stoking rebellion in various African countries - Gaddafi has played a significant role in
African affairs, including funding many projects of the AU and providing
development assistance to many African countries. Some African leaders might be
sympathetic to him because of this; but to reduce the actions of the AU to a simple
bias for Gaddafi is very misleading.
First, Gaddafi has not always made friends within the AU and
some leaders often challenged his views, nor have all African countries
received or needed his assistance. In fact, anyone who has read the communiqué
of the 23 February meeting of the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the
strong language used in it to condemn the violence in Libya and acknowledge the
legitimacy of the Libyan people in their calls for political reforms (even
before the UN on 26 February) will realise that the AU has been very partial in
this case. Secondly, while Libya contributes 15% of the AU budget, it is not
the only country that does this; Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa also
do the same.
Thirdly, the proposal for a political solution before
military options is a consistent approach of the AU in all conflict situations
(even in Côte d’Ivoire where there was a legitimate camp and an illegitimate
one) and is the tradition in diplomacy, including in the UN Charter. This does not
mean that military action should not be taken, but only when diplomatic means
have been exhausted.
It is evident from the above that the military option does
not offer a solution to the Libyan crisis and that a political settlement may
be the only viable solution. Such a negotiation should start with no
preconditions. But what kind of acceptable settlement can there be for Libya
under the current circumstances? The AU’s road map for Libya offers a good
starting point. In addition to a ceasefire, that would allow for the protection
of civilians on both sides, the road map calls for an ‘inclusive transitional
period that would lead to political reforms that meet the aspirations of the
Libyan people’. It does not exclude the immediate departure of Gaddafi from
power, but does not make it a prerequisite for the start of the dialogue.
What this road map is proposing is what is a government of
national unity (GNU). The GNU concept has widely been criticised, particularly
in Kenya and Zimbabwe. But one should beware misleading comparisons. Whereas
the situation in these two countries was a post-election one, the situation in
Libya is a war situation. In all such situations that end through a negotiated
settlement, there has always been a sort of GNU, and that is valid anywhere in
the world. Besides, the Libyan rebels have no legitimacy by the mere fact that
they have taken up arms. In a country that has no experience in democratic
governance and which is deeply divided along tribal lines, there seems to be a
lot of wisdom in a GNU and a transitional period during which structures of a
democratic government can be put in place.
In this transitional GNU, Gaddafi or someone from his camp
could retain the presidency but with reduced powers, while the rebels appoint
the Prime Minister with large powers. The transitional period should culminate
in multiparty elections in which neither the president nor the Prime Minister
may be a candidate. There may be a specific clause stipulating that Gaddafi,
regardless of the role he plays in the transitional government, may not be a
candidate, thereby providing for his departure from power. The elections would
then be run by an impartial Commission appointed by an international contact
group, in which the AU, the UN and the Arab League play the leading role. The
commission may include foreign members to ensure impartiality and the poll
should be internationally supervised. Thus, the outcome must be accepted by all
regardless of who wins them, as he will have been the choice of the majority of
Libyan people.
