Chapo’s heavy burden: restoring Mozambique’s fractured social fabric
The new president must not only end post-electoral violence, but reverse the political and economic exclusion that fuelled it.
Daniel Chapo, Mozambique’s fifth president, inherits a nation embroiled in violent post-electoral protests that in three months have led to over 300 deaths, and destroyed businesses and social infrastructure.
The international community, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has appealed for and mobilised efforts to resolve the crisis.
But the violent demonstrations against the 9 October election results, coupled with the police’s brutal response, are not the core of Mozambique’s problems. They are merely the tip of the iceberg of a divided and intolerant society needing reconciliation.
The current crisis stems from former president Filipe Nyusi’s authoritarian rule, marked by systematic electoral fraud, the persecution and assassination of opposition leaders, and the exclusion of rival political parties and civil society from governance.
The problem is not however solely political. It is rooted in the political economy and unequal distribution of the country’s wealth. Indeed, the underlying causes of the nearly 10-year-old violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado – socio-economic inequalities, political exclusion and elite corruption – may also be driving post-electoral violence across the country’s major cities.
Social cohesion in Mozambique requires pragmatic actions including sharing power with the opposition
Political elites, who are also economic elites or closely allied with them, have neglected most of the population, especially the youth. While public school teachers endure months without salaries, students study without textbooks and doctors strike for more pay, the political class enjoys a luxurious lifestyle, distributing expensive gifts and vehicles among themselves.
This disparity has fuelled resentment among newly graduated but unemployed young people, informal traders unable to sell their goods on city pavements due to police extortion, and farmers whose lands are seized by mining companies while the government remains indifferent.
At election time in October 2024, citizens frustrated with poor governance voted overwhelmingly for the opposition presidential candidate, hoping to bring about change. But the process was neither free nor fair, with opposition votes altered in favour of the ruling party.
To make matters worse, 10 days after the elections, two opposition leaders closely associated with presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane of the PODEMOS party, were murdered in Maputo, allegedly by police operatives. Mondlane himself was deliberately targeted by riot police who fired tear gas grenades during a press conference in Maputo.
Selective assassinations of senior opposition members characterised Nyusi’s governance over the past decade, significantly contributing to the environment of mistrust that has led to the current post-electoral violence.
During widespread protests against the election results, at least 100 PODEMOS party members were shot dead, most in their own homes. There are widespread suspicions that death squads were behind these killings. In one case in Cabo Delgado, witnesses said the killers of a local opposition leader wore uniforms used by the government-supported Força Local militia.
SADC’s efforts to help resolve the post-electoral crisis must aim higher than resolving current clashes
None of these killings by police – whether of opposition leaders or civilians – have been investigated. This not only reflects the judiciary’s incapacity, but indicates that the perpetrators are shielded by those with political power.
After two months of post-election violence, Nyusi initiated a political dialogue aimed at ending the crisis. He held meetings with political party leaders, but excluded presidential runner-up Mondlane – a decision that contributed to the dialogue's failure.
Members of Parliament of the traditional opposition parties – Mozambican National Resistance and Mozambique Democratic Movement – boycotted their swearing-in ceremony on 13 January. This political protest demonstrated their rejection of the election results and the failure of Nyusi’s dialogue.
Nyusi leaves a heavy burden for his successor. Chapo’s first mission must be to rebuild the fractured social fabric. Stopping the post-electoral protests is vital, but he needs to regain the trust of Mozambicans and repair a shattered society.
In his inaugural speech, Chapo said social harmony was his priority and that dialogue with the opposition had already begun. He pledged not to rest until the country was united and cohesive, and on course to ensure the wellbeing of all.
Building social cohesion must go beyond rhetoric. It requires concrete, pragmatic actions. In Mozambique’s case, this includes sharing power with the opposition, and wealth with the broader population.
Committed diplomatic efforts are needed to persuade FRELIMO to steer the country back towards democracy
The ruling party – Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) – has governed alone since independence, systematically refusing to share power with the opposition through electoral fraud. Chapo should consider appointing ministers and other high-ranking state officials from outside his party. This would show that despite being elected through a fraudulent process, he is willing to share power.
Another challenging task for the new president lies in the economic domain. It will be necessary to reduce inequality and focus on human development rather than enriching the ruling elite. This will require investing in better education and health, and creating job opportunities for the majority who feel excluded from the country’s prosperity.
Benefits from major natural resource exploitation projects, such as rubies, natural gas and heavy mineral sands, must reach local populations. Nyusi’s failure to deliver on this resulted in mining companies’ property being attacked and vandalised during the post-election protests.
SADC’s interventions to help resolve Mozambique’s post-electoral crisis must aim higher than resolving current clashes. Committed diplomatic efforts are needed to persuade FRELIMO to steer the country back towards democracy, consider a power-sharing option and implement meaningful electoral reform.
Without profound political and societal reforms, Chapo’s efforts to quell the protests will merely postpone the problem. Political violence will resurface as soon as an opportunity arises, whether through an armed insurgency like the one in Cabo Delgado, public protests against fraudulent elections, or another event perceived as deeply unpopular.
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